Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Oct. 6 by Watson, Bookchin, and Sterba.

Deep Ecology

Naess’s presentation of Deep Ecology not only has a rather idealistic feel to it, but comes to several conclusion that are fail to note some important factors. Promoting equality, classlessness, and supporting the fight against pollution are brought up as great things, as they are; however, talking about how good the end is does not do enough for me. Having the ability to tell everyone how good something most people agree on as well does not lead to much progress. There is simply not a great deal of instruction on what to do with Deep Ecology or how to implement it. Aside from this general complaint there is also a particular part regarding the 7^th tenant of Deep Ecology. It’s true that more local autonomy would most likely lead to more efficiency within each locale, but overall that is not necessarily the case. If regions each specialize in one particular good and trade amongst themselves the most of each product would be produced for the least cost overall; this is a whole fully agreed upon notion of economics. In addition to this, his idea of getting rid of the steps in a chain of command will most likely lead to other problems. The less links in the chain the more chance of oversight, to noticing problems, not properly fixing problems, and much more. Those at the bottom of a chain with so little links to the top get ignored more often, alienated from the other links in the chain, and eventually lead to inequality.

Deep Ecology

Deep ecology seems to attempt to simultaneously figure out a way in which we can define ourselves as individuals and a way in which we fit into nature. To me it seems to have little reasoning behind it, rather it is just a glimpse into way a person could view the world if that is what they tended to believe. While I understand that deep ecologists believe that all “living”(even rivers/ecosystems) things have intrinsic value because they are part of a whole I am unsure as to who being part of that whole gives them intrinsic value though I suppose those parts are instrumental to the functioning of the whole. Even if a complex system with intrinsic value does convey intrinsic value to its components, I am not sure how we can assign intrinsic value to such a system. I do not feel that any of the papers we have read so far have given an adequate way of determining what has intrinsic value which is something that has value as its own property, rather it seems most people assign things intrinsic value.
It seems that deep ecologists make many claims based on how they feel in general the world and environment is doing, and it may or may not be based in fact; it appears that deep ecologists are even being encouraged to form their own opinion on the matter. Deep ecologists seem to want to say that we are not or should not be the masters of nature, and while I would never say we have complete control over nature just as a king never has complete control over a subject, we have become a dominant force of change on the planet and if we chose not to interfere so much nature the fact that it is our choice to make demonstrates to me that we are in fact dominant over nature(though I am not trying to say that we can escape our biotic needs/avoid the catastrophes that accompany overpopulation). The one basis for a respect for the protection of nature I feel I can agree with is the fact that we are so ignorant of its complexity, it seems difficult to defend destroying something we do not understand because such an action cannot be reasoned out as the right thing to do.

Population & Deep Ecology

I want to discuss the implications of the 4^th basic principle of deep ecology from the Devall and Sessions article (aka question 2). The principle states “the flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires such a decrease” (231). The human population boom is seen here as not only detrimental to the environment but to the survival of human beings themselves.

I like this principle for two reasons:

First, and similar to issues of global warming, this restriction on human population growth asks humans to recognize that their actions are inextricably linked to their environment. That is, there is no separation between the individual and the community but each is seen here as two sides of one coin. Humans are both individuals and not-individuals. This principle compliments deep ecology’s goal of creating an ethic of interconnection – a point I think is intuitively correct.

Second, I think this principle does a good job of showing that human population and culture will stop flourishing at a certain point – a claim I think is underappreciated by most people against population regulation. Our population can only expand so far before issues of crowding, density, sensory overload, resource management, and territoriality become overbearing.

This point also does some work against the counterclaim that human beings have a natural drive to reproduce (both biologically and, to some, theologically) and that therefore regulation is both impractical and in violation of natural rights. I can concede that human beings do have a drive to reproduce, that this drive is natural, and that in the best circumstances this drive shouldn’t be stifled. I’ll even concede that, all things being equal, this drive is equivalent to a general right humans should have. However, the second point I’ve drawn out shows that this right isn’t absolute but relative to the circumstances. The Chinese law prohibiting multiple offspring serves as an example of a government that ultimately had to override the natural right of its people in order to provide different, higher-order rights. It would be wrong to produce children in a world where the population prevents the best conditions for growth and maturity – indeed, this is wrong both in regard to obligations to the child and to the already suffering population.

Guha is Mad, but Might Be Taking it Out on the Wrong People

In his piece, Guha lays out a somewhat harsh critique of deep ecology, arguing that it is not a legitimate environmental movement since it embraces American ideas of consumerism of nature. He argues that the fundamental debate of deep ecology, anthropocentric versus biocentrism, is a dangerous distraction from the real environmental crises we face globally. I agree with his critiques against things like the valuation of wilderness preservation over human livelihoods, but he seems to be against deep ecology in practice rather than in theory.

In theory, deep ecologists acknowledge that the overconsumption of natural resources is a fundamental and serious problem that needs to be addressed. They also advocate that changes in political and economic structures are paramount to fixing environmental problems. Deep ecology in theory addresses the very issues that Guha argues must be dealt with in order to "fix" the environment, reducing consumption (by also reducing population, according to Sessions) and the political endeavors like development that create social inequality and ecological disaster.

