Thursday, October 15, 2009
Wednesday, October 14, 2009
I agree with Derek Parfit’s belief that there doesn’t always have to be a “definite victim” in order to call something bad or a crime. It is undeniable that our choices that we are making now will affect future generations, and I agree that we are responsible for making wise environmental decisions now to ensure that future generations will be better off. Humans are somewhat to blame for any detrimental effect we might have on future generations, and should do what can be done to benefit future generations while also looking out for ourselves.
While others may disagree and challenge that we should look out for the interests of ourselves in the here and now, I believe that we can still further ourselves as well as the potential future generations to come at the same time. Making more environmentally friendly decisions now such as acting to end the overexploitation of resources will help us to live longer with the continual ability to draw from those resources over time, while at the same time helping to preserve the chance that those same resources will help and sustain others in the future. Similarly, burning fossil fuels and pumping other harmful substances into the air is a detriment to us now, and even more so in the future. Depleting the ozone layer, which enables through harmful radiation from the sun, increases the risk of skin cancer as well as a host of other issues that immediately effect generations now, and only grows worse for those in the future. We must not be consumed by short sightedness and instead look to the effects we will have on those individuals yet to come. Becoming environmentally aware and taking actions now really will benefit us, and will most definitely make the lives of people yet to come much better. We must act with not only ourselves in mind, but those of the future in order to secure them with the best possible lives we can.
While others may disagree and challenge that we should look out for the interests of ourselves in the here and now, I believe that we can still further ourselves as well as the potential future generations to come at the same time. Making more environmentally friendly decisions now such as acting to end the overexploitation of resources will help us to live longer with the continual ability to draw from those resources over time, while at the same time helping to preserve the chance that those same resources will help and sustain others in the future. Similarly, burning fossil fuels and pumping other harmful substances into the air is a detriment to us now, and even more so in the future. Depleting the ozone layer, which enables through harmful radiation from the sun, increases the risk of skin cancer as well as a host of other issues that immediately effect generations now, and only grows worse for those in the future. We must not be consumed by short sightedness and instead look to the effects we will have on those individuals yet to come. Becoming environmentally aware and taking actions now really will benefit us, and will most definitely make the lives of people yet to come much better. We must act with not only ourselves in mind, but those of the future in order to secure them with the best possible lives we can.
Future Generations and Energy Policy
It’s hard to say exactly what Parfit might purpose in terms of environmental policy, other than his main claim that we are responsible for the kind of environmental policies that will influence the welfare of people in the future, regardless of whether their personal identity changes as a result of our influence. I agree with Parfit’s claim that “it is bad if those that live are worse off than those who might have lived” (370).This claim seems reasonable to me in that it doesn’t side-step the responsibility that is delegated to the current generation to insure that future generation – again, without reference to whether they are different people because of our influence – have a high quality of life. If can create conditions by which future generations live better lives, we are morally obligated to increase the overall welfare of those people.
At the risk of sounding pedestrian, it’s occurred to me at this point that I really don’t have much to say for or against Parfit’s view only because his thesis, which of course does say interesting things about intergenerational rights and duties, ultimately proposes a common-sense view of morality that I think most people already hold, that is, that we are responsible for the welfare of future people and that we should consider the immediate, long-term, and predictable effects of our actions. This is a simplification of Parfit’s argument, of course, but ultimately I think his riffs on personal identity (which already seem a stretch, like Kristin was suggesting) ultimately lead to a dead end for me. I agree with Melanie’s blog post as well that Parfit, while being philosophically interesting, is at the same time boring and inconsequential for policy formation. I do like this piece however for Parfit’s ability to anticipate the implications of believing or not believing his intuitions as well as the puzzling view of obligations to children that haven’t or won’t be born. So maybe I'm being too harsh.... But I guess I’m just willing to express my (frustrating) inclination to be philosophically provincial here only because my reading of this article has, in regard to understanding environmental issues, brought me around the cul-de-sac back to where I started.
