Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Oct. 13 by Heilbroner, Hardin, and Golding.

I liked Meadows’s article because it called to attention the fact that we need to do more to protect biodiversity than just protect a couple animals in a zoo, or fence off an area for a national park. I like that she suggests “just leaving it alone.” It seems so simple, yet, like she pointed out before: there is barely any place on earth that humans haven’t raped for its resources. In the end of her article, Meadows calls for everyone to have moral respect for nature no matter what your reasoning is; whether it’s selfish or whatever.

Moving onto Russow’s article, I was bothered again by the selfishness displayed in the arguments of human beings to save certain species. With all of the recent readings, I am having a hard time coming up with a really good, convincing argument as to why species have value other than the value humans put on them. I hate the selfish arguments for things like game animals (“there will be fewer for humans to hunt if their numbers drop”) or the story about the condor eggshells that were weakened by DDT (“well then it’s probably affecting human health as well”) or protecting rare plants (“because of their medicinal value to humans.”) Why can’t we just protect and conserve things because living thing should have the right to live and thrive?

As for the case of the Orioles… it is more natural for animals or a species to weed themselves out than it is for them to be made extinct by humans. I feel like the Orioles should be encouraged to keep up with their seemingly natural interbreeding, because they are probably coming up with a stronger, better species by doing so. They’re probably doing this and getting the good traits from both species.

Meadows and Russow

Meadows has a very practical argument which is fairly simple in the way she states it which is that we need to control humanity in order to protect the environment regardless of we do it for moral reasons or for reasons of self-preservation. Russow’s claim that we need to protect the Earth to defend ourselves I can completely agree with though I believe it is more complex than she makes it out to be. For example what are ethical ways of controlling human numbers with such a huge base population and in what ways should we govern ourselves? I think these are much, much more difficult questions to answer than she makes them out to be. I don’t know why Russow believes it is more arrogant to consider ecosystems as a source of economic value in creating medicines etc rather than viewing them in terms of their ecosystem services or in their accumulated knowledge. All seem very anthropocentric reasons for valuing diversity so I would think they would be fairly equally arrogant. I largely agree that biodiversity as a source of economic value, environmental services, and as a source of wisdom are very accurate reasons to value nature.
Russow seems to conclude that species can have a greater/less degree of aesthetic value and that we have moral obligations to preserve that aesthetic value. I can agree that aesthetic value is definitely a valid source of value to give to creatures however while it may seem a practical one to her I am not sure that it is. For one thing it is a very subjective source of value and what one person finds aesthetically pleasing may vary from person to person. I also feel that it could be considered a rather arrogant point of view to equate life to a piece of art such as a painting. I am also not sure what the basis is for a moral obligation to preserve things with aesthetic value. Is aesthetic value an example of intrinsic value and how do we measure it? Personally it seems to me that while she does prove that other arguments will fail to protect certain species, aestheticism will also fail to accomplish giving protection to species.

Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Oct. 8 by Meadows, Russow, and Stone.

Morality and Natural Behavior in Watson

In his piece, “A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Ethics”, Richard Watson discusses the unattractive implications of the anti-anthropocentric, egalitarian view, which he believes amounts to self-contradiction. However, I will offer objections to his treatments of morality and ‘natural human behavior’. I begin by offering two quotations. The first highlights Naess’ distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘life’ communities, which Watson quickly dismisses. He writes, “Animals cannot be citizens [i.e., members of a human moral community]. But animals may, as far as I can understand, be members of life communities” (237). Watson goes on to argue, “If we are to treat man as a part of nature on egalitarian terms with other species, then man’s behavior must be treated as morally neutral too” (238). However, why is it that humans cannot be equal to other species by being a member of Naess’ “life community”, and at the same time be the lone member of the moral community?