Guha is right in that favoring biocentric attitudes over anthropocentric attitudes will not save the planet. As long as there are problems like the constant drive for capital accumulation, resources will continue to be exploited beyond repair. He is also correct in his apparent disdain for the wilderness preservation movement, which seems to favor leaving land "untouched" for the likes of first world tourists after thieving it from third world peasants. However, these problems are not inherent to deep ecology. Deep ecology supports wilderness preservation, but not at the cost of vital needs of any organisms. It also acknowledges that a shift to biocentric views must accompany a shift in the political, social, and economic systems that presently shape the world.

The ego and environmental degridation

I agree with the idea id of commercial and materialism and its connection to the ego can cause great environmental disaster. It makes sense to me that the two are linked. When Naess is talking about the narrow self, he is referring to how most of us see our identity. When we hold this identity, we are unaware of the true self, which is ultimate consciousness. That means that we are unconscious the egoic identity. There is unconscious attachment to this identity; an example would be high school kids trying to fit by putting down other kids to make themselves look cooler, or spending tones of money on the latest clothes and gadgets. An athlete that is so focused on being the best, they are willing to push others out of the way. All of these examples are people that are unconscious to the world around them because they are so worried about themselves.
This self centered thinking leads people to not even think twice about environmental degradation when they try to keep up with the Joneses by buying a large house all the way out in Suburbia like everyone else and buys the biggest S.U.V. to impress other people. Having to buy the fanciest Jewelry to have a high status symbol without thinking about the human injustice in those mines where those diamonds were mined. This ego based behavior is going to need to shift if there is going to have this dis- identification from ourselves and the environment and us moving towards the total-field image.

Deep Ecology

In their discussion of Arne Naess' concept of "deep ecology", Bill Devall and George Sessions argue that one of the basic principles of deep ecology is that human beings have no right to reduce the richness and diversity of life forms except to fulfill "vital" needs. However, Naess himself claims that deep ecology prohibits humans from destroying the natural features of this planet, and does not mention any possibility of exception(s) to this rule for satisfying our vital needs. Despite this contrast between Naess' and Devall's and Sessions' written versions of this principle of deep ecology, I think the acknowledgment of human beings' need to destroy natural resources to a certain extent in order to survive is meant to be implied in Naess' article. Obviously, human beings need to destroy natural features of this planet to some extent in order to survive (e.g., destroying living things for nourishment), and thus cannot comply with this particular principle according to a literal interpretation of it.
I find that an inadequacy in this principle lies in the fact that neither Naess nor Devall and Sessions go further after revealing this principle as an aspect of deep ecology to explain exactly what constitutes "vital" human needs, or those needs which could be justifiably fulfilled despite their potential negative impact on the environment. Clearly the needs for water, food, and shelter must be included in the category of vital human needs, but where is the line drawn here? Would Naess, Devall and Sessions consider testing new vaccines and other medications on animals before administering them to human beings if this could help us find a cure for terminal illnesses such as AIDS and thus allow many human beings to survive when they otherwise would not? Would they consider our need to prevent the spread of disease vital, or even a need at all? Naess, Devall, and Sessions point out that the term "vital needs" is left deliberately vague in their accounts of deep ecology in order to remain flexible and adaptable to varying judgments. However, I feel that it is important for the sake of their arguments to more clearly define what they mean by "vital needs" so that it is apparent to the reader what anthropogenic environmental destruction they believe can be justified by human necessities.

In Arne Naess’s writings, he talks about “ecosophy” calling humans to live more simply and to take a deeper look in questioning and answering our environmental concerns. Speaking of the shallow ecology movement and the deep ecology movement, he stresses that we need to focus more on the deep ecology movement instead of on the shallow ecology movement (the more powerful movement). While I agree that people need to open up their focus of self realization, identification, etc., in order to better their lives both for their own benefits and for the benefits of those around them, I think that he is trying to create a Utopian society, and something that cannot really be achieved. Self realization and identification alone take a great deal of commitment and openness to yourself that most people I believe will never do just because it is too time consuming, and because many people will not find value in doing so. You really have to want it in order to change your outlook on life and really try and live the better, more environmentally, and all in all “better life,” and I think that too many people are caught up in our materialistic and consumer driven society to ever really change or gain this perspective. It makes perfect sense that the shallow ecology movement has had more of a following and success as it directly relates to human benefits, while not looking at the abstract and impacts and values on non human related activities and things. While I see there being value in people gaining self awareness and identification, I think that in our society where technology, money and power are what most people see as being most valuable, we are naturally moving further and further away from a life of self realization and introspection.

Naess' Deep Ecology May Be Too Deep

Arne Naess is pushing for a movement that goes beyond The Shallow Ecology movement which consists mostly of putting a stop to pollution and resource misuse/depletion. These things are more focused on the idea of benefitting mankind and generally ignore other important and more complex issues that affect ecosystems on a multitude of levels. He has founded the theory of Deep Ecology or ecosophy. Naess explains ecosophy as "a philosophy of ecological harmony or equilibrium" (218). While he outlined seven basic policies (or a seven point-survey)of his ecosophy, even he realizes ambiguity is present in his descriptions, noting that, "[it] will show many variations due to significant differences concerning not only 'facts' of pollution, resources, population, etc., but also value priorities", and admits many of the points are "rather vague generalizations" (218). In knowing this, and reading his piece, I find it difficult to persuade an audience and or critic to fully join the Deep Ecology movement. While the text appeared to have some sort of order or style applied, I found a sense of disorder in his thoughts.
Despite fumbling over his words, I generally agree with his notions of simplifying lifestyles and looking further into environmental concerns that are below the surface we usually find ourselves peering at (where there are obvious social and economic connections to us). He calls for us to act unselfishly, such as when "striving to preserve in oneself or one's being...[where] it is not a mere urge to survive, but to increase the level of acting out one's own nature or essence" (223). This infers a requirement to "widen" our identification...though the majority of us may not be at a mature identification stage yet and more in a stage of alientation. It is key we find ourselves in (identify with) organisms and various aspects of nature and are successfully "identifying", but the wider identification becomes, the more difficult assignment of priorities and values becomes-it is subjective to each individual really, based upon experiences and "acquaintances" with systems and beings and places.
Naess' incorporation of objectivism in finding intrinsic value, and emphasizing simplification and identification are all very good and should be taken note of, but I find that it is all generally unrealistic for this to reach a global point. He recognizes that a "global approach is essential, but regional differences must largely determine policies in the coming years" (219)...but will the amount of differences between individuals within regions within the world prove to be too much to cause change in time?

