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Thursday, December 3, 2009
Stuart Mill's Attempt
John Stuart Mill’s challenges the idea that in order to have more prosperity and welfare, resources need to be overly used to ensure economic growth. Conversely, he believes that constraints on our over consumptive attitudes is needed in order to improve the quality of life. Ultimately, Mill is arguing for a more qualitative way of live as opposed to a quantitative. He states that the increase of wealth is not boundless, and that the progressive state will one day come to a halt. The only logical conclusion is that this unlimited growth attitude will destroy the environment and inevitably reduced quality of life. However, he seems to write as though he knows we will always move forward, and will not heed the warning signs the environment throws our way. This article was written in 1884. We have, to this day, not slowed down. In fact, humanity is moving ever forward. Every year the Earth is pumped with more gases due to the anthropogenic caused by mankind.
Another thing I picked up on was his common idea of integrating humanity and the universe. He groups everyone and everything together as a species in which needs to work together to improve the overall universe. He pushes for education to be a main concern. It’s as if being less educated is a scape-goat, exemption from the overall economic crisis. Therefore we should include them. The “better” minds are those who are going to bring this universe to a standstill, but it will affect everyone inside it. Overall, people should take responsibility for their actions, and in the meantime cease the notion that economic growth comes from killing the Earth.
I could not agree more with Schmidtz’s view that cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is necessary but not sufficient to determine morally permissible policies and decisions. As a “framework,” CBA would serve as a starting point for an open dialogue as to deciding what policies to enact. If a policy should fail the CBA, in that its costs would outweigh its benefits, it should be sent back to its makers for revisions or be discarded in its entirety. But, should a policy pass the CBA, it should necessarily not be automatically assumed that the policy is reasonable and should be enacted. Instead, we should conclude “that the policy has passed one crucial test and therefore further discussion is warranted.” Using CBA for the sheer sake of having full information of all benefits and costs a specific policy may cause is logical and necessary, in my opinion. It does well to guide our discussion, but CBA should not be used to decide policy alone.
Unfortunately, it is past this point at which I became stuck. In describing the limitations of CBA, Schmidtz emphasizes the importance in respecting people’s rights, certainly an important and admirable action. However, to illustrate his argument, he introduces Peeveyhouse v. Garland Coal (1962). He notes that Garland Coal refused to perform its contractual obligations in their entirety by not restoring the Peeveyhouse property back to its original condition after completing a strip-mining operation on it. Restoring the land would cost Garland Coal $29,000, while the restored land’s value would have be worth only $300. Referring to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma’s decision to award Peeveyhouse $300 in damages as “generally…regarded as utterly mistaken,” Schmidtz explains that the court reached its decision because the restoration would not be cost-effective. Though quite biased, nothing Schmidtz stated was false. Still, I feel need to offer defense to the court’s decision. To do so, I used the case law - http://academic.udayton.edu/CasesLawEcon/Contracts/Peevyhouse%201962.pdf.
One aspect ignored by Schmidtz was the actual contract itself. In exchange for royalties on the extracted coal, Peeveyhouse allowed Garland to strip-mine a section of their land for five years. A provision of this contract was that Garland was expected to return the land to its original condition. Although the major terms of the contract were upheld by both parties, Garland did breach the contract by not performing the provision. However, there was substantial performance of the contract. Although it can be argued that $300 in expectancy damages (the value of the land had Garland restored it) was not sufficient, it is also not unreasonable to argue that $300 is an equitable remedy. For instance, the economic waste doctrine holds that “if granting repair costs to the owner would result in ‘unreasonable economic waste,’ then the proper measure of the owner's damages should be the difference between the value of the project as promised in the contract and its value as delivered” (https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=43+DePaul+L.+Rev.+185&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=5c38a755056f84a867ca8216380126c8). As a main rule of contract law, a party should not be awarded more damages than she would have anticipated had the contract she was a party to had it not been breached. In an ideal world, Garland would owe Peeveyhouse specific performance, or at least enough compensation for Peeveyhouse to find an outside party to hire to fix his land. In such an ideal world, the court would consider the subjective value of the land to Peeveyhouse, and not just its monetary value. But, such a thing as expectancy damages is necessary in the realm of contracts.
As discussed in my business law class, consider my making a contract with a builder to build my dream home. I stipulate a specific placement of the windows in my house. Upon completion of my home, I see that my windows are placed in wrong positions by a matter of inches. The builder did in fact breach our contract, and I want him to correct his mistake, which would indeed involve a great sum of money and seems on the whole, an unreasonable remedy for the builder’s innocent mistake. Protecting the builder from such a commercial impracticality, the court would consider any loss of value to my home due to the different placement of the windows. Although the placement has important subjective value to me, it would not change the monetary amount my home is worth. As such, no action would be taken against the builder.
This tangent was probably not worthwhile, in that I still find myself agreeing with Schmidtz’s core points. Maybe it could illustrate the complexity behind decisions and policies in that cost-effectiveness must at least be a consideration in addition to morality. But overall, I just found myself irked at Schmidtz’s quick dismissal and simplification of the Oklahoma court’s conclusion.
Unfortunately, it is past this point at which I became stuck. In describing the limitations of CBA, Schmidtz emphasizes the importance in respecting people’s rights, certainly an important and admirable action. However, to illustrate his argument, he introduces Peeveyhouse v. Garland Coal (1962). He notes that Garland Coal refused to perform its contractual obligations in their entirety by not restoring the Peeveyhouse property back to its original condition after completing a strip-mining operation on it. Restoring the land would cost Garland Coal $29,000, while the restored land’s value would have be worth only $300. Referring to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma’s decision to award Peeveyhouse $300 in damages as “generally…regarded as utterly mistaken,” Schmidtz explains that the court reached its decision because the restoration would not be cost-effective. Though quite biased, nothing Schmidtz stated was false. Still, I feel need to offer defense to the court’s decision. To do so, I used the case law - http://academic.udayton.edu/CasesLawEcon/Contracts/Peevyhouse%201962.pdf.