Thoughts on Parfit
The thoughts that jump to the front of my mind regarding Parfit's piece are ones of confusion and a lack of satisfaction. Throughout his writings he suggests multiple hypotheticals, many complicated responses to hypotheticals, which he does not offer complete answers too in every situation, and he relies on a plethora of assumptions without much reasoning. All of this makes it in some cases difficult to follow, particularly when it comes to following his opinion.By the end you do come away with a clear point and conclusion; however, this conclusion is simply "many moral theories need to be revised". If Parfit had taken the time to try and reason as to why a certain theory was better, the writing may have been much more substantial. Regardless, the principle he seems to supporting, principle (B), I do agree with. It would be bad if people are worse off than what they might have been. In the case of depletion or conservation, or any of the situations regarding a large group of people, it seems rather obvious to me depletion is not a good idea. To be honest the amount of hypotheticals he presents creates a great mess of ideas to sift through to find the one conclusion he meagerly offers up.
Still, Parfit's goal is one that seems both pluasible and in general good. Future people should be able to blame those in the past for poor mistakes that lead them to lives that are not as good as they could be. Placing blame on the past does not assist in helping the present. Hopefully it instead makes people now realize that we are responsible for the future and the generations ahead of us. As parents can be blamed for the way children turn out, so can we be blamed for the generations after us; we must not hurt ourselves, but we cannot ignore the consequences of our actions.
Still, Parfit's goal is one that seems both pluasible and in general good. Future people should be able to blame those in the past for poor mistakes that lead them to lives that are not as good as they could be. Placing blame on the past does not assist in helping the present. Hopefully it instead makes people now realize that we are responsible for the future and the generations ahead of us. As parents can be blamed for the way children turn out, so can we be blamed for the generations after us; we must not hurt ourselves, but we cannot ignore the consequences of our actions.
Assumptions Clouding Parfit's Theory
By the end of Derek Parfit’s argument for intergenerational rights and duties, I had not been convinced of my responsibility towards future generations. At face value, it seems he succeeded in showing that a traditional view of these duties are not necessarily accurately posed. However, behind his confusing examples and hypothetical scenarios are left essential assumptions, which we are required to blindly accept.
To clarify his views towards the beginning of the essay, Parfit cites the invention of the train as an example of significant policies, decisions and time affecting our identity. In the respect to my mother and father being in proximity to each other to meet, marry, etc., I agree. But to say that a couple’s sperm and eggs vary enough in the span of one month to completely change their offspring’s identity seems a stretch (though I admit, I am far from adept at the science, so hopefully Cody can shed some insight in class on this). If a couple keeps the same exact lifestyle from August to September, what significant difference would there be between a baby conceived in August versus one conceived in September? Were I the baby conceived in September, I would feel comfortable saying that, had I been instead conceived by the same parents a month earlier, I would still be the same person (not just “sufficiently like” (365) me).
A larger problem I had with the reading was Parfit’s throwing around suggestions of decisions being “worse for” or “better for” individuals, or life being “worth not living.” I wish these concepts had been better qualified with specific mentioning of what it means for someone to be better off, or how one would go about deciding her life was not worth living.
I find it mainly difficult to consider Parfit’s theory because I am not convinced that major population changes occur due to biological differences Parfit suggests, and further because I have no sense of how to judge a good life versus a bad life, versus a life not worth living.
To clarify his views towards the beginning of the essay, Parfit cites the invention of the train as an example of significant policies, decisions and time affecting our identity. In the respect to my mother and father being in proximity to each other to meet, marry, etc., I agree. But to say that a couple’s sperm and eggs vary enough in the span of one month to completely change their offspring’s identity seems a stretch (though I admit, I am far from adept at the science, so hopefully Cody can shed some insight in class on this). If a couple keeps the same exact lifestyle from August to September, what significant difference would there be between a baby conceived in August versus one conceived in September? Were I the baby conceived in September, I would feel comfortable saying that, had I been instead conceived by the same parents a month earlier, I would still be the same person (not just “sufficiently like” (365) me).
A larger problem I had with the reading was Parfit’s throwing around suggestions of decisions being “worse for” or “better for” individuals, or life being “worth not living.” I wish these concepts had been better qualified with specific mentioning of what it means for someone to be better off, or how one would go about deciding her life was not worth living.
I find it mainly difficult to consider Parfit’s theory because I am not convinced that major population changes occur due to biological differences Parfit suggests, and further because I have no sense of how to judge a good life versus a bad life, versus a life not worth living.
arguments against parfit's views questioned
Even though they are view that Parfit is opposing, I don’t think that what is considered good quality of life holds the validity that its argument does, and the idea that we can’t see out of our personal identity. When using the examples of power plants and resource uses, it is said that if the people choose the risky option, or depletion, then people living in the future suffering the consequences won’t be suffering anymore because their identity is in that time frame and they won’t have any other experiences to compare their environment to. The people who are living with these consequences can know that hundreds of years earlier, there was a different option that would have lead to a different outcome, so they know that their reality could have been better.