With a Little Work, Deep Ecology is the Key

When I initially read Arne Naess' essays, I was somewhat confused by what he referred to as “deep ecology” or "ecosophy". It was difficult to pick apart the philosophical jargon and get to the heart of the point he was trying to make. However, when I read Devall and Sessions' view of deep ecology, the pieces that were unclear to me in Naess' piece suddenly made sense, and I was pleased to discover that I agreed with their ideas. According to these ecologists, humans need to stop thinking of themselves as somehow better than or separate from nature and instead realize that we are a component of the much larger biotic community. We need to stop thinking of "I" and instead think of "we", but not just in terms of other humans, but of all living beings. All living beings are dependent upon each other and by destroying one, we do harm to all others including ourselves.
We will get nowhere with our efforts to preserve the earth until rid our minds of the idea that we are somehow apart from nature, while all other living and non-living things are a part of it. Are we that egotistical that we think that we are better than everyone else simply because we have a higher intellectual ability than other species? Earth is our home and we must realize that we are an integral part of it. This is where our higher brain power comes into play. We have the capacity to either destroy or preserve nature. No other species can inflict the damage that our species can and we must recognize this. According to Devall and Sessions, "if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves" (230). The reverse of this phrase must also be true. By respecting and taking care of not only our species, but other species we better ourselves as human beings. If we are able to take these suggestions to heart, our next step is to begin to simplify our way of living.
Devall and Sessions admit that this will not be easy and that people cannot be expected to change overnight. This will take time and effort on all of our parts and the authors encourage everyone to take their ideas and add to them their own ideas about deep ecology. The only question I am left with, which seems to be a recurring question with each article I read is how do we get people to accept these ideas and really utilize them? For me Naess, Devall and Sessions ideas make complete intuitive sense, but for skeptics a great deal more convincing is neccessary before they fully embrace the ideas of deep ecology. For some it may take empirical data, for others an emotional connection to the crisis at hand, and for others still maybe an epiphany brought on by religious beliefs, but whatever the case something must be done to change our mindset because as of right now, there is "no grand solution which is guaranteed to save us from ourselves"(230).

Arne Naess's "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecological Movement" is a largely different view of ecological egalitarianism than what we've seen so far. I must commend him on the specifics of his "Seven points" for the fact that he directly focuses on what needs to be done from a large-scale, but also acute view of the world to institute this ecological egalitarianism. He delves into the societal factors that contribute to a "human-dominating-nature" stance and focuses on the fundamental changes needed to institute an overhaul of this idea.

The first part of the reading that struck me as insightful was the second section of the Deep Ecology: Biospherical egalitarianism. He speaks about how those ecologists who view life from a "bottom up" perspective gain a different respect for the way the world works. "He reaches...a kind of understanding that others reserve for men...The equal right to live and blossom." This is a fundamentally distinct view that is absent (at least from my experiences) from the majority of the human population. Yet, if it were to be instituted , it would wholly change the respect that is given to nature as well as other human beings. He sums this view up with the statement "The attempt to ignore our dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the alienation of man from himself." I believe this to be one of the most important themes in his "Deep Ecology", that in order for humans to adequately respect each other, a basis of respect for all life around us first needs to be established.

Moving on, I was intrigued by his challenge of worldwide institutions such as class-based society. His idea, and one that I personally agree with, is that a class-oriented societal structure only leads to a fragmented world-view, where an established world community is never recgonized by the individual, resulting in "adverse affects...of self-realization." He points out the idea that decentralization of government and institutions would benefit humanity in that large-scale centralized establishments fail to adequately yield to all local interests. This all ties in with the view that changing certain world policies such as fighting pollution and resource depletion should only be implemented if it benefits ALL of humanity, not just the populations of modern countries.

Overall I thought that Naess's views are fresh in the sense that in order for ecological egalitarianism to become established, large-scale societal structures have to be challenged and dissolved. Harmony among all aspects of human-life, including our respect for each other and the environment is a strong point that he follows throughout the article.