One aspect ignored by Schmidtz was the actual contract itself. In exchange for royalties on the extracted coal, Peeveyhouse allowed Garland to strip-mine a section of their land for five years. A provision of this contract was that Garland was expected to return the land to its original condition. Although the major terms of the contract were upheld by both parties, Garland did breach the contract by not performing the provision. However, there was substantial performance of the contract. Although it can be argued that $300 in expectancy damages (the value of the land had Garland restored it) was not sufficient, it is also not unreasonable to argue that $300 is an equitable remedy. For instance, the economic waste doctrine holds that “if granting repair costs to the owner would result in ‘unreasonable economic waste,’ then the proper measure of the owner's damages should be the difference between the value of the project as promised in the contract and its value as delivered” (https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=43+DePaul+L.+Rev.+185&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=5c38a755056f84a867ca8216380126c8). As a main rule of contract law, a party should not be awarded more damages than she would have anticipated had the contract she was a party to had it not been breached. In an ideal world, Garland would owe Peeveyhouse specific performance, or at least enough compensation for Peeveyhouse to find an outside party to hire to fix his land. In such an ideal world, the court would consider the subjective value of the land to Peeveyhouse, and not just its monetary value. But, such a thing as expectancy damages is necessary in the realm of contracts.
As discussed in my business law class, consider my making a contract with a builder to build my dream home. I stipulate a specific placement of the windows in my house. Upon completion of my home, I see that my windows are placed in wrong positions by a matter of inches. The builder did in fact breach our contract, and I want him to correct his mistake, which would indeed involve a great sum of money and seems on the whole, an unreasonable remedy for the builder’s innocent mistake. Protecting the builder from such a commercial impracticality, the court would consider any loss of value to my home due to the different placement of the windows. Although the placement has important subjective value to me, it would not change the monetary amount my home is worth. As such, no action would be taken against the builder.
This tangent was probably not worthwhile, in that I still find myself agreeing with Schmidtz’s core points. Maybe it could illustrate the complexity behind decisions and policies in that cost-effectiveness must at least be a consideration in addition to morality. But overall, I just found myself irked at Schmidtz’s quick dismissal and simplification of the Oklahoma court’s conclusion.
Citizens or Consumers?:
I agree with Sagoff’s argument for a Kantian approach to policy recommendation in regard to the environment – humans ultimately have to be treated as “ends in themselves” and not as simply a set of market preferences. It is obvious, however, that what people politically support and what people consume can be completely different and, in fact, contradictory. Our market preferences will never completely align with our political preferences, but this doesn’t mean that we should view human beings as merely “haver[s] of wants” (635) but rather it suggests that our market preferences ultimately cannot be the judge of our policy, especially in regard to the environment. The economist approach to policy formation suggests that what we ought to do as a community is less important than what we actually do as individuals making choices in the market place. Morality, however, isn’t concerned necessarily with the way things are but rather with the way things should be, and indeed, the economist’s position then isn’t concerned with morality but with efficiency and expediency in the market.
The challenge which Sargoff faces, however, is the practical application of the Kantian position. If, as the economist suggest, our market preferences accurately reflect our interests – though we would support just political causes at the same time – then ultimately our policy must coincide with the majority opinion. We can’t pretend that we are against factory farming if we are consistently supporting the industry; our market preferences show to the economists our true selves behind the politically correct/ideal mask which we hide behind. Sargoff, however, responds to this objection by claiming that, though our market preferences as consumers may ultimately express our true interests, we are nevertheless still outside of morality, that is, still talking about the way things are rather than how they ought to be. The practical application of Kantian principles, while extremely demanding, may be exactly what morality requires and our obligations as citizens may, in fact, sometimes trump our preferences as individual consumers.
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Schmidtz
Schmidtz’s piece is one of the few readings we have had that seems to takes other arguments more seriously, and understands that things are not simply black and white. His support of Cost Benefit Analysis is well placed, as is his skepticism in it. Though I agree that there are benefits from CBA Full Cost Accounting, such as the public’s ability to scrutinize and provide input in, Schmidtz does not address the issue of value enough. To be clear though, CBA, if done properly, does offer a chance for greater equity, environmental protection, and other goods. To denounce CBA in every aspect implies turning a blind eye to another tool that may help people makes good decisions (not a definite), something that makes no sense.
The other issue I have with CBA concerns values. Schmidtz makes reference to this, but he does not seem to give the idea enough weight. He falls back on the fact that we are simply human on several occasions. We are not evil, just human. Does that imply we naturally do not act fully accountable? If that’s the case then there is a great deal of work ahead of humanity.
I got a bit side tracked, but another point I wanted to mention regards the case of the neighbor with the barking dog. It says he’s not evil for keeping his neighbors up at night, since he was not fully accountable. In this case, and many others though, I believe he (or a she) is fully accountable though. The point here is that the others do not react when they have the ability to do so. One last thing to mention is the use of the Ontario Hydro case. Schmidtz final mentioning of this is that the prospects of public accounting made Ontario Hydro rethink what they owe the environment. There could be a multitude of other reasons this happened that Schmidtz does not mention, ranging from tax breaks, a new CEO, new legislation, a bad series of PR, and more. Schmidtz should not presume so much.
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I agree with what Mill says about how more economic growth doesn’t correlate to total well being of a population. It makes to me know how certain people hold the wealth in the word. An example would be corporations that set up shop in third world countries paying employees cents a day. They make huge profits and their products are sold in the wealthier nations that can afford to buy their products; it limits the movement of money to first word nations and because the third world employees are getting paid so little, little money moves between the first world and third world. Corporations like Nike, Dell, and once Union Carbondale have outsourced to the third world for the cheap labor. It’s a win/no-gain situation where the first world wins. The argument would be the trickle down affect but the trickle down affect is limited to the first world nations where the products are sold, because the only money in the third world goes to the workers which is very little. Third world nations aren’t in a strong position to fight back because these corporations one of their very few significant sources of income; if they start demanding more, then corporations can just uproot and go to another poor country that seeks their services. In essence the third world nations are at the mercy of the corporations. The fix to this problem would be to get a significant flow of money in third world nations. If they could produce their own product and sell it to first world companies not at dirt cheep prices, then they could start to see some improvement. Costa Rica has done this with real estate; it started out very cheap, but as more people moved in, the shops and restaurants in the area where first world citizens lived would have first world prices which has significantly helped improve the status of well being in their nation because the money has trickled down to the workers who have spent transferring it throughout the nation.
