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Late Post from Wednesday night...

I found it very interesting that Rolston describes all of this scientific information about Dragonflies and their wings, and describes how beautifully complex and specially engineered they are, but then goes on to make the point that a philosopher might say that Dragonflies themselves do not value their wings because they don’t have the brain capacity to put value on anything. I disagree with anyone who might say this. While Dragonflies may not look at their wings and consciously say “I value my wings” they have a high value to the insect, because Dragonflies would not be able to survive if their wings were torn off. I agree with Rolston when he says that it is disconcerting that humans can relate human values back to biology and not much else.

I found one question Rolston proposes very interesting. He asked “Could that [those wings] be of value to the species line?” The reason I found this interesting was because I feel like the people who say that Dragonflies don’t value their wings, would be the same people that say that their wings are of value to the species line. This means that the “species line” (something that does not live or breath in and of itself) can put a value on something; but the actual being itself cannot. I have a problem with that. I don’t believe that being able to consciously put a value on something is what constitutes whether it is “of value” or not. I have never (until right now) consciously said “I value my distal radioulnar joint in my arm” but there is definitely a value to its existence.

I asked someone in class onetime whether they believed that a tree falling in the woods still makes a sound if no one is there to hear it. I completely forget why I asked that question to that person in class, but it came up in a different way in Rolston’s piece. He said that “perhaps nothing is “astounding” until a human being comes around to be astounded.” I think that that is untrue because that item or being has the ability to astound (whether it does so or not,) so it is astounding by itself. As I read on, I discovered that Rolston actually agrees with me on this point, and actually acknowledges that his critics will roll their eyes at him saying so.

Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Sept. 22 by Schweitzer, Taylor, and Goodpaster.

Comments on Hettinger

Hettinger's commentary on Rolston is something that I can for the most part agree with, but his response lacks in several categories. To begin with Hettinger does a good job questioning Rolston and showing how, in my opinion, Rolston is wrong, but Hettinger fails to offer alternative styles of thinking along with every criticism he makes. Moving on from that simple complaint, Hettinger notes if nature doesn't have intrinsic value people won't work to help it, law makers won't attempt to save it. Here I disagree. For us to say something has value we must be able to appreciate it whether it lead to something now, or it is currently happening. Whether we are meant to dominate nature is irrelevant, for human beings create the concept of value, the concept of sound, and so many more. Beautiful things in nature do not have intrinsic value, they are valued due to their beauty. Hettinger mentions something regarding the Arctic Wildlife Reserve, even something like this is set up because humans value it, not because it is intrinsically valuable. In centuries past nature was not taken care of in many ways because we did not value nature. Humans did not know the untold effects that would befall future generations. Even now some people ignore the future, but many people do realize that it is in their best interest to do something about environmental crises. Once it becomes more beneficial to save the environment than not the save the environment, it will surely happen. Not because of an intrinsic value, but because people bestow value upon the environment; if it was intrinsically valuable than something would already have been done, but people simply don't agree with that. Even the people who fight their whole lives to create sanctuaries, or keep parks open only do so because they have placed value on these things.

value

When it comes to valuing nature, I would have to agree with Hettinger rather than Rolston. While Rolston believes that everything that has a value has a “valuer,” I agree with Hettinger in that some things merely have values, and nothing that in turn values it. Rejecting that “value requires a conscious valuer,” Rolston is faithful to the belief that value needs a valuer. Countering this view, Hettinger brings forward the example of a suicidal person and food. While the food is valuable to her health and well being, she may not value the food at all. I stand by Hettinger and his opinions in opposition to Rolson, for things do not need to have someone or something to value them in order for them to be valuable. There are many people in this world who do not value love, but who benefit and value from it. You do not have to believe in something for it to be real or for it to have meaning or value. I believe that everything has a value, without humans or anyone or anything per say putting that value on it. Although there are always the bad things in life, such as suicide, death, destruction, war, sadness, I believe to at least some extent that those things have value in their own right, for they help to show us the good things in life. Without the bad we would not clearly see and understand the good. Thus everything in life has value, whether or not someone or something says it is valuable.

Intrinsic value in animals

I disagree with J. Baird Callicott (P.110) who has the idea that intrinsic value is only present when human beings are present to give something value. I believe animals can value things intrinsically, maybe not as many things as humans can.
An example of this would be the idea of alpha and beta beings. A male lion who is the leader of his pride is the number one in that group. He gets to eat first, has first choice over any female he wants to mate with. If some lion chooses to eat before him, go after the best female, or challenge his authority, he knows his own place and knows it is his right to go before him, and this other lion doing so will anger him because he knows it is his right. Same goes vice versa, the lion who is ranked lower in the pack knows his rights to do things are smaller than most. Pets valuing the presence of their owners are another example of intrinsic value. As we intrinsically value the presence of our pets because they are cute or just happy to be in the present with them, they value are presence also. Many dogs are much happier around people rather than being alone. We feed them and give them shelter, but our pure presence in a room won’t harm or help their survival, it just affects them in terms of well being.