The very idea of the type of well being in consideration can’t fully constitute all of well being. Again, in the power plant and conservation/depletion examples, it seems quality of life is determined by health, and material possessions. These things factor into well being, but aren’t the most important aspect. The mental state. Wealth doesn’t determine how truly happy a person is. There have been studies that show material possession and wealth don’t equate to more happiness. Even more importantly, as we consume more and gain more, overall happiness hasn’t risen in people. In the case of depletion, we can’t say that their well being is better, because in some other poor places in the world with less consumption, they can have less but be just as happy.
The very idea of the type of well being in consideration can’t fully constitute all of well being. Again, in the power plant and conservation/depletion examples, it seems quality of life is determined by health, and material possessions. These things factor into well being, but aren’t the most important aspect. The mental state. Wealth doesn’t determine how truly happy a person is. There have been studies that show material possession and wealth don’t equate to more happiness. Even more importantly, as we consume more and gain more, overall happiness hasn’t risen in people. In the case of depletion, we can’t say that their well being is better, because in some other poor places in the world with less consumption, they can have less but be just as happy.
Parfit leaves readers wanting
Parfit fell short of making any kind of impact on me with his piece. To be perfectly honest, I didn't even want to finish the piece. I would hope that each paragraph or thought would end with some strong thesis or strong opinion from Parfit but it never did. He seemed almost to switch his views throughout the piece, so I had to keep going back to consult earlier paragraphs, searching for clues to understand.
If he didnt seem to switch sides then he made that little sense to me as a reader, which is also a problem. He also seemed to do a lot of "They are equally important", but this is a problem because the whole reason there is a problem is because a choice can't be made on which one is more important, which one is priority and which should be acted on.
He is just reminding us of the issue at hand without ever providing any kind of assitance, or nothing good enough to be called assistance. By not stating his belief strongly enough for me, as a reader, to carry it through to the end of the reading, he is not providing a defense. And without a defense there is no solution.
He spends so much time providing all these scenarios. He breaks them down and discusses them at length. Then he compares them to each other, making it seem like it will come to this grand conclusion of a logical solution, but it does not.
I'm not trying to insult his intelligence, because he poses good points and forces the reader to examine their beliefs in light of the scenarios and questions. He is sturring thought in readers. It just seems dissapointing that he has so much to say but no real conclusion to speak of.
Anyway, I personally think the whole "the people that would die with the Risky policy would not be alive in the future without that policy" thing is a intellectual waste of time. I feel that it is going no where fast and has no possible solution whatsoever. I mean yes, you have to wonder about it, but posing questions like that will not solve our problem at all.
I think it is our duty to save lives and makes lives better now because we are HERE on earth NOW and that is the duty to which we are entrusted. The NOW. But I do not support the Risky policy (killing people later) just to enhance things for the better now. I do not think it is ok to do something that we know will kill people, ever. Fix now without condemning the future. I personally think that efforts now to make things better (conservation) will inevitably save the future. I think sacrifice is necessary, as long as it doesnt compromise a life, and it is sacrifice that will carry conservation forward.
If he didnt seem to switch sides then he made that little sense to me as a reader, which is also a problem. He also seemed to do a lot of "They are equally important", but this is a problem because the whole reason there is a problem is because a choice can't be made on which one is more important, which one is priority and which should be acted on.
He is just reminding us of the issue at hand without ever providing any kind of assitance, or nothing good enough to be called assistance. By not stating his belief strongly enough for me, as a reader, to carry it through to the end of the reading, he is not providing a defense. And without a defense there is no solution.
He spends so much time providing all these scenarios. He breaks them down and discusses them at length. Then he compares them to each other, making it seem like it will come to this grand conclusion of a logical solution, but it does not.
I'm not trying to insult his intelligence, because he poses good points and forces the reader to examine their beliefs in light of the scenarios and questions. He is sturring thought in readers. It just seems dissapointing that he has so much to say but no real conclusion to speak of.