An alarming implication of anti-anthropocentric and egalitarian view, if Watson is correct that people must be “morally neutral” in the above sense, is a kind of “inactivism” (236); when the biocentrist’s “hands-off” view towards other species is combined with egalitarianism, Watson believes he is similarly required to ‘take his hands off’ his own species. Notice how this absolute and unapologetic inactivism strikes us a kind of moral failing. I believe that it is an overextension on Watson’s part to say that we would need to restrain ourselves in this way and to actually refrain from following our moral impulses. To act in such a way would be like attempting to imitate a species incapable of moralizing, as opposed to really acting in a way that is “natural” for humans.

Watson expresses his understanding of ‘natural behavior’ when he argues, “Human ways—human culture—and human actions are as natural as are the ways in which any other species of animals behaves. But if we view the state of nature or Nature as being natural, undisturbed, and unperturbed only when human beings are not present, or only when human beings are curbing their natural behavior [emphasis added], then we are assuming that human beings are apart from, separate from, different from, removed from, or above nature” (238). The italicized passage highlights a conflict between natural behavior and morality, but this is not how we think about these issues. Consider, if we were to use “natural” in this way, we would be hard pressed to identify when a human is living in his or her “natural state”—is it (1) when acting morally (which will require the rejection of some desires, such as the desire to pursue “evolutionary potential” (239)), or is it (2) when living out our evolutionary potential (which might involve denying the morally relevant features of a situation and the accompanying intuitions we experience)?

Watson’s treatment of the issues of morality and natural human behavior are problematic and ultimately stand in the way of his argument against the anti-anthropocentric view.

social ecology: almost there

Social Ecology provides an organic view of social theory such that it claims that the present ecological problems are rooted in deep-seated social problems. This particular theory emphasizes the inter-dependence with humans and nature. Moreover, it stresses the importance of examining the degree of connectedness you currently have with yourself, individuals, your community and nature.

Bookchin makes a strong case for the concept of social ecology by examining the relationships between human populations and their environments. This idea accentuates the notion that you can enhance yourself, society, the environment, and ultimately the world. Moreover, Bookchin describes the complexity of relationships between people and with nature, along with the importance of examining the social structures that coincide with these dynamics. Our ecological problems cannot be realized, much less managed or solved, without facing the social issues from that activate or perpetuate them. Social ecology positions the roots of the ecological crisis in a theory of domination between people. Thus, the domination of nature is seen as a product of domination within society. Therefore, if we change the relationships between humans, then our relationship with the rest of nature can change.

However, my reservations with Bookchin’s arguments lie in following two concepts. One is the concept of domination; couldn’t a socially egalitarian society, free of social domination, exploit the Earth and nature too? What would Bookchin reply to this? He doesn’t seem to address this point which makes his claim less substantial.

Another criticism of mine lies in his evaluation of Deep Ecology. His main critiques stems from his dismissal of Deep Ecology’s ecobabble. I fully believe that Deep Ecology relies too much on the idea of ‘Self’ and “Earth wisdom” and ignores the social nature of humanity and the social origins of our present ecological crisis. However, wouldn’t it be fairly easy for critics to easily assume social ecology is guilty of the same type of jargon? How can he provide an argument against this?

But, more importantly, I believe that Bookchin has cautiously detailed a rational and inter-disciplinary philosophy which he strongly upholds and defends. Thus, social ecology presents a more reliable and sound argument than deep ecology. Social Ecology’s best argument lies in the forward-looking nature and notion of responsibility inherent; thus emphasizing re-individualization that can transform humans into active agents in remaking society.

Is Hierarchy Necessary for Human Societies?

I am critical of Bookchin’s assertion that hierarchy is the root of our environmental problems because of his lack of comparative evidence with his utopia. His goal is to destroy hierarchy and have humanity be equal with the environment (Bookchin 242). I am skeptical of the removal of hierarchy because of Bookchin’s lack of societal examples, and his evidence of hierarchy throughout human culture (Bookchin 246). While Bookchin’s argument of re- individualization strengthens the offense against hierarchy, it does not do so adequately because of the vague nature of the concept. It would be more convincing if Bookchin gave a process to this transformation.