Retracing Natures Steps for Naturalizing Values

In Holmes Rolston's examination of nature and the application or possession of value to it, he feels that "values are objective in nature" (107) and that values need to be naturalized. He finds that we run into a lot of dead ends with philosophers only reaching so far as to placing anthropic values to biotic and abiotic objects within naure. Many find that things are only valuable once humans have come upon it and found it to be useful or interesting or pleasing to us. Without a valuer, value cannot be placed...and we seem to be the only ones capable of placing value (on our level/standards). He has also pointed out that Singer finds that it is possible to hold not just an anthropogenic but "sentiogenic" position on value, stating that "animals value on their own"...but that mostly just leads to how they biologically may value another object or thing, mainly from the theory of natural selection. He acknowledges that "it is difficult to dissociate the idea of value from natural selection".
A point that may back up value beyond its services in natural selection and therefore evolution of species may be found in what happened before the natural selection started, or rather, why the natural selection occurred in the first place. We now understand that animals, and humans as well, will select for "traits" that our ancestors have found to favor our species...but what happened in the moment where the first few individuals, hundreds and thousands and millions of generations ago, decided that such a trait was favorable? Did the male peacock that hit the genetic jackpot realize that his extra extravagent plumage was going to attract a mate better than the rest? Was the female knowingly searching for such a display? Something attracted her, caught her attention...maybe it could be argued that she valued the bright colors. And not certainly in the way that we do. It was something different, unique, and did not have a biological significance yet.

"Preferences on Satisfaction" doesn't sound like "Valuing" to this Highly-conscious Human

If I understand Rolston’s argument correctly, I would disagree that there are human-independent values in nature. When he argues – or as Hettinger summarizes him as saying – that there are non-conscious valuers that exist (such as a tree valuing water even though it can’t consciously register this valuing) I think that a mistake has been made using the term value. Here it seems that he’s suggesting that the tree “values” the water or that a wolf “values” a deer in that the water and the deer are good for the animal, they are instrumental goods which contribute to some desire-satisfaction model of well-being for the tree or the wolf. It seems to me though that the wolf and the tree don’t really value the water and the deer – at least not in the sense that you could say a human being values a symphony or a kind gesture from a friend – but that they have an instinct which compels them to fulfill a desire or, in the trees case, some impulse to use a resource which is available and can contribute to the tree’s health. The distinction, I suppose, is that the act of valuing something is a conscious phenomena – something so inherently linked with a highly-functioning, conscious being that it seems unlikely to me that a majority of creatures on the Earth really have this special capacity. This, of course, is one kind of support for the subjectivist view that without conscious valuers no value can really exist. This isn’t to say that I think nature has no value, but that any value is does have has to be anthropogenic – value ascribed to nature (and I think that nature does have value, it just simply does not stem from nature) has humanity as the valuing subject. There is, of course, the possibility that an animal out there is both highly conscious and highly instinctual (maybe certain primates, etc.) and so I can’t simply base whether or not an animal can value something on whether it has instincts or not, but it still seems unlikely to me that any species other than humans has the intellectual capability to value something (in my sense of the word). There are probably huge holes in what I’ve argued that I can’t see, so I’ll have to wait until tomorrow for someone to persuade me that the subjectivist view is wrong.

Naturalizing Values: Organisms and Species: by Holmes Rolsten, III

In his article, Rolston claims that many philosophers seem unable to separate humans from the rest of nature in such a way that any component of nature can have any intrinsic value on its own without this value being bestowed upon it by humans. Whether or not this statement is true, it is based on the belief that intrinsic value can be placed upon an object or living thing by a human or other being. This seems to contradict what I understand to be the meaning of intrinsic value: value that something possesses in itself or for its own sake, independently of anyone's opinion or judgment. If something or someone can bestow intrinsic value upon something else, how can this value even be considered intrinsic following that definition?
Rolston's claim that there is non-anthropogenic intrinsic value in nature seems redundant to me. If intrinsic value exists independently of anyone's beliefs or opinions, I would expect that intrinsic value is always non-anthropogenic. Rolston might reply to this by stating that one can give something intrinsic value if one believes it to be valuable for its own sake and not in an instrumental way. However, if a person decides that something has intrinsic value, there has to be some characteristic of this "intrinsically valuable" thing that this person likes or values himself/herself, even if this characteristic does not directly benefit the person. In other words, there has to be some particular reason why a person would deem something intrinsically valuable; no one would argue that something has intrinsic value unless this thing benefited or brought pleasure to that person in some way. When a person bestows value upon something, this value cannot be intrinsic since it is based on the person's opinion of that thing and is therefore dependent on someone's opinion or judgment.

Naturalizing Values by Rolston

In Rolston’s piece he challenges what seem to be science, ethics/values and religion/ creation. He shows that humans can assign intrinsic value to the non-human world directly. He also describes how values are merely for human needs and desires. (Who are we to determine what had value?) Rolston dismisses this idea because disallows assigning value to anything natural or non-human. Rolston presents four positions occupied by those who discuss value in nature. He says there is the (1) anthropocentric value, in which case only human beings have intrinsic value, (2) the sentience-centered value which describes that only sentient things have intrinsic value, (3) anthropogenic values in which only humans can generate intrinsic values, and ascribe it to some non-sentient things, and lastly (4) the Anthropogenic values in nature which makes intrinsic values independent of humans. It was tough for me to understand exactly which value Rolston was taking on as his argument. I do know he would not choose number one or two, so it seems to be some variant of three and four.