Anyway, I personally think the whole "the people that would die with the Risky policy would not be alive in the future without that policy" thing is a intellectual waste of time. I feel that it is going no where fast and has no possible solution whatsoever. I mean yes, you have to wonder about it, but posing questions like that will not solve our problem at all.
I think it is our duty to save lives and makes lives better now because we are HERE on earth NOW and that is the duty to which we are entrusted. The NOW. But I do not support the Risky policy (killing people later) just to enhance things for the better now. I do not think it is ok to do something that we know will kill people, ever. Fix now without condemning the future. I personally think that efforts now to make things better (conservation) will inevitably save the future. I think sacrifice is necessary, as long as it doesnt compromise a life, and it is sacrifice that will carry conservation forward.
Parfit what?
I'm sorry I'm completely lost on the whole idea of the "future people". The idea of getting into the specifics of whether when we make a decision the people whom would have existed in the first option are no longer the exact same people who would have existed in the second is just mind-boggling. On 367 he states "If we choose...this will lower the quality of life more than two centuries from now. But the particular people who will then be living would never have existed if instead we had chosen conservation." I don't know about anyone else but that doesn't seem to make a whole lot of sense to me, in the sense of logic. Whether or not these people are really the same people should not matter. The fact is that from a decision we are making, life could be worse for one group of people, or better for another group of people. In the "depletion or conservation case", I think that conservation would be the morally acceptable decision. It accounts for the fact that while "quality" of life would be somewhat more moderate, it would be better off for the whole in general, not just the people who are living in the next two centuries. While if delving into the technicalities of the argument, the people living worse off may not be the exact same people, there are still people involved, with the same moral rights and therefore are entitled to the better quality of life!
In the last full paragraph on 268 Parfit asks the question "Or does it matter whether these lives would be lived by the very same people?" and to answer him, I would say it does not! There will be people either way, people whose lives will be different due to our decisions and because of this it makes a moral difference.
Overall I like the idea of what Parfit is trying to do, and making an argument on the specifics of a situation to further clarify exactly what is going on is respectable. However, I do not think that it makes a whole lot of difference in the grand scheme of things. I belive most of the examples he gives need to be given a "black-and-white" perspective in that in one case, a decision can be made that is better for the future people, or one can be made that is worse for them. That it is. Whether or not they are the the actual same people does not matter, there will still be people in the same situation because of your direct action. Therefore, it is morally reprehensible to make that decision.
In the last full paragraph on 268 Parfit asks the question "Or does it matter whether these lives would be lived by the very same people?" and to answer him, I would say it does not! There will be people either way, people whose lives will be different due to our decisions and because of this it makes a moral difference.
Overall I like the idea of what Parfit is trying to do, and making an argument on the specifics of a situation to further clarify exactly what is going on is respectable. However, I do not think that it makes a whole lot of difference in the grand scheme of things. I belive most of the examples he gives need to be given a "black-and-white" perspective in that in one case, a decision can be made that is better for the future people, or one can be made that is worse for them. That it is. Whether or not they are the the actual same people does not matter, there will still be people in the same situation because of your direct action. Therefore, it is morally reprehensible to make that decision.
The Search for Solution to Energy Policy and Further Future
Parfit's arguments in his piece come mostly in the forms of multitudes of questions rather than succinct and sturdy beliefs. Filled with varying point of views and "for-instances", Parfit has attempted to redevelop the thought process involved in deciding and justifying choices about "intergenerational rights and duties". Yet, how can he claim they are insufficient if he comes to no better conclusion of his own?
He finds the current or most popular views to be wrong or underdeveloped. While not exactly coming to a specific argument for justifying policy decision-making, he generally feels that we are responsible, no matter who or how many come into existance in the future, for policies affecting the standard of living for those humans further along, especially if we can cause their lives to be better or worse because of it.
While hoping for general summations at the ends of paragraphs or any hint of strong support for a single claim for his own belief, I was met with more and more questions and more and more scenarios than I would have liked to come across.
Parfit offered explanations to examples of situations and their implications in relevance to what other people may find to be true and morally relevant; and for his own "intuitions", gave weak suggestions to what may be an acceptable claim. In fact, he changes claims throughout the text, trying to find a suitable and supportable position. He instead concludes his text with the thought that, "...this part of morality...concerned with human welfare, cannot be explained in person-affecting terms. It's fundamental principle will not be concerned with whether acts will be good or bad for those people whom they affect" (Parfit, 372). This leads me to believe that he spent his whole time explaining and questioning what is good or bad to just dismiss it altogether and leave us with the notion that "...moral theories may need to be revised" (372)...but how so? Give something solid!