I strongly agree with Sagoff’s opinion that basic cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is not the best tool for decision making. As he points out, it may be the best tool for basic decisions about how much of a specific product should be produced for sale, but it cannot be fittingly applied to social and environmental issues. This is because most people think that there are things in the world that have worth that goes beyond monetary value. However, some would argue that value is merely determined by “willingness to pay.” But, though we as consumers may buy a product whose manufacturer pollutes the environment or exploits their workers does not mean that we support those actions. I agree with Colm to an extent that our personal consumer actions are often selfishly driven by personal desire while our voting/political actions are more often guided by our views of right and wrong. This dichotomy tells us that in making decisions there are things outside of mere costs and benefits that matter to people. Therefore, basic CBA is not an adequate tool for measuring the desirability of stronger labor laws or stronger environmental standards. I would like to point out that I do not think the dichotomy between consumer actions and political actions is right. People should consider what they are indirectly supporting when they purchase a specific product. This is difficult because patrons rarely have all the information about where a product comes from and how it is made, but if we made an attempt to vote with our money some of the things we value intrinsically would gain in monetary value and be given more consideration in cost-benefit analyses.
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Decision Making
Mark Sagoff argues in his article “At the Shrine of Our Lady of Fatima, or Why Political Questions Are Not All Economic” that cost-benefit analysis should not necessarily be the determinant of political decisions. I agree with this claim and believe that many political decisions, such as the decision to pass a law such as one proposed by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) that would (supposedly) protect American workers from exposure to harmful toxins, should not be made solely on the basis of cost-benefit analysis. However, I think that Sagoff could have made his argument stronger by acknowledging the usefulness as well as the inadequacy of cost-benefit analysis. One could argue, for instance, that some such decisions, such as the decision to employ methods of geoengineering should be based at least in part on cost-benefit analysis.
If the potential costs or disadvantages of injecting sulphate aerosols into the atmosphere (e.g., causing further anthropogenic harm to the atmosphere/ozone, causing harm/injury to people, causing species extinctions) outweigh the potential benefits of doing so (e.g., improving the condition of the atmosphere), the logical conclusion that we would then come to would be that we should not use this method of geoengineering because of the risk(s) associated with it. However, any decision, whether or not it concerns the environment, should be made based on the consideration of multiple factors- cost-benefit analysis could be one of these factors but should not be the only one. Likewise, any other factor should not on its own be the basis of any decisions, especially those decisions that directly concern the health of the environment.
If the potential costs or disadvantages of injecting sulphate aerosols into the atmosphere (e.g., causing further anthropogenic harm to the atmosphere/ozone, causing harm/injury to people, causing species extinctions) outweigh the potential benefits of doing so (e.g., improving the condition of the atmosphere), the logical conclusion that we would then come to would be that we should not use this method of geoengineering because of the risk(s) associated with it. However, any decision, whether or not it concerns the environment, should be made based on the consideration of multiple factors- cost-benefit analysis could be one of these factors but should not be the only one. Likewise, any other factor should not on its own be the basis of any decisions, especially those decisions that directly concern the health of the environment.
In Defense of Steady-State Economics
Mill makes strong points in his support of a steady-state type of economy. He focuses on two main components of our current societies that must be addressed and changed in order to reach a favorable state of living for all (humans and environment). Both population and consumption should be controlled and reduced.
In realizing our current condition with overcrowding, struggle for employment, depletion of natural resources, and extremities between classes, Mill states that a steady-state would be an improvement. Being in a more stagnant system does not mean there will not be continued increase in spiritual, educational, technological, and scientific fields. And it could increase these parts of culture and social progress as a whole.
Mill offers a few options for steps to reaching a steady-state. He mentions stricter population control (and distribution) and legislation that leads to restraints on sum/acquisition of fortune one may have-leading to better paid and overall wealthier population of workers.
I feel, however, more information is necessary in this excerpt concerning the process of reaching a steady-state economy from our current status. How exactly is population going to be controlled so that it reaches a state closer to the birth rate mirroring the death rate? There should also be more mentioned about the policies or steps for controlling our consumption (of energy and materials). There should be a focus on planning out and setting aside enough land and water so that ecological processes may continue with little/less disturbance to maintain a balance between human presence and natural ecosystems and species. Increased regulations on rates and amount of resource use is also necessary in addition to higher/stricter standards for emission (limits) and toxicity (severance taxes, quotas for extraction...).
Finally, a statement Mill makes on page 601 should be treated more as a matter of opinion rather than fact, and may not be the best support for the notion that steady-state will work. Mill claims, "the best state for human nature is that in which, while no one is poor, no one desires to be richer, nor has any reason to fear being thrust back, by the efforts of others to push themselves forward", yet where is the evidence that this is fact? For throughout history, I personally only am familiar with constant states of competition, of bettering oneself or one's clan/group. Biologically, I feel that his statement lacks support, for every species strives to continually evolve to a more "fit" state. Such a Utopian world he describes doesn't appear to have ever existed (or consequently prove it works/is feasible) and seems will be an extremely difficult status to attain based off of (evolutionary) history.
In realizing our current condition with overcrowding, struggle for employment, depletion of natural resources, and extremities between classes, Mill states that a steady-state would be an improvement. Being in a more stagnant system does not mean there will not be continued increase in spiritual, educational, technological, and scientific fields. And it could increase these parts of culture and social progress as a whole.
Mill offers a few options for steps to reaching a steady-state. He mentions stricter population control (and distribution) and legislation that leads to restraints on sum/acquisition of fortune one may have-leading to better paid and overall wealthier population of workers.
I feel, however, more information is necessary in this excerpt concerning the process of reaching a steady-state economy from our current status. How exactly is population going to be controlled so that it reaches a state closer to the birth rate mirroring the death rate? There should also be more mentioned about the policies or steps for controlling our consumption (of energy and materials). There should be a focus on planning out and setting aside enough land and water so that ecological processes may continue with little/less disturbance to maintain a balance between human presence and natural ecosystems and species. Increased regulations on rates and amount of resource use is also necessary in addition to higher/stricter standards for emission (limits) and toxicity (severance taxes, quotas for extraction...).
Finally, a statement Mill makes on page 601 should be treated more as a matter of opinion rather than fact, and may not be the best support for the notion that steady-state will work. Mill claims, "the best state for human nature is that in which, while no one is poor, no one desires to be richer, nor has any reason to fear being thrust back, by the efforts of others to push themselves forward", yet where is the evidence that this is fact? For throughout history, I personally only am familiar with constant states of competition, of bettering oneself or one's clan/group. Biologically, I feel that his statement lacks support, for every species strives to continually evolve to a more "fit" state. Such a Utopian world he describes doesn't appear to have ever existed (or consequently prove it works/is feasible) and seems will be an extremely difficult status to attain based off of (evolutionary) history.