I agree with Rolston when he mentions to non-human things acting as if they value things (such as the bat valuing her young and the flies), and nature in general always seems to be striving towards achieving things (through natural selection). There is no reason why we should not consider this valuing. Therefore, there is no reason why we should not consider that this valuing leads to intrinsic value.

Equal value appointed to all environmental factors

Rolston provides a concise and correct definition of value from a biological standpoint. Rolston’s first point states the complexity of systems developed in nature are ignored by humans because the processes take place on a sub-microscopic level. Since the organization and sophistication of evolutionary pathways within an insect are hard to observe, humans give insects little value, but really are these insects so invaluable to the ecosystem that humans can disregard their right to life? Insects have graced this earth for the better part of 5 million years. If these “pests” were of such low value to their environment then why has nature neglected to exterminate them? The problem of humans assigning the “value of the species” leaves much room for debate. When we assign this value we tend to look at the intrinsic value the organism has upon our immediate pleasures. However we falter in recognizing the real worth of the individual for the biosphere and ecosystem as a whole. Unfortunately, I must disagree with Rolston that abiotic factors of the environment are only valuable when an organism needs them. Every molecule or nutrient that is used in the process of life is constantly being cycled, from the oxygen cycle, to the nitrogen cycle, and even the phosphorous cycle. Microbes are responsible for much of the renewal of our waste products, and thus without them, humans and animals alike would soon deplete the environment of these key nutrients. Thus, value should be placed on all aspects of life, even those abiotic: dirt, the air we breathe, the water we drink, etc. Here insects will be employed to prove their “value.” Dung beetles take balls of manure under the ground to nest but inadvertently take the nitrogen that is contained in the waste. Without being buried, the nitrogen will form N2 and float into the atmosphere. Only when nitrogen-fixing bacteria, in the roots of legumes, fixate N2 will this nitrogen source be reintroduced to the lithosphere. This saves farmers an average of $6 billion annually in the US. Rolston therefore is supported not only in his assessment of value but also backed by economical worth of less valued species.

Natures Intrinsic Value

I too agree with Rolston's idea that nature has intrinsic value. I think that he does an excellent, albeit complicated, job of explaining why. I feel that nature has value all its own, devoid of the instrumental value that humankind places on it. Yet, there are a few points that caused me to question his ideas.
One was the cohesion of the idea that value is in place even when the subject is unaware of that value. The wolf that values her young was one example. Or the value she places on deer that she can hunt and use for sustenance was another. I don't know if there is any real value from the perspective of the wolf, at least not in the way we humans use the term. She would seek out food or naturally care for her young, yes, but to say that she values them I believe is incorrect. They are of value to her, but she cannot place any such value on them herself. If we go by this, then how can we accurately be using the term "value"?
He talks about the dragonfly's wings and how they are of value to the dragonfly. I think that this is true also, but I doubt that the dragonfly itself values the wings. We as cognitive beings can understand that they hold value for the creature, but what does it mean if the creature which we are focusing on does not or rather, cannot comprehend that value? The value is only coming from us as the observers placing it there, even if it is not valuable to us. Therefore I'm not sure if the term value is the correct one in the sense we commonly use.
Another problem toward the end of the reading was the idea that things in nature only have value if there is "positive creativity". He used the example of Jupiter and stated that it had no intrinsic value because it lacked this "postitive creativity". I would argue against this point for the fact that Jupiter still holds value. Entertain the notion that on one of Jupiter's moons, say Europa, primitive life may exist. Does Jupiter not hold any value for this life? While there is no "positive creativity" on Jupiter itself, the value is in it's existence for the possible life on it's moon. If it was not for the existence of Jupiter, the moon would not be orbiting it and therefore no life could exist. I suppose we could say that Jupiter is instrumentally good to the life but then is the wing of the dragonfly also instrumental to the dragonfly?
Nonetheless, I like the idea of there being an intrinsic value in the natural world and appreciate the insights that Rolston puts forth.

Valuable - Being able to value, or having value?

My first major concern with Rolston’s piece is that he bases most of his article on the idea that something is not valuable if it is not able to value other things. One of his statements where he says this is, “Animals are valuable, able to value things in their world.” So, animals are valuable; does that mean we must see them as having their own value, or does it simply mean what he said, that they are able to value things? The point is that being valuable, or having value, I think are two different things if you use his definition of valuable. And that is where I think Rolstein’s piece fell apart. I think he is essentially trying to prove that things have value on their own, not because humans give them value. Simple enough. However he then goes on to confuse the issue and say that the reason animals are valuable (they should have value of their own) is because they can value other things. That’s where he lost me. I actually hated this idea and thought he was going off on a limb and pulling some idea out of nowhere. I still think they are two different things. For something to hold its own value, and for something to be able to value other things, are two separate things. Yet he is trying to say that they both are what makes something valuable. I agree with the first one, but not the second.
I think animals and plants have value because they have characteristics and ability’s that are unique to themselves or to their species, and with these unique abilities are able to survive and prosper in this world. That is why I believe they have value. Not because I say that they are valuable, or because they are able to value other things, but because they, themselves have characteristics that make them valuable to themselves. He touched on this topic and in that I agree with Rolston but I strongly disagree with his ideas of animals and plant valuing other things is what gives the animal or plant itself value. In the Hettinger piece points out that just because something is good for a being does not imply that the being values it. We have no idea of the feelings of value that animals or plants have. I don’t think a tree values water, even if we are talking about unconsciously valuing the water. On the contrary, I think that the water is good for the tree in that it keeps it alive and living so that it can make new trees; and that fact is what makes the tree valuable. It is able to take other parts of nature, while maybe not valuing it, and use it to continue its lifecycle. It is continuing a species that is of some importance, or else natural selection would have made it go extinct, and that in itself makes the tree valuable.