Bookchin focuses on a primarily negative view of hierarchy, and does not examine its possible benefits, such as societal order. Considering the history of hierarchy, I would argue that nature selects for such a system, and that Bookchin’s utopia could be unsustainable. If every human were to be conceptually “re-individualized” and had a powerful empathy with the oppressed of the world, would they follow “social ecology”? How will a human group remove hierarchical values and how would their symbiotic society function? These are questions that Bookchin considers but only gives optimal answers for without considering negative alternatives.

I believe that a social ecology could occur, but that it will break down, as hierarchy manifests itself again in human nature. I do not believe that hierarchy can be destroyed but at the same time I do not want to believe that humanity’s true nature is to dominate. While Bookchin’s argument progresses the understanding of human domination in environmental problems, I believe he demonizes it too early, without weighing the pros and the cons in comparison to his utopia.

The arguments of Richard Watson raise two main points which lead to a valid challenge to the ecological philosophy of many anti-anthropocentric biocentrism views. The first point Watson makes of George Sessions view, particularly his contention of the intrinsic value found in ecological equilibrium raises an important question of the extent to which value can be placed on nature itself. More importantly, he raises an even greater question challenging the ecosophy view of what the ultimate goal of human life is.
As Watson points out, the concept of human’s role in nature as superior does not have to result in a destructive end. It may very well result in that but it seems to be presumptuous to say that human beings as actors in nature should not be considered apart of it. I especially like his argument contending the ecosophy view that humans should not change the ecology of the planet. Since humans are as much a part of nature as a rat or fish, they should be able to do what they are naturally capable of doing. That includes thinking and utilizing their rationality to better themselves and their lives. The goal of humanity will never be to simply end its existence, but like Watson said it could very well end up happening. In that light, I am all for humans being allowed to live within their natural disposition and act within their nature. If it is within human nature to ultimately destroy itself than let it happen. We cannot change human nature to suite a desired outcome in our dealings with the environment. It seems if we tried to we would end up in the same position if we hadn’t tried.
What is to say that we cannot work in light of human nature and go with the very relationships that define humanity? Humans should utalyze their rational faculties to improve their relationship with the environment. It only seems natural to go this route.
The second argument made by Watson challenging Spinoza’s contention that the ultimate good of humanity to arrive at a greater understanding of nature. It does not seem to be the ultimate goal of humanity being as most people don’t do it. Moreover, just because it would bring you joy to realize a greater understanding of nature, does not mean that it is the ultimate end of humanity. It is dangerous to associate such sweeping assumptions to an argument for an ecological ethic. It made sense for Watson to contest this point and it is perfectly logical to assume human nature is contrary to that which Spinoza posits.

Anti-Anthropocentric Ethics

I believe that Watson’s position against ecosophy fails to recognize certain counterarguments. He says that according to ecosophy, nature is natural only when human beings are not present or restraining their natural behavior, and that this assumes that humans are separate from nature. I would argue that nature is as it should be when no one species is causing astronomical and devastating effects on the environment—it just happens to be that humans are that species, and it would be just as bad an action if it were done by any other species. He also says that other species are morally neutral and their behavior can be neither good nor bad, but that the moral evaluation of human behavior sets humans apart. I might argue that each species has its own unique characteristics that distinguish it from others, for example, human morality. On one level, certainly, all species are different, but on a much deeper lever perhaps all things are one. One might also say, to make things a bit more equal, that an action of any species can be bad or wrong, and that no behavior is morally neutral; however, any animals, not just humans, that are able to understand the moral significance of their actions ought to be held responsible for any wrong actions, and in this way the division is not made between nonhumans and humans, it just happens to lie there as far as we know. Watson also says that it is the nature of humans to flourish at the expense of other species and the planet’s ecology. From this position, I am led to assume that he believes that this nature is inherent in humans; however, I believe that there can be, and have been, individuals and even societies who do not live by causing massive destruction. If this nature can be separated from the human, then it is not inherent, and so should not serve as a reason why such destruction is a natural part of being a human being. Watson also comments that humans alter things, and that this is their destiny and nature’s way. It might be any being’s nature to alter things a bit, but I do not see evidence that humans inherently must cause a large scale of devastation to the planet. In addition, just because it is does not mean that it ought to be. Slavery, at a time, was widely accepted, but just because it existed does not mean that it ought to have existed. Even if humans do tend to ruin their environment, it does not mean that they ought to, let alone that their very tendency to damage their surroundings gives them the right to ruin them.