100+ years later, we're still not there. Why?
In his piece, Mill argues that there is a stationary state that will inevitably be attained by modern society, when the standards of living remain unchanged. This concept is reminiscent of the ecosystem/scientific idea of equilibrium - an ecosystem will continue to change until it reaches a point of stasis where the distribution of resources is sustainable. Our society, despite his prediction made in the late 1800s, has still not yet accepted that stationary state. Our lives remain a constant struggle, I think, because of the combination of economic valuation and capitalist economic system. Our economic structure reinforces the concept of comparative advantage: that having more of something than our neighbor offers us benefit that we deprive from that neighbor. This motivates us to continue to relentlessly pursue more - we must always be chasing the accumulation of capital, which is itself an arbitrary and constructed object.
We cannot continue to obey the commands of comparative advantage and accumulation. To do so is to delay the inevitable achievement of stasis, jeopardizing the environment and human well-being.
I think Sagoff can use Mill's concept to further explain why somethings are - and should remain- outside the control of the market, owing to their super-economic value (i.e. have moral or aesthetic value beyond that for which we are willing to pay.) The economic valuation of things, exemplified by the application of cost-benefit analysis and the commodification of the environment or worker safety, is a driving force in our refusal to accept a stationary state.
We cannot continue to obey the commands of comparative advantage and accumulation. To do so is to delay the inevitable achievement of stasis, jeopardizing the environment and human well-being.
I think Sagoff can use Mill's concept to further explain why somethings are - and should remain- outside the control of the market, owing to their super-economic value (i.e. have moral or aesthetic value beyond that for which we are willing to pay.) The economic valuation of things, exemplified by the application of cost-benefit analysis and the commodification of the environment or worker safety, is a driving force in our refusal to accept a stationary state.
Sagoff
Mark Sagoff succeeds in bring to light the problems experienced in a society that uses a cost-benefit analysis to judge different situations. I felt that he did an excellent job of presenting the problems with an economic-based value system and offering a different possible perspective, the Kantian one, to judge given situations of right and wrong. The quote by Reiff offered on p. 627 “the public world is constituted as one vast stranger…” I thought was a strong illustration of how the individual views the world around themselves currently.
I felt that Sagoff’s critique of the cost-benefit analysis adequately displayed the problems in using such a system. How could a person’s life, or even their safety for that matter, ever be treated as a commodity and therefore given an exact monetary value? Coinciding with Sagoff, I believe that one’s life cannot be accounted for in this manner and that human life, as well as environmental quality has a greater, inherent value. Given this, I did find the first few sections of the article to be a bit overwhelming; however they did continue to illustrate his Kantian viewpoint.
With that aside, I had a question of whether or not this Kantian value system was one that Sagoff thought could be implemented practically. He describes the system as needing individuals to “put aside their personal interests, it would follow that they put aside their power as well.” (p.627) However, isn’t he advocating that this value or practice of neutral positioning be instilled in the individual, since there would be no way to enforce it? How could we force individuals in power to accept this Kantian view in order to find a neutral position from which to judge? Also, if this system were accepted, what would happen in situations where there are opposed sides, each with their own legitimate claims? I understand that this may be delving too much into the practicality of the issue but it just arose as I finished reading the piece.
Overall Sagoff clearly displays the problem with the cost-benefit value system in today’s society and does a good job of calling for a replacement using the Kantian value system. I felt a personal agreement with the aim of a society where the individual is valued for himself and the population disregards making decisions in a cost-benefit manner because it ensures that there is never an acceptable amount of personal suffering. Also, he does an excellent job of calling to the individual to realize the power they possess in their actions and use it to benefit others not just look in self-interest.
I felt that Sagoff’s critique of the cost-benefit analysis adequately displayed the problems in using such a system. How could a person’s life, or even their safety for that matter, ever be treated as a commodity and therefore given an exact monetary value? Coinciding with Sagoff, I believe that one’s life cannot be accounted for in this manner and that human life, as well as environmental quality has a greater, inherent value. Given this, I did find the first few sections of the article to be a bit overwhelming; however they did continue to illustrate his Kantian viewpoint.
With that aside, I had a question of whether or not this Kantian value system was one that Sagoff thought could be implemented practically. He describes the system as needing individuals to “put aside their personal interests, it would follow that they put aside their power as well.” (p.627) However, isn’t he advocating that this value or practice of neutral positioning be instilled in the individual, since there would be no way to enforce it? How could we force individuals in power to accept this Kantian view in order to find a neutral position from which to judge? Also, if this system were accepted, what would happen in situations where there are opposed sides, each with their own legitimate claims? I understand that this may be delving too much into the practicality of the issue but it just arose as I finished reading the piece.
Overall Sagoff clearly displays the problem with the cost-benefit value system in today’s society and does a good job of calling for a replacement using the Kantian value system. I felt a personal agreement with the aim of a society where the individual is valued for himself and the population disregards making decisions in a cost-benefit manner because it ensures that there is never an acceptable amount of personal suffering. Also, he does an excellent job of calling to the individual to realize the power they possess in their actions and use it to benefit others not just look in self-interest.
Quality not quantity: High densities promote the spread of infectious diseases
I agree with John Mill. He feels very strongly that nations need to adopt the motto “Quality not quantity” in regards to human populations. John Mill states that every country has the capability to grow, but provides a very detailed description why it isn’t the greatest idea for the future of the human race. Mill creates an illusion of humans walking on one another’s’ heels as a common practice. As Mill proceeded on with this hypothetical situation, I couldn’t help but to think of the Tyson and Perdue chicken farms that Singer and Mason spoke of in “The Ethics of What We Eat.” Singer and Mason give horrid details of the lives of animals confined in an unsuitably small space, and it isn’t too farfetched to think that humans, when existing at a very high density, will begin to experience the same problems. With a population spike, it is no surprise that food quantities would have to increase. In this scenario, humans will be forced to live in close proximity to livestock. This presents a great threat to the safety, health and wellbeing of the human race. In the past diseases specific to birds participated in gene transfer with human infectious bacteria or viruses. This resulted in deadly diseases like swine and avian flu. Investigations deduced that the avian flu originated in China. It turned out that duck farmers kept their livestock around their house and allowed their ducks to interact with wild ducks. While this sounds like a novel idea, it presents a huge problem. Wild ducks confer diseases to farm ducks, who then act as the vector to transport the disease within close proximity with human infectious agents. Gene transfer occurs between the two and low and behold a disease which was once specific to birds mutates to use humans as a vector as well. To avoid this scenario, human densities should be kept in check. By keeping human populations low, we will experience a healthier and a higher quality life.