Laziness of outlook and and reliance on culture does not excuse anyone

Rolston's piece deals with the debate of whether something in nature can have value if no human is there to acknowledge and appreciate it. It seems that any attempt to get people to value animals or nature doesnt just involve giving them a plausible reason to value non humans (stemming off a "Do it because it seems right"). There is this necessity for an overt justification. People have reached a point where proof is required because the technological advances of the time alomost promise an answer to everything. If the answer can't be found it is being worked on and people will wait for it. People expect the easy way out of "Until its a 100% certainty, nothing should be done". That answer can never be provided in this long standing question of whether valur extends to non humans. People are waiting on an answer that will never come. They have become reliant on a lifestyle that allows them to ignore issues that science/technology doesnt have an answer to. Assimilation into one's culture does not excuse anyone from looking deeper and sometines doing things just on the offchance that it is true or that it is morally right.

Plus people don't care about what doesnt seem to directly affect them. Why care about a tree...it won't affect me." Rolston points out that people are always on different wave lengths and have different moral standards and that this will always be an issue but that doesnt mean that nature can be abused while people debate. He also states that having the logic that because nature doesnt seem to have OBVIOUS value that makes it ok to decide it doesnt. He admits that there is no way he can say the value is there, but there is no way to say, beyond a reason of doubt, that value is not there.

Back on track now. Rolston makes a compelling argument on why humans should believe that the value is there even if a human isn't there to witness and aprreciate it. He delves into the immune system and its intelligence, defenses, and "memory". The immune system fights and protects an organismic self. This is all happening with or without human acknowledgment. This point seems extremely valid in such am argument. And an immune has value. Without it, life would cease (Im not saying that all life would cease). There is value in the mere fact that it is a partner in the continuation of life. It has value in its usefulness, whether or not people see it.


There is also the mention of the fact that animals defend themselves becuase there is a "somebody" there behind the fur. They defend their lives because they mean to preserve it to keep living. This desire to keep on living means that they warrant the respect of other life (which also seeks to keep living, none more so decidedly than humans) to see value in that beings life. If they want to preserve it, we have no reason to say that it shouldnt be preserved just because it has no value. Seeing the value isn't the issue, saying it doesnt have any and acting on that stance is the problem because they are fighting for their life.

I strongly support his theory that humans are incapable of seeing the value because it is biological and humans have a reliance on experientially based value ("blinders"). The obvious, of course, escapes us. This goes back to my theory on people's excuse of their culture (technology and such). "If its not obvious, then it cant be there" is the mentality at hand. Experiance is necessary. People refuse to break through the box they stay in that allows them to hide away from feeling guilty or having to care about things that are not certainties which justify being cared about.

Rolston does say that more evaluation is needed before saying that there is value, which kind of seems to be an insult to his own efforts to see value even if it is not obvious or not real just because it MAY be. He's now saying that more needs to be done, research wise, before any efforts are taken or decisions made. I believe that value should be awarded to nature just in case so i disagree with this. One other reason why i disagree is because no sure answer can ever be found so they will be wasting time that nature could be being preserved and helped by sitting around debating and talking when action could be taken to prevent the loss of nature. By time they decide nature will be destroyed regardless....and then what happens if it turns out there was value in everything.

He proceeds to confuse and offend his own logic by saying that if more debating is not done then we will fall into the "naturalistic fallacy" of giving value to it all because we "ought" to. Why not! It is not fair to deny that "ought to" to anything. We are assuming an authority that is not ours to have, hold and act on.

Value being at a biological level and not an obvious one doesnt make it unimportant. Faith is had without proof or visual aid. This is the same thing.

He ends with a great statement of the importance of throwing away this attitude of of seeing humans as absoluts and only seeing value in everything as it benefits us, directly or indirectly. This is a hazardous reasoning because it is an assumption of authority, a disregard for the world around us and is leading to nothing good for the future of mankind. It will only get worse. Nature doesnt't stand a chance if it is appreciated and treated in a way reflective of what it does for humanity.

Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Sept. 17 by Rolston and Hettinger.

Regan's Understanding of Utilitarianism is Whack.

One of Regan's arguments is that utilitarianism is an invalid theory to approaching morality. He explains how he sees utilitarianism: that it seeks to validate choices that will bring the most benefit for the most number of individuals. While it is true that utilitarianism seeks to benefit the most, it does not allow for the benefits to be accumulated at the costs of other's lives.