Ecosophy T

Naess’s essay Ecosophy T is supposed to be introducing a philosophy that is inspired by deep ecology known as ecosophy T. The T is meant to identify his specific philosophy because other deep ecologists may develop a different ecosophy more in accordance with their “value priorities, attitudes and opinions.”I understand that this philosophy was inspired by deep ecology but it is not entirely clear whether he considers ecosophy T and deep ecology as one in the same or whether one precedes another. Naess’s philosophy centers around Self-realization of the comprehensive as opposed to the narrow self. He encourages people to define who they are widely. I see this as beneficial; half of the problem with western culture is selfishness. People are often aware of global issues such as pollution and genocide, and though they may condemn them as wrong they typically do not act against the issues. It can be argued that this is because their perception of self is limited to the boundary of their physical bodies. Because this is the case, it is difficult for a person to fight strongly for or against something unless it affects him/her in a direct physical way. If people could expand their concept of “self” and see it as connected to, including, and effected by the global biotic community they may be more likely to work against injustice.
Though I see the benefit of this philosophy and understand Naess’s connection between self-realization and viewing everything as having intrinsic value, I do not think a skeptic or critic of deep ecology would find this piece convincing. He presents a sort of progression through which a person would go in order to view all of nature as having intrinsic value (biocentric equality). Development of maturity breeds identification (when the interests of another being become our own interests) which leads to a widening of the self, which ultimately enables a person to recognize the intrinsic value in the biotic community. Unfortunately, in Naess’s writing this progression is not presented coherently. I don’t think he connects the threads of his philosophy together in a way that is clear enough to convince a skeptic that the environment has intrinsic value. Additionally, I don’t think a person would be even remotely compelled to attempt to expand their “self” as a result of reading this essay.

Yes! Finally a reading that I connect 100% with!

Although I had never heard of it before reading this book, I am a big fan of the term “ecosophy.” I have thought for a long time that the environmental movement has been a selfish move on the part of humans, disguised in a mask of environmentalism. Naess put it perfectly in his definition of The Shallow Ecology Movement when he said that the “central objective [is] the health and affluence of people in the developed countries.” From my eyes, it seems as if most of what humans do to “preserve the environment” is for the benefit of humans, and not for the belief that the environment deserves to be as alive and well as we [humans] are. Ads on t.v. asking people to donate money for things such as the National Wildlife Foundation, appeal to their audience by saying things like “Don’t you want future generations to be able to see a Giant Panda in the wild?” This is not asked with the feelings of the Panda in mind, this is asked with the curiosity and hope for humans in the future to be able to see them. In my mind, this is selfish.

My favorite quote in the whole reading was “…the so-called struggle of life, and survival of the fittest, should be interpreted in the sense of ability to coexist and cooperate in complex relationships, rather than ability to kill, exploit, and suppress. “Live and let live” is a more powerful ecological principle than “Either you or me.””(pg.216)

YES! Why can’t the whole world think like this?! If they did, I feel like everyone woud be competing to see who was more friendly rather than who can come out on top.

In Naess’s second piece, what appealed to me most was his talking about the people in the deep ecological movement, and their focus on “voluntary simplicity” and how people who live this way tend to live “lightly” in nature. I am a Quaker by religion, and Quakerism is based on five basic principles of Simplicity, Peace, Integrity, Community, and Equality. Knowing the members of my Quaker Meeting at home, and knowing how they tend to live, leads me to think that the deep ecological movement is a very Quakerly movement. I support this J

Guha's personal bias is clouding his perspective and understanding

Guha makes many compelling points about the situation where he lives in terms of poverty and the effect of our American environmental influence and desires for the third world countries. It is a different situation, yes. I feel as though he was so determined to emphasize that their state of life is different over there that he missed the point of the environmental cause. He gave the cause more authority than it assumes. At one point he says that he does not understand why the focus is on biotic integrity as opposed to the needs of humans. I had to laugh at this because to me that was like asking a cow why its not a moose. Environmentalists aim to look beyond human needs. Thats how things got this way. That's why we have this problem. Environmentalists sacrifice human needs for the sake of the ultimate survival of everything that is (globe). Its like he's really not understanding the point by posing that question.
He goes on to say that the two fundamental problems facing the globe are unrelated to the anthropocentric-biocentric distinction. First off, Guha assumes an authority that is unfounded. Just because he disagrees with what our biggest problem is that doesn't falsify the biocentric belief. It is not about only addressing the two biggest problems. And it isnt about only solving short term problems. Again, he is shortsighted. This problem is bigger than I believe he understands. It is a long term thing. We need to see all of the problems and treat them equally. That is what biocentrism stands for...the big picture. Trying to solve only short term problems has never solved the long term problems. And unfortunately, the long term problems are a problem now and will keep getting worse. They must be dealt with. He is simplifying the situation in an attempt to take a shot at deep ecology but this simplification is a battle environmentalists have weighed, analyzed and understand to be foolish and detrimental to earth.
I found it entertaining once more when he says that deep ecology is too radical when he not only earlier acknowledged the "big problems" facing the globe that NEED fixing but also that he fails to admit that it is only too radical for certain parts of certain third world countries. It is obvious that the deep ecology as it is will not work for these exception places, and deep ecology ecologists never claimed that their method was perfect or that it could be applied everywhere as is.
One last thing I would like to say is that i didnt like his cut on Americans for having cars and essentially having access to natural resources. Deep ecology acknowledges America's past and current mistakes and they are trying to make it right. They are putting in a serious and passionate effort to make up for America's mistakes. Guha attacks us for our mistakes but then attacks deep ecology as a form of recognition and apology for those mistakes for its effort to try to help and fix. Suuure

Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Oct. 1 by Naess (2 articles), Devall and Sessions, and Guha.