I think Watson in his “Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Ethics” focuses on one of the toughest objections to the philosophy presented by deep ecology. The goal of deep ecology is for human beings to see themselves as being a part of nature. The sense of yourself is more than just you as an individual but your self is expanded to include all living things with which you have a connection. However, this deep ecology movement puts limits on human expansion, consumption, and materialism. Why is it then, if we are equal to everything other species, that we are the only species needing to hold ourselves back? “If man is a part of nature, if he is a ‘plain citizen’, if he is just one nonprivileged member of a ‘biosphereical egalitarianism’, then the humans species should be treated in no way different from any other species”(p. 237).

Watson explores this and realizes that is does not make sense to argue from the deep ecology stand point to answer this question because if we are part of nature there is no reason to stop doing whatever we, in our capacities as humans, are capable of. However, if you argue, like he does, from an anthropocentric view you will find that it is for our own good that we need to scale back, for the preservation of the species. While this argument makes sense it still does not solve the problem of practicality that both views are missing. Yes, it may be easier to formulate a curriculum around the threat our activities are posing on our future, it is more or less the environmental education happening today.

Yet, some would argue that this education is failing, why? Humans have self interest in mind because that is their nature. They fail to see the need for drastic change because they do not feel threatened by the environmental changes happening. Deep ecology feels that this would change if they expanded their understanding of self to include the whole world, but I think this is a leap and the solution is still not found.

Social Ecology vs Deep Ecology

I am not certain whether Bookchin is criticizing basic deep ecology or what deep ecology developed into. For example, the abstract connections to the environment discussed by Naess in his essay ecosophy T aren’t included in the eight basic principles of deep ecology as listed in Devall and Sessions. However, if Naess’s philosophy is always presented with deep ecology they become entwined. Regardless, I have to agree with Bookchin on a couple of things. First, deep ecology’s advocacy of population control is troubling. While they do not use those words, principle four in Duvall and Sessions implies that such a thing is necessary. Population control is out of place in a theory that is asking people to see the value in and cease from harming all living things. If humans should value and cease from harming all life, isn’t it then wrong to discuss methods of active population control? Or is it that we are supposed to be passive and value even the aspects of nature that take life (disease, etc)? It seems imperialistic to say so because it is the underdeveloped third world countries that would be affected most and they as people are not any less valuable than people in overdeveloped western countries.
I also agree with Bookchin’s main point that deep ecology doesn’t address the social issues that are the root of the ecological crisis. The main social force he sees as a root is capitalism. Deep ecology does not address capitalism as an issue and is an impossible solution in a nation/world run dominantly by such a system. Capitalism is a selfish hierarchical structure that is constantly working to maximize profits and minimize production costs by allocating cheap resources. Doing what is environmentally or ecologically responsible is currently costly meaning that corporations and big businesses typically have no interest in being environmentally responsible. Because environmental abuse is intrinsic in capitalism, I agree with Bookchin that a social ecology that would address such issues is necessary.