Regan uses an analogy of a cranky, rich aunt that he wishes to murder in order to spread her wealth to charity. He argues that this would be acceptable to utiliarians. I beg to differ. In my understanding of utilitarianism, primarily provided by Peter Singer in his earlier piece, murdering someone in exchange for other's benefits is impermissible. Singer's whole presentation of utilitarianism was based on his attempt to liberate animals from the very things Regan seeks to protect them from: consumption, testing and abuse. Singer is appalled by the consumption of animal flesh. It would seem that he would still be against the death of one cow for the sake of fifty humans.

Regan attempts to reduce utilitarianism to a cold calculation of numbers. Whatever benefits the most individuals should be the right choice, period. However, utilitarianism is not that simple. It accounts for the fact that an action will make an individual suffer more than it will benefit another individual. For Singer, the ultimate interest for an individual is life. Hence, he does not approve of killing one cow to feed fifty people. Therefore, regardless of how many people can be helped by the murder of the rich aunt, it is morally impermissible because it takes away the aunt's most important interest for lesser interests of others. Thus I find Regan’s critique of utilitarianism weak.

moderate animal rights position

Tom Regan expresses his very radical view of the moral standing that we should extend to animals in our ethics and treatment towards them. This animal ethic derives from the idea that moral standing should be acknowledged in all “subjects of a life.”
For Regan, all entities that are considered “subjects of a life” possess “inherent value.” This then means that all who have inherent value have it equally whether they are humans or not. Thus, Regan suggests that there are moral limits to what how we treat a subject of a life with this inherent value. Reason, as humans possess this characteristic, then compels us to recognize the equal and inherent value of these animals. And with this in mind, their equal right must be treated with respect as well.
I agree that there should be a level of respect for these subjects of life; this ethic resolves the notion of cruelty such that a concept that a good end doesn’t justify evil means (in regards to implications for animal cruelty and our current US commercial animal agriculture). Moreover, I agree that there is a level of inherent value in animals that should help facilitate our reasoning that should compel us to recognize and support animal kindness as a respect factor.
However, like Warren, I do not believe that inherent value on its own is a strong enough case for animal rights. Animals, plants and the forest can all be considered subjects of life that have inherent value. However, the most important thing to recognize is that none of them have moral rights. Rationality, in congruence with morality and reasoning, provide a much stronger argument for the ethics of treatment that should be applied to animals. We, as humans, have moral right to sentient beings that we should not inflict pain on sentient beings without compelling reason. Now, I understand that “compelling reason” is a very broad and abstract notion; however, so is Regan’s idea of inherent value.
For clarification, let’s describe a situation. For example, imagine that I had to kill a hundred chickens to test a new drug and could save millions of lives by finding a cure for cancer. Personally, I feel that maximizing the good while keeping human dignity and striving for respect for all involved (humans and non-humans), is the most practical animal rights ethic possible. This then would contest Regan’s argument that there are moral limits to what one can do to a being with inherent value, despite these overall consequences or benefits. He claims that there are moral limits, as these beings have “rights” and are possessed by all creatures who are subjects of a life.
I wholeheartedly agree that pointless cruelty to animals is morally wrong, as we have ability to reason and to understand and comprehend the notion that we should be striving for respect (as much as possible) for all while additionally not infringing on human dignity. We should eliminate the unnecessary suffering of animals, especially suffering that does not lead to the satisfaction of any “important” human needs (cure for cancer, food, etc). I feel that it should be morally permissible to use animals to satisfy important human interests and needs.
In conclusion, human beings belong to one biological species and animals belong to another biological species. Thus we have the ability to reason and understand (unlike animals) while acting and striving for respect for inherent value without infringing on human dignity. Therefore, my belief and ethic lies more congruent with Warren’s weak animal rights position rather than Regan’s “Radical Egalitarian Case for Animal Rights.”

Inherent value?

Regan claims that both humans and animals are “subjects of a life with inherent value.” To refute the claim that animals do not have as much value as humans because they lack reason and intellect, he states that because we do not view a retarded child or mentally deranged individual as having less inherent value than the rest of humanity we cannot say that animals have less value. This is not a very convincing argument. I don’t see how it follows that because we view the mentally handicapped as having inherent value, animals must have inherent value. Regardless, to refute his point, both a retarded child and a mentally deranged person are capable of language and learning. They may not be able to work out complex intellectual problems but they can understand basic issues of right and wrong and can probably follow basic logic. This is not something that animals are capable of. They cannot make even a basic moral choice.

Regan may refute the above argument by asking about those who are brain dead or severely mentally retarded. These individuals cannot reason and often struggle to communicate, yet we generally view them as having inherent value. It is true that these individuals are not deemed useless or treated cruelly despite the fact that they cannot contribute anything to the world or fend for themselves. However, most of their value as beings comes from those who care about them (i.e. parents, siblings, etc). Without the familial connection to moral, reasonable, intellectual beings these severely impaired individuals would not survive. Animals in the wild would not provide the same support for their fellow animals that have defects or handicaps. These animals are left to fend for themselves. Overall, many mentally disabled individuals maintain the capacity to reason and those who do not generally have less inherent value than other humans and are not good benchmarks by which to assess animals’ inherent value.