Cost –benefit analysis or at least the definition that Schmidtz is operating under does have many intriguing points. Within his argument he brings forth many of CBA’s limitations and believes that if we understand these limitations then we will be able to use CBA as a tool. His goal is then Full Cost Benefit Analysis which, “refers to an attempt t carry out CBA in such a way to take all known costs, external as well as internal, into account” p. 269. Using this type of understanding we will make more educated decisions not use CBA as the sole decision maker. However, I am fearful that this is optimistic at best, with which Schmidtz would also agree. Unfortunately CBA is not immune to corruption. The reasons for people’s actions might not be the same as other people’s costs more likely than not they will be in direct confliction. While he holds out hope that people will be able to use this tool effectively I have serious doubts. Everyone has their own subjective view of the world yet this does not mean that either person is in the wrong. For example, two children dangle from a bridge; the fireman can only save one because of the time and the circumstances. Neither child’s mother would be wrong in wanting their child to be the one to be saved. Even if it was their child verses five other children being saved odds a mother will still want their child saved. The problems with CBA is not that we are corrupt but that we are human and have vastly different value and those values and different doesn’t always mean bad but it makes it harder for use to come to conclusions on how to act appropriately in moral situations.
Thoughts on Sagoff's Message
I found Sagoffs commentary about the how there is a struggle between what we want as citizens and consumers to hold fairly true. As a consumer I know that it is always tempting to buy things regardless of how little I know about the product, how trivial it is, or maybe I even know it was produced irresponsibly. Personally I believe that it is our “political” or moral goals that should be the main guide of our actions, however to me it seems like there is largely a failure to uphold them. I feel like I see things somewhat differently than Sagoff does. The problem is not with the dichotomy between our personal wants and our political beliefs; I largely believe them to be the same. The problem is that the market hides the value of things that are not commodities and ignores that even things we don’t necessarily pay for can have great amounts of value. I believe that we as individuals do not want to burden ourselves with the costs of paying for things which others will also benefit from yet not pay for since the market does not really view them as a commodity. If there was actually a way to have people fairly split the costs for cleaner air, and water amongst other things people would gladly do so both for their “political” reasons and for their own self-interest. I also think the playing field can be somewhat tilted towards these large corporations. The corporations claim to be “people serving people” however they are inherently well organized and generally have a lot of capital to spend in favor of their point of view. It is much harder for individual citizens to get together and to raise money to express their opinions.
Redistribution is the best bet in my eyes.
In the piece by Mill, I think there are many important points that need to be dealt with if the world is going to continue to “grow” industrially, and increase its wealth, which it inevitably will. He claims that a restraint needs to be placed on the population because if not, the number of people will exceed our max amount of capital, and we will collapse. Specifically, by that I think he is trying to focus on the lowest classes being affected the most. I agree that with even the slightest change in the economy, the poorest of the poor get hit the hardest. So if we exceed our economic capacity, the “classes who are at the bottom of society” will be affected the most, and feel the most damage. He proposes to restrict the number of people coming in a nation to simply be within the numbers needed to replace the existing people of that nation. However, he never gives any way to go about doing this. Sure it’s a great idea, as someone dies, someone should be born, however I don’t see any practical way of keeping track of this, or regulating it in any way. He does give another proposal to keep the nation functional ideally, which is to distribute the fortunes of a nation better. I liked those ideas and I think the better point to focus on, when trying to save the nation is the redistributing of the wealth of the nation. I think one of the best ideas he had was that there be no enormous fortunes, except what is earned in one’s lifetime. Meaning, there be no major inheritances that just get passed on from family member to family member instead of being used to help the nation prosper. However, I find this a little too invasive, because someone in their family most likely earned that money somehow, so they deserve to keep it in the family, but I think there should be laws that require them to give a certain amount to charities or lower income families, each year. Almost, forcing these people to give back and put some of their money back into the nations capital. I think this is a better idea than telling them they simply cannot pass their money onto their relatives, but it would help spread the money that is in the nation around to other classes and maybe help decrease the gap between the classes. I realize this isn’t going to “fix” any major problems either, but I think it is a better way to go about it than some of Mill’s more drastic ideas that I don’t see ever being able to be carried out.
Cost-Benefit Doesn't Cut it
I agree with Mark Sagoff that we cannot make decisions regarding public policies about the environment or anything else non-economic related based solely on a cost-benefit analysis. Decisions based only on what the costs will be compared to what the benefits will be is irresponsible and disregards very important conditions that should be considered such as how moral a certain situation is. In some situations, while the monetary benefit of a particular decision may be great, the ethical repercussions of that decision may still make it unfavorable.
I am in agreement with Sagoff that economic factors should not be the only concern especially when dealing with things in which the value cannot be determined by how much one is willing to pay for it. For example some believe that steps should be taken to protect worker only insofar as the benefits outweigh the costs. This is speaking in market terms. When protection becomes too expensive, the cost is no longer worth it to some people. However, the cost of these safety measures is too limited of an analysis of if they are worth employing. While society may get more "bang for its buck" this way, it is at the expense of the safety of the workers. To not take the proper measures to protect these people is immoral. This ethical dilemma according to Sagoff outweighs any monetary costs that will result.
Similarly, in the case of the environment, one cannot put a price on the trees, the land, and the creatures that inhabit them. While one cannot give a monetary value to the environment, many still argue never the less, that it has substantial value. Sagoff argues that there are two sides to every person: the consumer, who only looks for what he or she wants or needs, and the citizen, who makes decisions based on what is best for not only themselves but the population as a whole. The cost-benefit analysis only takes into account how much someone will pay for something. People are only viewed as consumers. We tend to only our wants and desires.
Sagoff points out that we also act as citizens and that this causes us to act to maintain the balance of a "good" society. Cost-benefit analysis is a good place to start when dealing with things such as public safety and environmental quality, but we must not stop at how much people want something and how much it will cost us. We need to look further into the moral implications that the decisions incur. Just because something is economically more cost effective, doesn't make it right.