I understand that he argues against standard views and traditional ways of justifying "intergenerational rights and duties", and he did this by breaking down and disecting situations; but he offers nothing in return or replace of them. He calls for a "claim X"...better and wider than claim B ("If the same number of lives would be lived either way, it would be bad if people are worse off than people might have been") and can sometimes be used in congruence with PAP statement ("It is bad if people are affected for the worse"). Both of these, apparently, are better than his original claim A ("It is bad if those who live are worse off than those who might have lived"), which can only be supported and weighed if he examined more deeply into moral theory...a task he finds too massive to attack.
If he is ending his piece with the idea that human welfare morality cannot be supported in identifying good or bad acts or outcomes, why do all of his statements try to incorporate those conditions? If he realized that such an examination is too much for him to accomplish, why bother at all? I feel he has not persuaded anyone to follow a better method of justifying policies and plans for the future because he offered nothing in return. I'm not sure if Parfit would believe in this, and I'm not even sure I would totally agree with such a notion, but...in an anthropocentric, increase common good point of view...perhaps the following could be fit into an argument or statement: All human life has value and so we must consider all persons and increasing the common good (a long-term goal). Whether a person is of a present or future existence, this does not change the fact they are human beings. Therefore, moral consideration and common good must still be acknowledged.
He finds the current or most popular views to be wrong or underdeveloped. While not exactly coming to a specific argument for justifying policy decision-making, he generally feels that we are responsible, no matter who or how many come into existance in the future, for policies affecting the standard of living for those humans further along, especially if we can cause their lives to be better or worse because of it.
While hoping for general summations at the ends of paragraphs or any hint of strong support for a single claim for his own belief, I was met with more and more questions and more and more scenarios than I would have liked to come across.
Parfit offered explanations to examples of situations and their implications in relevance to what other people may find to be true and morally relevant; and for his own "intuitions", gave weak suggestions to what may be an acceptable claim. In fact, he changes claims throughout the text, trying to find a suitable and supportable position. He instead concludes his text with the thought that, "...this part of morality...concerned with human welfare, cannot be explained in person-affecting terms. It's fundamental principle will not be concerned with whether acts will be good or bad for those people whom they affect" (Parfit, 372). This leads me to believe that he spent his whole time explaining and questioning what is good or bad to just dismiss it altogether and leave us with the notion that "...moral theories may need to be revised" (372)...but how so? Give something solid!
I understand that he argues against standard views and traditional ways of justifying "intergenerational rights and duties", and he did this by breaking down and disecting situations; but he offers nothing in return or replace of them. He calls for a "claim X"...better and wider than claim B ("If the same number of lives would be lived either way, it would be bad if people are worse off than people might have been") and can sometimes be used in congruence with PAP statement ("It is bad if people are affected for the worse"). Both of these, apparently, are better than his original claim A ("It is bad if those who live are worse off than those who might have lived"), which can only be supported and weighed if he examined more deeply into moral theory...a task he finds too massive to attack.
If he is ending his piece with the idea that human welfare morality cannot be supported in identifying good or bad acts or outcomes, why do all of his statements try to incorporate those conditions? If he realized that such an examination is too much for him to accomplish, why bother at all? I feel he has not persuaded anyone to follow a better method of justifying policies and plans for the future because he offered nothing in return. I'm not sure if Parfit would believe in this, and I'm not even sure I would totally agree with such a notion, but...in an anthropocentric, increase common good point of view...perhaps the following could be fit into an argument or statement: All human life has value and so we must consider all persons and increasing the common good (a long-term goal). Whether a person is of a present or future existence, this does not change the fact they are human beings. Therefore, moral consideration and common good must still be acknowledged.
Parfit is too Hypothetical
When reading Derek Parfit's paper, I was somewhat confused as to what his position was on whether or not we should care about future generations and thus, take measures to ensure their survival. From what I gathered, it appears that Parfit believes that we have an obligation to future generations even if those generations consist of different people based on what decisions we make. He believes that wrongs do not require a victim. I believe in order for something to be wrong, it must either affect someone in a harmful way or have the potential to detrimentally affect someone's life. I agree with Parfit that we are somewhat to blame if people in the future are harmed by something we do now, knowing it may have a detrimental affect in the future.