Where do we Draw the Line?

Tom Regan claims that all mature mammals are sentient beings that are “subjects- of –a- life” meaning that they are not only living beings, but also have memories, emotions, and some degree of self-awareness. Their lives can be altered for better or worse and this entitles them to rights equal to a human’s. He argues that all subjects of life (i.e. humans and mammals) have an inherent value which obligates us to morally consider them. so. Mary Warren proposes a different form of animal rights and critiques Regan’s idea. She seems to take the greatest issue with his argument that animals deserve equal rights due to their inherent value. Regan gives a detailed description of what inherent value is not, but he never fully articulates what it is and where it comes from. I agree with Warren in that Regan does not adequately support this part of his argument, but my greatest issue with Regan is akin to Warren’s second criticism, which questions where we draw the line in determining what beings have moral status and which do not? Warren says that the reason that defining which animals fit into this category is such a problem is because there is no way to tell for sure which animals have the intellect necessary to fit the criteria. Regan suggests that it is all mammals, but Warren points out that “some birds appear to be just as mentally sophisticated as most mammals” (93). Yet under Regan’s idea of animal rights, these complex creatures are given no inherent value or moral status. I agree strongly that this is a fatal flaw in Regan’s proposal because it disregards some animals, which under his definition “subjects-of-life”, should be given rights. There is, however, another fundamental issue in regards to determining which animals should be given rights and that is who has the authority to make this decision? Do we rely on someone who is an expert in animal behavior and cognitive ability or do we rely on a philosopher who knows a great deal about the human condition but little about the animal one? Deciding what level of intelligence deems an animal worthy of moral status is extremely complicated and subjective. It is far better to assign some moral status to all living beings and then rank their moral status based on intelligence and likeness to humans in behavior and self-awareness. In this model, all living beings have some value, but some simply have more than others based on cognitive ability and relationship to humans. Value being given to all animals would ensure that they would no longer be regarded as things to which we may do as we please, but as living beings that deserve our careful consideration.

Regan’s Philosophy is Beneficial to the Developed World

I sympathize with Regan’s desire to eliminate all society-condoned animal-exploitation because I agree with his algebraic take on the equality between animals and humans, and its utility to our country’s environment.

In opposition to Warren’s criticism of Regan’s notion of inherent value, I am in support of his concept. I consider it a variable representing the base similarity between animals and humans that allow them to be equal. Whether or not there is a scientific, spiritual, or religious view to confirm or deny the idea, it is still there, and can be utilized to construct system of human-animal equality.

A grey area of Regan’s argument are the benefits to our country’s environment from the banning of factory farms, specifically the reduction of resources used to feed the animals, and the waste and pollution caused by the factory farms. But, since all animal-exploitation is banned, there are no kitschy “family farms”, where the idea goes that animals are necessary for a farm environment to prosper. Where does Regan draw the line on how humans interact with animals? If a chicken dies on a farm, can a human eat it?

I wonder how people who really like meat would feel about a law that would completely take away their freedom to eat it. Meat eating is so integral to American culture, that the idea of it being banned much like racism, is extremely radical. Regan implies that such change would be spun from a nation-wide belief change that animals shouldn’t suffer. It seems readily apparent that unless such a giant wave of changed perception were to occur, the opposition from our habits, and our country’s corporation would squash any small uprising in terms of animal rights.

Upon reading the article on animal rights by Tom Regan I found that although his intentions are well aimed, his argument is fundamentally flawed as well as practically irrational. His argument for an equal level of instrinsic value between humans and non human animals rests on what I believe to be a faulty premise. He says that everyone has equal intrinsic value for being a sentient being. He goes on further to rightfully say that animals are sentient beings as well. While it is easy to concede that fact, what is more difficult and largely unexplored by Regan is the value we place of a volitional consciousness. In my view, what gives the human species a morally superior position to non human animals is their ability to reason. Since we are able to think on a higher philosophic level and contemplate our decisions and their ethical repercussions, we possess a distinguishing characteristic. Regan himself raises the question but in his attempts to extinguish its validity he gives a terribly irrational association. He attempts to make his point by noting the rationality we apply in taking care of an infant or a mentally challenged person. Although they are humans, in their state they do not have the ability to reason and use their mental faculties like the rest of the species. What is troubling to me is that he cites infants. Although in their infantile state they are unable to reason on a naturally superior level than that of other non human animals, they more often than not possess the ability to one day acquire that ability. Although his arugment is based on a negative philosophic argument, he is also unable to address the many problems his dream world would possess.
If commercial fishing and other food producers were unable to do what they do to the extent that they do it than the fall out would be catastrophic. Yes the commercial fishing and cattle raising practices pose a threat to local and even the global environment, but what were to happen if they were altogether stopped. Aside from some very angry Texans and new Englanders we would see price of food skyrocket with a shortage in supply and an increasing demand for a global population heading through the roof. Getting rid of the system would create a situation that would pose immediate threats to the nourishment of people all over the world. I think that the approach of Warren is more feasible and serves to promote a similar aim of Regan. We see the application of such environmentally friendly commercial fishing boats that have welcomed scientists on board to help reduce the amount of undesirable fish ending up in their nets. By studying the fish and their reactions to the looming mouth of a predator (the net), they noticed that by placing a black funnel around the head of the nets catch it caused the undesirable fish to swim at a higher depth and therefore out of the nets catch. Such examples like this can help to serve the fish populations but more broadly this represents what continuing to fish on a larger scale can help maintain price as well as help understand and improve the conditions of a previously unaltered system. We value the animal for what they provide us and in doing so we can slowly come closer to a more perfect existence between all other animals.

