The Spectrum of Inherent Value

I believe that Regan’s reasoning for the equal inherent value of humans and animals leaves room for opposing arguments. He states that those who experience life are all of equal inherent value. I would agree with him only as far as that all living things have inherent value; I would not go so far as to say that they all have equal intrinsic value or that they deserve equal rights. I see all living things as existing upon a spectrum of value—the greater the value of the organism’s community, the more rights ought to be bestowed upon it. Humans occupy a place at the furthest end of the side of greater value. My views are more Kantian, in that I believe that what gives humans more value than other creatures is a capacity that allows them, through reason and other uniquely human self-determination techniques, to sense right and wrong, and to act according to morality. No other animal possesses such a sophisticated ability to act only after consideration of the morality of its actions—they are led by instincts. This clearly separates humans from animals and other living things. The more biologically advanced or human-like qualities a group of creatures possess, the closer that group lies to humans on the spectrum.

Regan might argue that some humans lack this quality, and so according to this view, they would be of less intrinsic value. However, I would contend that humans lacking this capability still have the same inherent value as others. Members of the moral community, or humans, have duties or responsibilities to each other. Being a community member without this capacity, or being the runt of the litter, is not grounds for inequality. Group membership and birth into this community guarantee all individuals the same basic loyalties of other members, and the inability of an individual to fulfill one’s duties towards others does not mean that duties towards that individual are annulled. Membership grants each individual the same inherent value as others in the community because of the duties of community members to each other. If one has the same basic set of duties to two different entities, those two entities are of equal value. Just as the birth or adoption of a child into a family inherently brings about certain duties between the family and child, a birth into a community brings about mutual duties within the community.

Humans are members of many communities, and those closer to the individual carry more obligations—although one might choose to, one would not be obliged to take care of someone else’s ill and aging parent. One might place more personal, subjective value upon one’s family, but this is different from objective inherent value. Subjective value in this sense is value more than that which is given inherently, and it exists for the individual only from a singular position amongst the community; from an impartial bird’s eye view one can observe the spectrum of value, and all humans would still have equal objective inherent value as members of the moral community. Animals, although still a broader community of ours, are separated from us on the spectrum, as they do not share our uniquely human capacity, so our duties to them are something less than the maximum and they are not to be guaranteed the same privileges as humans. They are, however, still inherently valuable and we still have duties to them, and so any harming or killing of them ought to be thoroughly justified.