However, Parfit does not convince me that we are more obligated to ensuring the survival of future generations than we are in preserving our current generation. Parit claims that when we make a decision, we must take into consideration not only those individuals who will be alive in future generations, but also those individuals who may have lived if we had made a different choice. Using this method, it is extremely difficult to determine which choice is the better or more "moral" one as we cannot predict the future and exactly what people will be in it. I cannot see a practical application to Parit's argument.
If I have to make a choice as to whether to make life better for someone in the present generation or make a choice that may or may not help someone who may or may not exist in the future, I will be likely to help the person who is alive now. This is not to say that I don't care about the well-being of future generations as I do think it is important to do what we can to preserve resources for them, but I do not think that we should care more about future generations than the generation that is struggling to survive right now. The bottom line is that Parfit has an interesting idea, but it appears to be based too much on hypothetical situations than on concrete evidence.
However, Parfit does not convince me that we are more obligated to ensuring the survival of future generations than we are in preserving our current generation. Parit claims that when we make a decision, we must take into consideration not only those individuals who will be alive in future generations, but also those individuals who may have lived if we had made a different choice. Using this method, it is extremely difficult to determine which choice is the better or more "moral" one as we cannot predict the future and exactly what people will be in it. I cannot see a practical application to Parit's argument.
If I have to make a choice as to whether to make life better for someone in the present generation or make a choice that may or may not help someone who may or may not exist in the future, I will be likely to help the person who is alive now. This is not to say that I don't care about the well-being of future generations as I do think it is important to do what we can to preserve resources for them, but I do not think that we should care more about future generations than the generation that is struggling to survive right now. The bottom line is that Parfit has an interesting idea, but it appears to be based too much on hypothetical situations than on concrete evidence.
Tuesday, October 13, 2009
Monday, October 12, 2009
Martin Golding
Martin Golding has no problem in arguing that our obligations towards future generations are negligible. Before he delves into his argument about obligations he sets up three preliminary questions that need to be addresses. Who and what are the individuals to whom we owe these obligations, and to what class of obligation do they belong. In the first part of his piece he argues that obligations to future generations are essential for the sake of the future community. However, I have several concerns with that; one of which is what is the future? He seems to generalize the future, but does he mean generations from now, or a few years from now. I feel as though no time is better than the present, we have things going on in society that we need to address now- everything from disease to destruction of the Earth. Which takes precedence over the other? That brings up the subject of weight, which is more important. Humanity or the environment… However, trying to stay on track… in the later part of his essay he then turns around to say that present peoples’ should not have any obligation to future fellows. “It is doubtful that we should regard ourselves as being under an obligation to future generations (pg 363).” We don’t know what values they will uphold, what inventions will be introduced, and what futuristic problems may occur. How can we uphold obligations to people who have yet to exist? Golding discusses pollution and curbing population growth and asks how we can have such obligations without the collective effort of the people. It is tough to determine outcomes without the membership of the future generation. Our actions now will determine our future. As Golding states, “whether we have obligations to future generations in part depends on what we do for the present (pg. 364).”
Martin Golding seems to say first that we should make sure that we always look ahead to our future generations to make sure that we keep everything in good shape for them and make the future the best possible for them. I agree with Golding to a point; we should think through the consequences of our actions. I also can take into account his other point that we should not trouble ourselves with the future generations because they may not have the same morals and values that we have today. Who’s to say that the future generations will care about the extinction of a certain species that we care so much about today such as the Polar Bear? There are acts now to help prevent the endangerment of these animals and other precious species that we today see as important and valuable to the world today, but will there be people who even care about Polar Bears and other species in the future? If we always keep looking ahead and not looking at the present, how will we handle the issues today? When Golding says that the future is something to preserve, does he mean that the present is not as valuable? While reading this article, I found myself confused with what he would say as an opinion and would consequently question myself as well. I believe that we should look to the future with regards t our present actions, but it should not be something that we obsess over. I take from this reading a message that says to be concerned but not to have that concern take over our present day lives and keep us distracted from the problems we face today.