Sessions: All life is equally important, humans are not demigods

Session states that “Nature knows best.” This statement is probably the strongest statement in Watson’s whole piece. Given all the medical advances that have come about since the dawn of the twenty-first century, it is astounding that humans cannot find a way to create life from non-living organic compounds. Even attempts at creating a test tube babies and encouraging natural fertilization have resulted in dismal results. On average, of eight ova taken from a host mother only two or three will be fertilized and will be chosen to be placed in the mother’s uterus. Once in the uterus, the embryo must then attach to the uterine wall. The success rate at this stage is staggering low. Here the natural process of fertilization and reproduction that nature has perfected cannot even be imitated by humans when they are using the same materials as nature. This example clearly shows that humans do not own nature, another key point of Watson’s.
The example outlined above is man’s attempt at creation; however, Sessions states in Spinoza states that humans “can only manifest or express themselves through injury to others.” Unfortunate as it may be, Sessions notes that humans have done nothing productive to the planet. As stated previously, humans are too destructive, too powerful, and too successful in regards to reproductive capabilities. Over exploitation of the environment leads to niche loss for other organisms and ultimately they are no longer needed and cease to exist. For a species that has such high cognitive ability and holds itself at a sub-god level, it is upsetting that we are unable to resist the urge to over exploit our resources. Humans must therefore choose to be demigods and give up their animalistic urges or become harmonious with the world around them and act as an equal to the rest of the earth’s species.

Anti-Anti-Anthropocentric Ethics

In his critique of anti-anthropocentric ethics, Richard Watson argues that anti-anthropocentrists or biocentrists contradict themselves by setting humans apart from the rest of nature while simultaneously advocating equality among all life forms. Watson believes that any environmental ethic should be based on a human interest in survival, and that this is possible because of the fact that what's good for the environment will promote our survival as a species as well.
While I agree with Watson in his claim that generally speaking, what is good for the environment is also good for humans as an individual species in the long run, I disagree with Watson's argument that biocentrists contradict themselves by striving for equality among species while concurrently placing humans above the rest of nature. It's not that simple.
Biocentrists do not necessarily believe that humans and other life forms should be treated as equals; this obviously wouldn't be feasible since other life forms don't possess our cognitive capacity and can't function in society in the same way that we do (e.g., animals can't vote). What I think all biocentrists have in common, however, is that they believe that all forms of life deserve moral consideration and should be treated with respect. It is possible to possess this view and recognize the differences between human beings and other organisms without placing human beings "above" the rest of nature.
Kenneth Goodpaster, for instance, is a biocentrist but acknowledges the fact that while possessing a life can make one morally considerable, it does not automatically make one of equal moral worth and deserving of the same rights as human beings. Although in a sense this does place human beings at a higher level than other forms of life, this position does not advocate the domination and destruction of nature by humans but rather encourages humans, as creatures who possess great power and are capable of significantly altering the planet, to respect other creatures and the environment in general. Considering the well-being of humans as well as that of other species is an attitude more likely to promote better treatment of the environment than the attitude that we should only focus on what is best for human survival.

I agree with Watson, that man has as much right to follow his own evolutionary path as any other animal on the planet. I believe that man is a part of nature, and that he is not apart from nature. Human’s have a thought process that allows us to plan and invent and pursue things on a bigger scale than other animals. In order for our survival and evolution, man must be true to his path just as a beaver would create dams to be true to his. Even if we didn’t interfere with nature, there would still be species that would get wiped out, and species that would be more dominant. While humans want to take care of the environment because they feel that it’s our responsibility to, it also it so that we can survive. If the environment dies along with all the things that help us live our daily lives, then I’m sure more people will recognize that when crops die and we have to experience what it’s like when there truly is a food shortage. We are a part of nature in that what we do is a way to help nature evolve and then in turn, evolve ourselves. Technologies invented to help man, will, but we cannot take earth’s natural resources for granted. Sure, nature has the ability to heal itself, and sometimes that is the cause of man, but the balance in nature is always changing because of new species that evolve and how their impact changes the environment for where they are placed. Watson thinks that we should keep to our path and continue to evolve and help other species evolve too. Maybe there is a way to keep our impact to a minimum and not completely take over nature’s role in the world.