Weaknesses of Hettinger and Throop's Refocusing of Ecocentrism

It seems troublesome that Hettinger and Throop never actually define wilderness. They define wildness as an intrinsically valuable feature of natural systems, as “not humanized” (191). They say that wilderness is “an important manifestation of wildness,” but never is the concept of wilderness clearly stated (193). Nelson proved more specific in labeling wilderness as a social construct.

I am compelled to agree that wilderness is in fact socially constructed, and this leads to considering another notion Nelson considered associated with wilderness, ethnocentrism. He acknowledged that some languages of other cultures have no word for “wilderness” (201). Hettinger and Throop admit that valuing wildness is constructed through cultural traditions, but they do not realize the slippery slope leading towards ethnocentrism on which they teeter. Instead, they compare their views of valuing wildness with valuing human equality. Doing such, they further assert that, as the Western world was responsible for having raised the latter notions, the former notions will likewise endure widespread approval and “universal validity” (194).

Just as they construct values of wilderness through ethnocentricity, Hettinger and Throop seem to construct the “intrinsic” value we are allowed to give to wildness. They speak of early periods of history, during which wildness “was ubiquitous and threatening” (193). Overlooking their lack of supporting facts, they continue to state that “wildness has little or no value in itself there was simply too much of it relative to humanized environments” (193). Whereas today wildness is seen as valuable since it is rare, too much wildness seems to make it worthless. I question whether or not there is a balance with which Hettinger and Throop would be satisfied.
Besides failing to discuss how much wildness we should strive for relative to humanized environments, I found several other items I thought were left ambiguous by Hettinger and Throop. For the sake of my Microsoft word count, I will limit this discussion to a small list of items: the hierarchy of importance of ecosystem values, priority principles indicating when wildness trumps other goods, and whether wildness value is objective or a function of the value-er.

I believe Nelson was correct in questioning the threat of human/nature dualism in this wildness-based ecocentrism. Hettinger and Throop encouraged the view of nature as the “other” in a spiritual sense. They thought the secular world needed something bigger than themselves. In respect to this argument, could it be implied that religious people can and do value wildness less than atheists? Furthermore, as Nelson realized, considering nature as the “other” is dangerous in that it fosters a competitive, “us versus them” mentality. In addressing this concern, Hettinger and Throop interpret the criticism as wanting humans to be seen as identical to nature. They talk of the absurdity of a “biotic citizen,” but the fact that they would concentrate on such a notion seems more absurd. In my opinion it goes without saying that there are fundamental differences between humans and nature, and these can be accounted for without reaching so extreme into the realm of dualism.

Lastly, I have qualms with the examples Hettinger and Throop presented as illustrating people’s valuing the wild. They say that people prefer certain things over others, such as natural beauty opposed to beauty resulting from surgery. Though perhaps I am nitpicking, these conjectured preferences do not equate to values. I could prefer to cheat on an exam, but value honesty so that I do not cheat. The later examples of people valuing wildness without truly realizing it (ie. bird-watching) do not successfully support the intrinsic value of wildness. They speculate that these activities are done for humans “to be in touch with nonhuman nature,” but this seems presumptuous (194). Perhaps someone plays golf to network with business associates, or someone eats dinner because they find the weather comfortable. They do not prove that appreciation for these activities stem from an intrinsic value of wildness.

In Michael Nelsons article he made a generally persuasive argument about the way in which we treat the term wilderness and how we should go about dealing with this debate in the future. I like how he thinks we should more clearly articulate the nature of the criticism of the concept of wilderness. Furthermore I agree with him that conceptual analysis is the best fighting ground to ultimately arrive at a more shared understanding of what the “wilderness” means for us not to us. It seems to me that we need to move towards thinking of what this wilderness means for us not simply what it means to us. Before we move towards an understanding of this sort, I feel it is necessary to include humans in the varied concepts of wilderness. We are as much a part of a city as we are a part of the wilderness. We build a house and live in it, but we don’t only have a relationship to that house. We have a relationship to the wood that it is made of and more broadly to the place where that wood comes from. Although we are not in that forest in Oregon or Washington we are there. Not there in person, but there in that we have taken from it without really ever thinking about it. Nelson makes a similar point. He says that Leopold is as good a foundation for a conceptual analysis of our wilderness because of the communal properties he argues for. Nelson cites the example of people of one nation feeling this lack of connection with the people of another who have the bomb dropped on them in a distant land. This is not because those people are worth less or deserve it but rather because they are not their neighbors. I mean to evoke a similar quality within the human condition, a communal relationship with the wilderness on a whole new level. Like Nelson I am not sure how to do this, but I sense it has started on some level already. My parents always use to get excited when they saw a product was made in the USA. Economic issues aside, the communal aspect is there. If people became more aware of what individual impact that had on the environment, and how they could make small changes I bet people would start to make those changes. The hope is that overtime people would be able to proudly say I got this wood from a forest in New York at a smaller carbon footprint and with greater care to the ecological environment there. Ok that’s a stretch, but you got to aim somewhere if you’re going hit the target.