The Trouble with Hardin's Math
Garrett Hardin argues that the decisions we make in the present that affect either our immediate benefit or delay benefit for some future generation are like math problems that calculate the changing value of things based on interest. He thinks that when someone needs something in the immediate, his perception of the potential interest that could accrue to that 'something' in the future diminishes until the return is not worth the investment. To relate his example, the hungriest people will decide to eat grains allocated as seeds for future plantings now because they do not appreciate the value of saving them. The trouble with this assessment is that the interest isn't the part of the equation that changes. The grains will have the same value for future generations whether they are reluctantly forgone by the hungry or whether they are preserved by a united society. What really changes in the equation is the value of the 'something' in the first place. The hungriest desire the grain the most, so the initial value of the 'something,' the grain, is higher for them. The well-fed policemen in charge of protecting the grain see less value in the grain, so the investment is less of a sacrifice.
Of course, my correction of Hardin's math does absolutely nothing to help answer the seemingly impossible question of whether we "owe it" to posterity.
I also wanted make a critique of the conservation movement in light of Hardin's essay and his story of the poor Chinese in conflict with the priest. The conservation movement seeks to preserve nature for future generations, while ignoring the needs of the less privileged in the present. The Sierra Club, then, is like the well-fed policeman or priest, who guards the grain or tree, because they do not need it in the immediate present. I imagine the indigenous peoples of so many nations faced with mandates forbidding them from their subsistence practices can make the same point to conservationists: "Why do I have to serve posterity while you stuff your belly? Where is your sense of justice?"
Of course, my correction of Hardin's math does absolutely nothing to help answer the seemingly impossible question of whether we "owe it" to posterity.
I also wanted make a critique of the conservation movement in light of Hardin's essay and his story of the poor Chinese in conflict with the priest. The conservation movement seeks to preserve nature for future generations, while ignoring the needs of the less privileged in the present. The Sierra Club, then, is like the well-fed policeman or priest, who guards the grain or tree, because they do not need it in the immediate present. I imagine the indigenous peoples of so many nations faced with mandates forbidding them from their subsistence practices can make the same point to conservationists: "Why do I have to serve posterity while you stuff your belly? Where is your sense of justice?"
In Who Cares for Posterity? by Garret Hardin he posits an interesting examination of human reason in the context of the existence of future generations. His consideration of human nature, namely our faculty of reason, offered a strong base to ground his argument. I specifically want to address his assertion that resources of the future can only be protected by institutional means. He offers two examples of institutional protection of resources in the siege of Leningrad and food shortage scenario in the USSR. In the first example it was a desire to preserve the horticultural identity of Russia that rationalized many deaths at the hands of starvation. In the second example it was a more explicit reverence for the future itself. In both examples reason was replaced by a belief in some greater good that future existence as a whole is more important than the existence of lives in the immediate. Hardin seems to suggest that we must check reason in order to preserve an environment and ability to exist for the future generations. If he doesn’t flat out call for a rejection of reason, he thinks that it is necessary to reject it at times.
I don’t think he made a sufficient connection between the sacrifices of an individual and that of an institution. His example of institutional sacrifice in the case of Leningrad does not seem to translate over to the individual. Yes, in both cases I mention there are circumstances of starvation and consequent restrictions. In the second example in Russia, it seemed that it was a social agreement that led people to respect the future. What about a situation where a nation was not starving but rather had an abundance of food. Would he say in such cases it is not within human nature to learn or adopt a sufficient reverence for the future? I would hope that in such a case, no matter if he thinks humans are capable of adopting a new reverence, that some degree of reason could be employed. I am not all together convinced that reason should be rejected as a viable medium to adopt a sustainable future. What is so unbelievable about our rational faculty acting in a way that preserves the future? What about the free market for example, what if government put such constraints on the free market where it was not so free anymore. What if it was impossible to be profitable unless your business helped the earth more than it hurt it. While I am not sure that should even happen, I just wanted to point out that application of reason could make the future brighter, even if we don’t care about it.
I don’t think he made a sufficient connection between the sacrifices of an individual and that of an institution. His example of institutional sacrifice in the case of Leningrad does not seem to translate over to the individual. Yes, in both cases I mention there are circumstances of starvation and consequent restrictions. In the second example in Russia, it seemed that it was a social agreement that led people to respect the future. What about a situation where a nation was not starving but rather had an abundance of food. Would he say in such cases it is not within human nature to learn or adopt a sufficient reverence for the future? I would hope that in such a case, no matter if he thinks humans are capable of adopting a new reverence, that some degree of reason could be employed. I am not all together convinced that reason should be rejected as a viable medium to adopt a sustainable future. What is so unbelievable about our rational faculty acting in a way that preserves the future? What about the free market for example, what if government put such constraints on the free market where it was not so free anymore. What if it was impossible to be profitable unless your business helped the earth more than it hurt it. While I am not sure that should even happen, I just wanted to point out that application of reason could make the future brighter, even if we don’t care about it.