I am in agreement with Sagoff that economic factors should not be the only concern especially when dealing with things in which the value cannot be determined by how much one is willing to pay for it. For example some believe that steps should be taken to protect worker only insofar as the benefits outweigh the costs. This is speaking in market terms. When protection becomes too expensive, the cost is no longer worth it to some people. However, the cost of these safety measures is too limited of an analysis of if they are worth employing. While society may get more "bang for its buck" this way, it is at the expense of the safety of the workers. To not take the proper measures to protect these people is immoral. This ethical dilemma according to Sagoff outweighs any monetary costs that will result.
Similarly, in the case of the environment, one cannot put a price on the trees, the land, and the creatures that inhabit them. While one cannot give a monetary value to the environment, many still argue never the less, that it has substantial value. Sagoff argues that there are two sides to every person: the consumer, who only looks for what he or she wants or needs, and the citizen, who makes decisions based on what is best for not only themselves but the population as a whole. The cost-benefit analysis only takes into account how much someone will pay for something. People are only viewed as consumers. We tend to only our wants and desires.
Sagoff points out that we also act as citizens and that this causes us to act to maintain the balance of a "good" society. Cost-benefit analysis is a good place to start when dealing with things such as public safety and environmental quality, but we must not stop at how much people want something and how much it will cost us. We need to look further into the moral implications that the decisions incur. Just because something is economically more cost effective, doesn't make it right.
Sagoff
I had to laugh when Sagoff made his confession on p.621 about how he "supports any political cause that he thinks will defeat his consumer interests" because I often say the same things about myself. I have to face myself in the fact that I frequently don't practice what I preach. Most of us don't, in at least a few aspects. We are all guilty of this. Sagoff hits the nail on the head in saying that we have this contempt for the the interests we act upon daily. Our consumer lifestyle is not consistent with our judgements as a citizen. We are products of our society and this living contradiction we practice is the result. Im not holding society responsible for individual actions, as individuals are responsible for themselves, but society did influence this lifestyle that people use to cop out of their internal desire to change. They say "Thats the world we live in. We are just doing what we have to in order to survive" and they allow that defense to excuse from the knowledge that living solely in consumer senses is a guilty lifestyle.
I agree with him that a big problem is the fact that individuals don't realize the influence they have. They are not lost in the multitude. I remember I confronted a friend of mine recently for not recycling some bottles and such and she said something along the lines of "It's not like it makes a difference. I'm just one person". She didnt understand that it is individuals who lead to a multitude. It has to start with someone before it can become many. People need to face the fact that they can't be lazy and say they don't matter because they are only one person. It will take this recognition on people's part before the proper changes can be met.
He reminds us that we prevent significant deterioration of air quality as a matter of self interest and as a matter of collective self respect for everyone and our planet. This is the compromise, the balance that is needed between the two types of interests. The answer involves, in part, a recognition of responsiblities both from us and from the government. As humans, we must address our contempt for the contradictional lifestyle we embrace, we must step out of our habitual tendencies and up to the plate that has a time limit, which people are just starting to understand.
I agree with him that a big problem is the fact that individuals don't realize the influence they have. They are not lost in the multitude. I remember I confronted a friend of mine recently for not recycling some bottles and such and she said something along the lines of "It's not like it makes a difference. I'm just one person". She didnt understand that it is individuals who lead to a multitude. It has to start with someone before it can become many. People need to face the fact that they can't be lazy and say they don't matter because they are only one person. It will take this recognition on people's part before the proper changes can be met.
He reminds us that we prevent significant deterioration of air quality as a matter of self interest and as a matter of collective self respect for everyone and our planet. This is the compromise, the balance that is needed between the two types of interests. The answer involves, in part, a recognition of responsiblities both from us and from the government. As humans, we must address our contempt for the contradictional lifestyle we embrace, we must step out of our habitual tendencies and up to the plate that has a time limit, which people are just starting to understand.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Monday, November 30, 2009
Geoengineering
I believe that Gardiner has successfully outlined several substantial problems with the Arm the Future Argument, or AFA. One aspect of the AFA that concerns me is that it essentially looks upon mitigation, or reducing global emissions, as being impossible, or so improbable that we ought not to focus on it, and perhaps we even ought to give up on it. Starting research now on geoengineering would detract attention from mitigation and “non-evil” forms of prevention. Both reduction and geoengineering research would require us to act now; if this is the case, then why not choose the wiser action. I do not see how research on geoengineering could be justified if at the same time no steps toward reducing emissions were taken, as this would imply that we do not care about future generations enough to spare them the climate catastrophe, only enough to provide them with a “less evil” way to deal with it. Furthermore, such research provides us with a convenient excuse for not mitigating. If we are already helping a future generation out of the disaster we are creating, then perhaps we would not see the point in changing our ways as well—why would prevention matter more than our lifestyles if we are giving them a remedy anyway? Another problem that I have with the AFA is that it does not address the problem of political inertia. The AFA sees political inertia as something that needs to be accepted rather than confronted; however, any successful measures that might be taken regarding climate change must address this issue, and I see it as a problem to solve rather than to work around. Political inertia ought not to be passively accepted along with a plan for the future that is dubious at best any more than a climate catastrophe ought to be accepted, and to accept one is really to make room for the other. Perhaps we ought to invest more in combating political inertia instead of geoengineering. I also think that the AFA is a bit narrow in vision, as I do not see that it is likely for geoengineering to be the only solution available, let alone the best solution, for a future climate problem. I would also question how successful geoengineering would actually be, what the long-term effects would be, and if it would actually be the lesser of two evils—this questioning could perhaps provide reason to support minimal limited research. If, for instance, it was found that the effects of geoengineering would be far worse for a distant future generation than the climate catastrophe would be for the future generation, then perhaps the research was valuable, of course, only with other mitigation efforts well under way as well. Reducing global emissions is the best option that we have to address climate change, and that ought to be our focus; geoengineering, on the other hand ought to be more of an experimental side project, and have nothing to do with actual considerations or preparations for the future. Geoengineering research seems somewhat irrelevant when compared to the reductive measures we need to be taking at present, and simply because political inertia is in the way does not mean that we must quit—it only means that we ought to be more creative and persistent. Reliance upon geoengineering research ought to be for when our sincere actions are not working well enough or quickly enough and nothing more can be done, not for when we have a multitude of valid “non-evil” options, but we choose not to use any of them. There may seem to be only two options in the AFA, but in today’s reality, this does not hold true.
sophie's choice comparison
Gardiner’s Geoengineering piece “Arming the Future” criticizes Crutzen's favored proposal that we should be exploring the possibility of injecting sulfate aerosols into the stratosphere in order to suppress global warming by blocking the incoming solar radiation and modifying the Earth’s albedo. Gardiner argues that making choices relying on such technological fixes as geoengineering would not solve the underlying problem but treat the symptom. He argues that this type of solution is just as reckless as the attitude that got us into the problem in the first place. Furthermore, he seems to believe that geoengineering imposes huge risks on others and further alienates us from nature.