Complacent Ignorance in the topic of Carnivorism

I feel that the manner in which Davis Wallace avoidance of the issue of whether or not there is a moral defense in favor of eating meat. I too consume meat because it is something that I enjoy. To me it seems that meat is a part of American culture (and more generally a culture of affluence), personally I was raised to eat a meal with a meat, a starch, and a vegetable. I feel that Wallace is alluding to the fact that in our modern culture individuals are very much separated from the actual process of killing and butchering an animal, while they are at the same time very much used to eating what results from such butchery. The question would be whether or not the individuals consuming the meat would be comfortable with slaughtering the animal from which it came.
The issue I take with Wallace’s paper is contained within his last couple lines where he says “that it’s probably best to stop the public discussion right here. There are limits to what even interested persons can ask of each other.” Personally I feel that we have discovered the exact opposite of that. Our culture hides the blood and guts of the issue so to speak, and skirts around the edges. I agree that I am a meat eater out of selfishness as Wallace would say, because it is comforting and a food I am used to. However to say that that we should simply end the conversation on the animal rights issue seems like a cop-out to me. I feel like we need to challenge ourselves to find some sort of moral standing on the issue, whether pro-carnivore or against it or somewhere in-between. To not do so is to simply avoid figuring out what we truly believe in, and potentially to continue doing something which we actually feel is wrong.

After reading Regan’s text, I found that I agreed with what he seemed to say about how animals and humans have inherent value. I agree that they do, and both animals and humans should be treated well and with respect. I view all living things as having some kind of value. Animals seem to be in the same category as children and babies, they’re constantly caught in the same problem where people are not sure if they actually feel pain or not. This is demonstrated by countries piercing babies’ ears or the infant getting circumcised only being a few days old because they were thought to not have their nerves fully developed. I can also see the argument for who it actually hurts more when what Regan used as an example as a neighbor kicking a person’s dog. I feel like the neighbor hurts the dog. If the dog is walking away and its leg is hurt or anything and doesn’t put weight on it because it is uncomfortable for it, then the dog obviously feels pain. By Regan’s view point, the neighbor is actually hurting the person whom owns the dog because the dog is the person’s property. While I cannot usually see this side of the situation and ones similar to it, this text made me question my assumptions and what I would normally think about the situation. Regan had a way of making me look at things differently and I will continue to do that when reading other material that I already have assumptions for.

Jamieson is short sighted in view of zoos

Dale Jamieson, stating that zoos take no initiative to educate and that the public is “apathetic and unappreciative”, is inept in fully understanding the potential zoos have to offer. Jamieson states that zoos are incapable of acting as an institution for knowledge. At any self-respecting zoo, animals are placed on display in their natural habitat. A brief description of the animal, its natural habitat, and other interesting facts can be found affixed to an easily observable information plate. But a zoo offers much more than just plates; since the animal is in its natural environment, the observer can examine the behavior and evolved traits such as mimicry, ect. For science majors, observation is a source of knowledge far more superior than a text book, and since trips across the world are costly and most of the time irrational, zoos are the perfect intermediate for learning about non-native and native species alike. Furthermore, zoos offer an easy look at animals from a world much different from our own. Without them, the public would never see an African lion, or a Gaboon viper, much less tropical birds or Amazonian fish. And what of the fish and jellies of the sea; they would go unseen by much of the general public. This leads to a hole in his view of an “unappreciative public.” The public, not understanding the diversity of the ocean, or the planet for that matter, would shun the idea of species preservation, and would be much less willing to save the environment. Thus, through seeing the animals, the public is more appreciative for the planet as a whole. So Jamieson was wrong that zoos offer no plausible knowledge. Honorable zoos not only care for their animals but also try to enlighten the minds of the general public and scientists alike.

A Critique of Regan's Rights View

Explaining the benefits of the rights view over contractarianism and utilitarianism, Regan twice emphasized “in principle.” I found this to be a telling aspect of his rights view. Though contractarianism may not be the best support for human and animal rights, I had not considered it allowing discrimination any more than the rights view may. Regan claims that the rights view denies discrimination “in principle,” unlike crude contractarianism (88). Although he had previously discussed Rawls’s view of contractarianism as an improved version of the philosophy, it seems he deliberately ignores it here in order to make his point. I can fathom contractarianism leading to discrimination, but Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” means to address this problem. In principle, should people set moral guidelines with equal consideration of all species, genders, races and physical and mental attributes, discrimination would ideally be averted [Rawls admittedly did not include animals in his view, but I am for the sake of my argument]. Hypothetically, the signatories are ignorant to the circumstances of their existence. So, beings unable to participate in deciding moral laws (ie. babies, mentally incapacitated, animals) would still have their needs considered.