We are too selfish to ever care enough about future generations to make any significant difference!
Heilbroner, in his piece asks the loaded question of “why should we care about future people or whether humanity survives in the distant future?” He admits that reason alone won’t drive us care enough about these future generations to actually do something about preserving their future. So he poses an idea, with the help of Smith, that we should use our inner consciousness and, “our love of what is honorable and noble, of the grandeur and dignity, and superiority of our own characteristics” to give us the drive to preserve the future of mankind. I personally think that although this is a great idea, it is just that, an idea. Not a practical answer to his question asked. I think humans are simply too selfish to ever fully adopt the plan to “save” or “preserve” future generations. If reason itself doesn’t compel us help preserve them (and reason is usually the only thing that can make people do things), I think it is ridiculous to think that people will accept the enormous actions that need to be taken for this plan to work because it is honorable, for our dignity, or because it is noble and the right thing to do. I think it’s ridiculous. A few, and definitely not enough to even matter, may be compelled to preserve future generations because of this reason, but most, the large majority of people, will never accept reasons such as dignity or honor as reasons to change any behavior of theirs.
Not only do I disagree with these abstract moral reasons for preserving future peoples, because I don’t think it’s even possible, but I also disagree with Heilbroner’s concept that if we aren’t changing our ways we are “the executioners of mankind” or “that we are passing the ax of the executioner off to the next generation”. I think the prosperity of future generations is up to them. Sounds mean, but who is to say that by preserving our resources and controlling our population numbers we will be making life any better for future generations? For all we know, in the year 3075, a group of people will decide to make a bomb that blows up the entire world. That has nothing to do with us, in this day and age. That particular generation decided to be “the executioners of mankind.” If that were to occur, all of our sacrifice and hard work would be ruined by some future generation, not by us. Even though it sounds selfish, I think we should enjoy ourselves now, while we can. No one knows what the future holds. So who is to say we are making any kind or “horrible difference” with our current actions? And who is to say we would me making some kind of “great improvement” by changing our ways? No one can tell us that, and that is why I think too many people today will not buy into the sacrifices that go along with trying to “preserve future generations”. No one really cares, whether it’s because reason can’t make them care, or because they don’t buy into the honor and dignity idea, they simply don’t care enough to change. And even if either of these reasons can make some people care, it won’t be enough to matter, or to make any significant difference. So let’s have fun while we’re here and let the future generations worry about themselves when that time comes, because they will most likely be trying to “have fun while they are here” as well. So why should we be the saviors if they will most likely screw it up later anyway?
Not only do I disagree with these abstract moral reasons for preserving future peoples, because I don’t think it’s even possible, but I also disagree with Heilbroner’s concept that if we aren’t changing our ways we are “the executioners of mankind” or “that we are passing the ax of the executioner off to the next generation”. I think the prosperity of future generations is up to them. Sounds mean, but who is to say that by preserving our resources and controlling our population numbers we will be making life any better for future generations? For all we know, in the year 3075, a group of people will decide to make a bomb that blows up the entire world. That has nothing to do with us, in this day and age. That particular generation decided to be “the executioners of mankind.” If that were to occur, all of our sacrifice and hard work would be ruined by some future generation, not by us. Even though it sounds selfish, I think we should enjoy ourselves now, while we can. No one knows what the future holds. So who is to say we are making any kind or “horrible difference” with our current actions? And who is to say we would me making some kind of “great improvement” by changing our ways? No one can tell us that, and that is why I think too many people today will not buy into the sacrifices that go along with trying to “preserve future generations”. No one really cares, whether it’s because reason can’t make them care, or because they don’t buy into the honor and dignity idea, they simply don’t care enough to change. And even if either of these reasons can make some people care, it won’t be enough to matter, or to make any significant difference. So let’s have fun while we’re here and let the future generations worry about themselves when that time comes, because they will most likely be trying to “have fun while they are here” as well. So why should we be the saviors if they will most likely screw it up later anyway?
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