I wholeheartedly believe most of Gardiner’s piece in terms of our blindness to the underlying problem and our arrogance to think we can control the Earth; however, there is one point in his paper that deducts from his overall argument. He details additional liabilities and marring evils to geoengineering. He makes the point that he agrees that we have a moral responsibility to future generations with geoengineering but that we also have a moral responsibility to pursue better climate policies. This is an example of Sophie’s Choice. He discusses Sophie’s Choice as an illustration that can be applied to the geoengineering debate. Sophie had a choice; one or the other. She had to choose between saving one of her children or submitting both to be killed by the Nazis. There was no in between. She made a clear choice in a black and white decision. However, in the geoengineering debate there is plenty of gray area, which makes this a poor reference and argument that deducts from Gardiner’s argument.
Geoengineering is not something that we have to do cold turkey. Why are we suggesting that it is one or the other? To do it or not? Sophie’s Choice is not a good comparison as it was only a decision with two choices. Crutzen favored exploring the possibility of geoengineering with sulfate aerosols. Therefore, with more research of geoengineering, there could be many ways in which we pursue this option so its not a do it or not solution.
Because climate change is a complex and intricate problem, there is no black and white. Thus, it might be our best option to benefit ourselves from technical fixes, like geoengineering, in the transition for a change to even occur. Why can’t we at least investigate whether geoengineering could be one of those fixes? Geoengineering might have the potential to be a good way to bring rising temperatures under short-term control and it could also allow us to wait for the longer-term fix of cutting carbon emissions. Here is a gray area that is unlike Sophie’s Choice in terms of being one or the other. Therefore, it seems as though we have a moral obligation, one that is very different from Sophie, to consider geoengineering through more research so to better understand the gray area.
I wholeheartedly believe most of Gardiner’s piece in terms of our blindness to the underlying problem and our arrogance to think we can control the Earth; however, there is one point in his paper that deducts from his overall argument. He details additional liabilities and marring evils to geoengineering. He makes the point that he agrees that we have a moral responsibility to future generations with geoengineering but that we also have a moral responsibility to pursue better climate policies. This is an example of Sophie’s Choice. He discusses Sophie’s Choice as an illustration that can be applied to the geoengineering debate. Sophie had a choice; one or the other. She had to choose between saving one of her children or submitting both to be killed by the Nazis. There was no in between. She made a clear choice in a black and white decision. However, in the geoengineering debate there is plenty of gray area, which makes this a poor reference and argument that deducts from Gardiner’s argument.
Geoengineering is not something that we have to do cold turkey. Why are we suggesting that it is one or the other? To do it or not? Sophie’s Choice is not a good comparison as it was only a decision with two choices. Crutzen favored exploring the possibility of geoengineering with sulfate aerosols. Therefore, with more research of geoengineering, there could be many ways in which we pursue this option so its not a do it or not solution.
Because climate change is a complex and intricate problem, there is no black and white. Thus, it might be our best option to benefit ourselves from technical fixes, like geoengineering, in the transition for a change to even occur. Why can’t we at least investigate whether geoengineering could be one of those fixes? Geoengineering might have the potential to be a good way to bring rising temperatures under short-term control and it could also allow us to wait for the longer-term fix of cutting carbon emissions. Here is a gray area that is unlike Sophie’s Choice in terms of being one or the other. Therefore, it seems as though we have a moral obligation, one that is very different from Sophie, to consider geoengineering through more research so to better understand the gray area.
In Gardiner’s piece on geoengenering he raises many questions that must be addressed while considering the application or development of geoengenering. While he uses the example of artificially introducing sulfate into the atmosphere to combat climate change problems, I am not sure his example is as encompassing as he suggests. However, I am more concerned with the logic he applies while considering the “research first argument.” It seems he misconstrues some arguments and utilizes the selective pressure he places on them to strengthen his argument. This condition requires more detailed attention.
When Gardiner criticizes the suggestions of Ralph Cicerone concerning geoengenering, he paraphrases Cicerone’s argument to a level where it is easy to find vague and often insufficient arguments. The first aspect of Cicerones’ position that Gardiner contends is the desire to promote free inquiry in the research of geoengering. Gardiner suggests that Cicerone is considering freedom of inquiry in fantastic terms. Gardiner uses the example of counting every blade of grass on the lawn of someone in Washington just to know, for the value that simple knowledge of how many blades of grass exist in this lawn. While I am not sure the exact position of Cicerone, it is reasonable to assume that his argument for open inquiry is meant to entail at least some degree of triage. Yet Gardiner suggests that knowledge associated with geoengenering research may be irrelevant. Citing Thomas Schelling, Gardiner says that inquiry and research may prove to be irrelevant due to the expectation that technological advancements in the future will be so profound it will negate the relevance of the geoengenering research done in the present. I take this claim by Gardiner presumptuous and ill-conceived. To assume that there will be these technological advancements in the future is naïve, not to mention the assumption that present research will not at least hasten these significant technological advancements is pessimistic and reliant on the future for answers. Therefore, while I agree that some knowledge is trivial in researching geoengenering, you can’t assume that all research is so futile.
Secondly, I find the argument concerning the degree of resource expenditure on geoengenering to be insufficient. While Gardiner admits that geoengenering research is not an “all or nothing game”, he is suggesting that there is no way to adequately or prudently allocate funding or research without it becoming just that. Implicit within his argument is the contention that we are unable to rationally begin research on geoengenering without detrimentally underfunding other more important projects. I agree this is a cause for concern and that there will be difficult choices made, but this does not justify not taking the chance to do this research. Gardiner seems to take a pessimistic view of geoengering research, and ultimately finds that it’s deployment is a question concerning the lesser of two evils, but it seems he places much of his faith on the science of the future. I find this to be ill conceived because if it comes down to future generations inheriting the precedent we set with regards to geoenegering research, they will leave it to the next generation as well. Personally, why not take the chance now? There may be unforeseen goods rather than evils that come from research.