I recognize the impossibility of this being flawlessly accomplished, but at any rate Rawls’s concept discourages speciesism and encourages tolerance and equal consideration by means of perceiving just and unjust actions through manifold perspectives. Whereas in principle the rights view would lead people to treat non-human animals and humans with respect, should someone question or violate this view, what reasoning behind the rights view would compel her to uphold justice and equality? Regan only offers the notion of “inherent value” (87).

In respect to utilitarianism, a being’s ability to feel suffering or pleasure calls for her equal consideration in matters of rights. Though inflicting suffering may sometimes be necessary, utilitarians strive to minimize inflictions. The rights view does not consider this, again relying on inherent value of the individual. Should the notion of inherent value be dismissed, what further logic would compel us to not violate individuals’ rights, were we granted the opportunity? How would people cope with having to choose a lesser of two evils when abiding by the rights view?

As Warren emphasizes, Regan does not define inherent value, but only tells us what it is not (92). Hence, for us to treat humans and animals equally and justly under the rights view, we must acquiesce to a presupposition which is neither defined nor proved logical.

The Spectrum of Inherent Value

I believe that Regan’s reasoning for the equal inherent value of humans and animals leaves room for opposing arguments. He states that those who experience life are all of equal inherent value. I would agree with him only as far as that all living things have inherent value; I would not go so far as to say that they all have equal intrinsic value or that they deserve equal rights. I see all living things as existing upon a spectrum of value—the greater the value of the organism’s community, the more rights ought to be bestowed upon it. Humans occupy a place at the furthest end of the side of greater value. My views are more Kantian, in that I believe that what gives humans more value than other creatures is a capacity that allows them, through reason and other uniquely human self-determination techniques, to sense right and wrong, and to act according to morality. No other animal possesses such a sophisticated ability to act only after consideration of the morality of its actions—they are led by instincts. This clearly separates humans from animals and other living things. The more biologically advanced or human-like qualities a group of creatures possess, the closer that group lies to humans on the spectrum.

Regan might argue that some humans lack this quality, and so according to this view, they would be of less intrinsic value. However, I would contend that humans lacking this capability still have the same inherent value as others. Members of the moral community, or humans, have duties or responsibilities to each other. Being a community member without this capacity, or being the runt of the litter, is not grounds for inequality. Group membership and birth into this community guarantee all individuals the same basic loyalties of other members, and the inability of an individual to fulfill one’s duties towards others does not mean that duties towards that individual are annulled. Membership grants each individual the same inherent value as others in the community because of the duties of community members to each other. If one has the same basic set of duties to two different entities, those two entities are of equal value. Just as the birth or adoption of a child into a family inherently brings about certain duties between the family and child, a birth into a community brings about mutual duties within the community.

Humans are members of many communities, and those closer to the individual carry more obligations—although one might choose to, one would not be obliged to take care of someone else’s ill and aging parent. One might place more personal, subjective value upon one’s family, but this is different from objective inherent value. Subjective value in this sense is value more than that which is given inherently, and it exists for the individual only from a singular position amongst the community; from an impartial bird’s eye view one can observe the spectrum of value, and all humans would still have equal objective inherent value as members of the moral community. Animals, although still a broader community of ours, are separated from us on the spectrum, as they do not share our uniquely human capacity, so our duties to them are something less than the maximum and they are not to be guaranteed the same privileges as humans. They are, however, still inherently valuable and we still have duties to them, and so any harming or killing of them ought to be thoroughly justified.

Varying Degrees of Subjecthood?

Regan discusses the inherent value of beings which are the “subject-of-a-life”. However, it seems that humans and animals are the subjects of lives to varying degrees, and therefore have drastically different experiences of what Mary Anne Warren calls “subjecthood”. I believe this creates problems for Regan’s theory.

While a Utilitarian theory of sentience accounts for the differences between species, acknowledging that we have different capacities to feel pleasure and pain, Regan’s account seems lacking in that it does not adequately account for the fact that we are the subjects of lives to varying degrees. Consider, as Kant pointed out, the fact that animals are not self-conscious and therefore do not have an “I”. Being incapable of such self-reflection makes impossible the mental anguish and suffering that humans experience (which was acknowledged by Peter Singer). Considering this, some of Regan’s language becomes misleading, for example, his argument that humans and animals “want and prefer things; believe and feel things; recall and expect things” (Regan 88). Surely, depending on what species is in question, the experiences of “believing” and “expecting” will vary tremendously from one case to another. They may in fact vary so greatly that we will consider them to be “subjects” in significantly different ways.

This becomes especially problematic in light of Mary Anne Warren’s commentary on Regan. She recounts his theory, that things must have either “the same inherent value and the same basic moral rights that we do”, or that they have “no inherent value and presumably no moral rights” (Warren 92). If a things being the subject-of-a-life is the basis for its having inherent value, it is indeed problematic that we cannot tell where the line differentiating these classes of things is. It is alarming to think that we could mistakenly treat some subject of a life which has the same inherent value as a human as having no value at all, but this seems to be all but unavoidable on Regan’s theory. It seems correct that subjecthood is more likely to come in degrees than to be all or nothing.