Nelson provides a very strong critique of the notion of wilderness, as it is an insufficient and problematical argument for environmental ethics. Wilderness is the highest manifestation of what is considered natural. This idea, in the wilderness debate, inevitably puts forth the additional notion of a stark contrast with humans or the human agency and what is natural. However, I agree more or less with Nelson and his hesitation of wilderness as the environmental ethic that will persuade the dissenters. Nelson argues that there needs to be a better definition of what wilderness is and a better conceptualization of wilderness. Therefore, I am more inclined to promote the idea of “wilderness management” which Nelson describes as a suggestion to the ideal to which humans should strive for in regards to more dedication and commitment to preservation and restoration. But this again doesn’t fully define what types of wilderness and forms of wilderness require management and to what degree.
There seems to be a debate as to what wilderness is exactly and what it should be. On one hand, wilderness is a valuable place to “get away.” On the other hand, wilderness is a place that is completely unaffected by humans, relatively an untouched landscape. I think that this lack of definition hinders the conceptual analysis that the dissenters will invoke and also doesn’t provide a strong moral ethic to embrace for others.
Additionally, the other major point of the wilderness debate that seems to be inappropriate is the dichotomy put forth. Humans have evolved alongside other non-human beings in the "wilderness" and the idea or notion of characterizing wilderness in opposition to humans is substandard. I think that it only hampers and impedes a philosophy that will result in creating a sense of feasibility, collectiveness and urgency required in addressing the challenges we face. Nelson argues that this perpetuates false dualism which limits our understanding of and attempts at creating an environmental ethic that could persuade the dissenters from gaining a moral sentiment that leads to a feeling of ethical obligation in terms of conservation, preservation and restoration. Moreover, the issues that we face nowadays need to avoid a human/nature dichotomy, as this only conceptually separates and compartmentalizes our problems and values which stand in the way of a true environmental ethic embraced by the masses.
Nelson argues that wilderness as argued now involves inappropriate baggage. He puts forth the idea that the salvation of wilderness lies in the human mind, such that we need to re-conceptualize the notion of wilderness. However, I am not fully convinced that it is the term wilderness or the notion behind it that will fully capture and yield a social community that will develop moral sentiments creating a feeling of an ethical obligation to nature.
However, I do think that a social community with a better concept of the interactions between humans and their environments is important in regards to persuading the dissenters, as well as properly defined and terms and conditions. But in contrast to Nelson, I am not sure that it will jump on the band wagon of wilderness. More significantly, it is important to understand and comprehend that humans are intrinsically tied to the environment. We are a product of nature and we cannot, and should not, deny that relationship, as it is the only way to solve our current environmental crisis. When we see nature as happening "out there," and not near us, we can easily relinquish and abandon our responsibility to it. The important social and perhaps philosophical challenge is to provide a more specific and focused argument while integrating sustainable practices of preservation, conservation and restoration into our "unnatural" urban and suburban lives.

Hettinger and Throop seem to say that nature can take care of itself without the influence of humans and that when we try to fix the mistakes that we have made the damage just seems to intensify. To this I would agree with. The environment is a self regulating system and it is too risky to try and help or aid the environment when there isn’t a need for it, because we can do more harm than good. Wildness is essential for restoring and maintaining natural systems because it lets the system exist in its wild state without humanities influence controlling it. When humans get rid of a species from an ecosystem and then try to restore the amount of the species as there was before they can often do more damage than repair. Since the absence of the wolves in Yellowstone has greatly impacted the environment and the other organisms that live there, would it really be helpful to disrupt the way that nature has compensated for the fact that there is no top predator like the wolves to keep things in check? I feel that the wolves should be able to reintroduce themselves and be able to find their own ways of supporting themselves and getting used to the environment without the aid of humans. This way, the environment can shape around the wolves, and the wolves will have a more natural impact on the environment. Besides, according to the authors, disturbance in the norm for many natural systems and ecosystems, do not tend to mature, but rather seem to take a step back when recovering from the trauma of the disturbance. An invading species can be an example of this theory, when the species disturbs the life of the other organisms living within the ecosystem that is functioning well. The authors also said that humans need to find a way of preserving the wild without it leading into a way that destroys it, but how exactly do we do this? I found I was trying to answer this question a lot during my time reading this text. I feel like the authors gave many examples of what exactly their ethic was toward the land, but not as many for how to put these ideas into actions. I think that if we realize what is going on in Yellowstone and more people are open to the idea of letting nature be on its own without human aid, that we can find a way to be sustainable without having to cut down on valuable lands and ecosystems that are trying just as hard to sustain themselves.

A Consideration of The Value of Wildness

Hettinger and Throop claim to support the belief that wildness is something that is to be valued intrinsically; however, I do not find that they adequately support this view. In attempting to support their assertions, they appear to defend instrumental, rather than inherent value. They argue that the value of wildness depends upon the historical context and the situation, and that wildness was not always valuable. If something is inherently valuable, however, value exists in the entity simply by virtue of its being that entity—the value is an inseparable part of the whole. If wildness was intrinsically valuable, there should be neither a time nor a place when it loses its value, for instance, when it happened to be bountiful and thriving in early periods of human history. It appears as though what Hettinger and Throop are really saying is that wildness is now valuable because it is rare, and when it was not rare, it was not valuable. It seems to me that a portion of their argument actually lies on the basis that wildness is worth something because there is not a great deal of it; I do not see that they back up this claim, and I might suspect that it was not their intention to make it. They hold that education about the humanization of earth will lead people to value wildness, yet I do not see how such education would lead people to the conclusion that wildness is valuable for any reason other than that it is endangered and rare. Individuals might even learn to value wildness, not only because it is rare, but because it is of use to humans, who take pleasure in it and value it instrumentally. One concern regarding the wildness view is that it appears as though the value of wildness is instrumental, in that it brings people pleasure—of course Hettinger and Throop dismiss this claim. They argue that “valuing nature for its wildness is not valuing wild nature for the pleasure it brings us” (p. 193). I would argue, however, that they have not given us sufficient reason to value wildness intrinsically, simply because it is wild, when in fact they even contradict themselves on this point, although they have provided reason to value it because we derive pleasure from it.

Humans Get Out and Stay Out

Bill Throop and Ned Hettinger argue that stability and diversity are not strongly correlated, but rather we must rely on intrinsic values such as “beauty, diversity, creativity,” but above all wildness. They propose that the value of wildness should be the underlining value for natural systems. Wildness is important in a system because it has been untouched by human influence. The value of wildness is essential for restoring natural systems because it allows for the system to exist in its wild state without humanities imprint controlling the ecosystem. As Troop and Hettinger write, “extensive restoration projects disturb nonnormal scales.” They explain their idea of wildness though their example of the wolf reintroduction into Yellowstone. The reintroduction of the wolf will bring wildness back into the system. However, any reintroduced animal into a natural system are at the hand of a human. The only way to allow these wolves to be introduced and become wild again is to allow them to introduce themselves by giving them the freedom to roam, hunt, mate, etc. “Ecology of stability” is the idea that natural systems are self regulating and can control themselves for they are in constant motion towards stability. “It is risky to advocate preserving the integrity of natural systems when such integrity may not exist.” They are arguing for a holistic ecocentric approach, that the environment is a system of its own and it could be dangerous to try to fix something that does not need fixing. By focusing so strongly on preservation, we ignore the importance of finding a way for humans to live in nature without destroying it.” We should just let it be, and figure itself out. Chaos and destruction are a part of the natural system. Therefore, when the wolves are eventually reintroduced by themselves, the landscape will shape them just as they will inevitably shape the landscape. Therefore, the wildness value gives hope to wilderness and the wolves themselves.

I strongly believe in this argument that humans need to stop trying to dominate nature for our own well being. Systems were doing well before we industrialized, polluted and pillaged; for example, the Amazonian Rainforest or Coral Reefs or even wetlands. They are self sustaining systems that were doing well on their own, but once humans come in and try to wield the natural powers for our own they systems began to break down. The one critique I have for the article is the point he makes about weight. Again, it makes me beg the question, who has the right to decide which systems carry which amount of weight? Also, they mention on page 193 that “humans extirpating the wolf from the Yellowstone region in the first part of this century had a vastly different impact on wildness value” than people from earlier historical events. Therefore, this could just be the moment in time in which we decide this is right for the environment. Things are liable to change as the Earth changes, so what is now acceptable can one day be “prehistoric.”

Hettinger and Throop’s Refocusing Egocentrism is by far the best argument I have heard thus far as to why we should preserve the ecosystems. Their expansion of Leopold’s idea that meaning was held within stability and interdependence to mean that value was not just in interdependence of any kind but of the wild. The natural, the organic, the wild, as they call it, has an intrinsic value and there for must be preserved. Their examples of why we value what is natural were persuasive with the consideration of plastic surgery taking away from natural human beauty and stocking a pond taking away from the triumph and thrill of catching a wild fish. However, these are all examples of things we value in nature in relation to goods we receive from it, pleasure, joy, and triumph and sp it makes nature the instrumental good to get to these. As much as I believe that they are right to think that nature is beautiful and holds value I think that they contradicted themselves with the fact that nature holds intrinsic value. Other than the examples listed above there is one major example in the text where they are assigning what appears to be an instrumental good that comes from valuing the wild. “Valuing the wild acknowledges that limits to human mastery and domination of the world are imperative …. Confronting the other helps humans to cultivate a proper sense of humility” (p. 92). The benefit to humans of valuing the wild comes in the form of humility. This would mean that the wild is not a good in itself it is good because we see it as a good, it bring good to us in the way that it brings us humility and joy and inspiration. Nature without humans giving it instrumental value would not have value. I do not think that the authors, as convincing as their agreements are for the reasons to value and preserve the wild I cannot see that the wild is intrinsic.

Ned and Bill cast the lance on conservation, unfortunatly it wasn't sharp enough

The view established in Ned Hettinger and Bill Throop’s “Refocusing Ecocentrism: De-emphasizing Stability and Defending Wildness” contains messages that are demeaning to all conservation efforts. The purpose of conservation is not solely designed to allow organisms to exist exterior to human intervention, but more importantly, to repay a debt which has resulted from westward expansion, industrialization or a mixture of the two. Wolves wouldn’t have needed to be conserved if they weren’t pushed to the brink of extinction. Furthermore, it is completely sophomoric and unintelligible to assume that wolves were reintroduced for the sole purpose of allowing future generations to enjoy them. “Doing it for the children” impacts the population and motivates them to become proactive. Any parent would want for their children the same experiences, if not better, than what they have experienced. Therefore prompting the public to help with these efforts through the use of intrinsic values has a higher motivational power than main reasons for such an action.
The primary reason however is frequently overlooked. Any biologist knows that the main reason for conservation and preservation of apex predators is to ensure a stable community. Without a top down effect, predation, the consumers grow unchecked until they outgrow their respective niche and invade other species niches. A popular example of such a situation is the white tailed deer. The north was once home to tertiary and quaternary consumers such as bears, coyotes, bobcats and wolves. From over hunting and extremely successful removal efforts, these predators are all but gone from eastern American woodlands. Without check the white tailed deer population became far too large for the communities which it inhabits, and thus began to eat food outside its normal diet. As a result, the diversity of plants in any given woodland has dropped by about 90% of what it was 400 years prior. As humans it is our duty to rectify this situation even if it takes a catchy slogan with little more than face value to make the public interested.

Wildness Ethic: Ecocentricism for the City-Dweller

I support the wilderness ethic because it is more adapted to urbanites that are disconnected with nature because of the ethic's separatist take on human-nature interactions.

Hettinger and Throop clarify in their 44^th footnote that humans can have a “wildness” to them and be integrated in a “wild” environment (199). They make this point in order to respond to an objection that states wild nature as more valuable than human-involved nature, and the conclusion that people (specifically subsistence farmers) will be kicked out of the land (194). I believe this distinction strengthens the wildness argument because it puts a limit on the level of seperatization between humanity and nature.

Through this specification, it can be argued that the wildness ethic is constructed more towards humans who are out of touch with nature, rather than those who depend on it wholly for their livelihood. As Leopold argues at the end of his “Land Ethic”, many modern humans are disconnected from nature (171-172). Nettinger and Throop acknowledge resistance from Urbanites because of their fear of the “wild”, however they posit that rationality can lead to such an appreciation of the wild (194).

In theory, if the wildness ethic were to catch on and be implemented, many “non-humanized” ecosystems would be left (relatively) alone, and continue to exist somewhat undisturbed. To the conceptual Urbanite who does not interact with nature, this relationship would be functional as long as the respect and division between humanity and the wild nature is rigidly respected. The ecosystem services would continue, and humanity would forcefully check its population growth through the taboo-attribute to the use of wild-land. Through this implementation and possible success, the wildness ethic could have positive results on our relationship with the environment.

Objection to Restoration Projects on Wildness Value Theory

Consider a complicated passage in Hettinger and Throop which seems to come dangerously close to self-contradiction: “Wildness value can count in favor of restoration projects. By returning the system to what it would have been had humans not altered it, restoration can help diminish human influence” (196). While the authors realize the strangeness of this statement and recognize the potential difficulties for a theory of wildness value which simultaneously supports restoration projects, I do not think that they are able to overcome these problems.
What should we require of such a restoration project, which sets as its goal “returning the system to what it would have been had humans not altered it”? Should we hope that the exact number of wolves that were originally removed from the ecosystem can be successfully reintroduced, despite the ways in which the ecosystem has inevitably changed? This would likely magnify the effects of human intervention in the ecosystem and would therefore be an increase in human intervention. In a certain sense, this is same as saying that the amount of wildness is decreased.
Should we instead try to reintroduce what seems to be an appropriate number of wolves to the ecosystem? But what could this possibly mean, other than protecting the stability and equilibrium of the ecosystem, which is the view that the authors reject?
Again, restoration projects such as the one in Yellowstone seem to be the opposite of what an advocate of the wildness view would support. After all, it is not as if we could change the past and manipulate the environment in such a way that it would really be like the removal and reintroduction of the wolves never happened. It seems more correct to me to accept the conclusion that “wildness value” would be maximized by limiting our involvement as much as possible. On this view, once human intervention has resulted in the removal of the wolves from the ecosystem, we should just “quit while we’re ahead”, so to speak.
These issues raise problems for Hettinger and Throop’s conclusion. Indeed, while “restoration designed to enhance wildness value wears its limitations on its sleeve”, it seems that the wildness value theory will ultimately conflict with our intuitions “about our obligations to preserve and restore natural systems like Yellowstone” (197). While it may have seemed that we should try to undo our previous evil of intervention, I do not see how it is possible to hold this on Hettinger and Throop’s view.

Comments on the restoration of wolves in Yellowstone

In the piece regarding the restoration of the wolves in Yellowstone, I particularly liked, or wanted to talk about, the section towards the end where Hettinger and Throop are talking about how the additional activity that would be required by humans to bring the wolves back into Yellowstone would initially detract from the wildness value, yet in the long run the benefits that would result from the initial decrease of wildness would be great. I feel there is a lot riding on this statement and it could be looked at in many ways. Sure, maybe in the long run, the restoration of wolves to Yellowstone would return the system to what it would have been had we humans not altered it in the first place. But, I have a hard time buying that further alteration can reverse years of affects. They seem to think, within a reasonable time frame, it is possible to bring a wild area back to its natural state through restoration projects. They do agree that human activity would always be part of the chain that led the particular system to where it is right now, but they believe it can be brought back to what it would have been if we never affected it. I don’t buy it. Who is to say that when we bring the wolves back, the system would be back to the way nature intended it. Who’s to say, now that we took the wolves away, and the elk prospered, and the aspen are no longer regenerating, and the beavers have declined, that when we bring the wolves back that the ecosystem will be anything like it would have been if we never took the wolves away. I highly doubt the entire system will balance itself back out so well to the point that the system will be “what it would have been had humans not altered it”. They claim that putting the wolves back would be like picking up litter in a forest to diminish the human impact on the forest. I think it is largely different and in no way the same. The numbers of species of plants and animals that are integrated into the ecosystem at Yellowstone, and that were affected by the removal and will be affected by the addition of the wolves, are much greater than the number of species affected by a piece of litter I pick up. I feel that the authors are making this idea of restoration look better than it actually is; and a lot simpler as well. There is no doubt in my mind that the removal of wolves did not benefit the natural environment, or the natural flow of the wilderness. But, I do have doubts that putting them back would return the system to what it would have been if we never took the wolves out.