When Gardiner criticizes the suggestions of Ralph Cicerone concerning geoengenering, he paraphrases Cicerone’s argument to a level where it is easy to find vague and often insufficient arguments. The first aspect of Cicerones’ position that Gardiner contends is the desire to promote free inquiry in the research of geoengering. Gardiner suggests that Cicerone is considering freedom of inquiry in fantastic terms. Gardiner uses the example of counting every blade of grass on the lawn of someone in Washington just to know, for the value that simple knowledge of how many blades of grass exist in this lawn. While I am not sure the exact position of Cicerone, it is reasonable to assume that his argument for open inquiry is meant to entail at least some degree of triage. Yet Gardiner suggests that knowledge associated with geoengenering research may be irrelevant. Citing Thomas Schelling, Gardiner says that inquiry and research may prove to be irrelevant due to the expectation that technological advancements in the future will be so profound it will negate the relevance of the geoengenering research done in the present. I take this claim by Gardiner presumptuous and ill-conceived. To assume that there will be these technological advancements in the future is naïve, not to mention the assumption that present research will not at least hasten these significant technological advancements is pessimistic and reliant on the future for answers. Therefore, while I agree that some knowledge is trivial in researching geoengenering, you can’t assume that all research is so futile.
Secondly, I find the argument concerning the degree of resource expenditure on geoengenering to be insufficient. While Gardiner admits that geoengenering research is not an “all or nothing game”, he is suggesting that there is no way to adequately or prudently allocate funding or research without it becoming just that. Implicit within his argument is the contention that we are unable to rationally begin research on geoengenering without detrimentally underfunding other more important projects. I agree this is a cause for concern and that there will be difficult choices made, but this does not justify not taking the chance to do this research. Gardiner seems to take a pessimistic view of geoengering research, and ultimately finds that it’s deployment is a question concerning the lesser of two evils, but it seems he places much of his faith on the science of the future. I find this to be ill conceived because if it comes down to future generations inheriting the precedent we set with regards to geoenegering research, they will leave it to the next generation as well. Personally, why not take the chance now? There may be unforeseen goods rather than evils that come from research.
Geoengineering = Open-Heart Surgery?
I would like to investigate the similarity between the solutions to climate change, and heart disease. Consider our general environment as a human heart, and humanity as the mind. The heart’s health is slowly deteriorating because of high fat, salt, and sugar consumption similar to the effect of our consumption of fossil fuels. The mind knows that high-consumptions of such foods are detrimental to the heart’s health, but the combined craving of the body and mind makes the change difficult partly because the negative effects are in the future. Most likely, without a strong enough scare, the mind will continue the unhealthy diet until a catastrophe occurs, in this case a heart-attack. Presumably, the human being will have some kind of medical procedure in order to survive. After that, the mind may be sufficiently influenced to change the diet or possibly depend completely on medical intervention.
This analogy does not fit climate change and geoengineering completely (Ex. It does not fully consider the intergenerational dilemma by having only one human body), but I am interested in its implications. Political inertia is similar to the resistance one has to changing their diet because both are a result of conflicting values. While the body desires fats, salts, and sugars in large quantities, the mind can also realize the negative effects of such high consumption. Similarly, “we” can see the theoretical implications of our consumption of fossil fuels and the resultant emissions, but that comes into conflict with our “high-consumption” way-of-life. We can rely on medicine or geoengineering to bail us out of the “bad diet” but is that sustainable? However we could take the rout e of geoengineering being a bridge between our bad life-style and our “good” life-style afterwards. After a quick search on Google, I found this quote from someone who has worked with people on changing their diets, “In 20 years of working with patients, I've found that people will commit to change only when their motivation outweighs the challenges,” (oprah.com). It seems that there is a consensus that mitigation is the best solution but a lack of sufficient reasons to make it a reality.
This analogy does not fit climate change and geoengineering completely (Ex. It does not fully consider the intergenerational dilemma by having only one human body), but I am interested in its implications. Political inertia is similar to the resistance one has to changing their diet because both are a result of conflicting values. While the body desires fats, salts, and sugars in large quantities, the mind can also realize the negative effects of such high consumption. Similarly, “we” can see the theoretical implications of our consumption of fossil fuels and the resultant emissions, but that comes into conflict with our “high-consumption” way-of-life. We can rely on medicine or geoengineering to bail us out of the “bad diet” but is that sustainable? However we could take the rout e of geoengineering being a bridge between our bad life-style and our “good” life-style afterwards. After a quick search on Google, I found this quote from someone who has worked with people on changing their diets, “In 20 years of working with patients, I've found that people will commit to change only when their motivation outweighs the challenges,” (oprah.com). It seems that there is a consensus that mitigation is the best solution but a lack of sufficient reasons to make it a reality.
“Calculated moral failure”: Accounting for the moral failings of others
In his article, “Is ‘Arming the Future’ with Geoengineering Really the Lesser Evil?”, Stephen Gardiner foresees a ‘nightmare scenario’ in which people are forced to choose between a global catastrophe and ‘the lesser evil’ of geoengineered technology. As he discusses, there seems to be a kind of “calculated moral failure” or “moral schizophrenia” present in the idea of pursuing geoengineering research while so many better options for saving the planet from climate change are currently available to us. However, I think it should be noted that this moral failure is not that of an individual person, but of a group; there is a kind of ‘identity problem’ in his discussion of moral accountability. I think we should discuss the implications of this.
Consider how the advocates of geoengineering projects are not necessarily the same individuals responsible for excessive carbon emissions and for climate change. In this way, while the decision to begin geoengineering research in preparation for a future scenario where it might be necessary is a “calculated moral failure”, it is not necessarily the moral failure of the person doing the calculating. Instead, it might be calculated by geoengineers on behalf of the irresponsible citizens of the world. If the motivation to pursue geoengineering lies in the expectation of the continued moral failings of others, I think this is justified.
Of course, as Gardiner acknowledges, the options of reducing our carbon emissions and beginning geoengineering research are not mutually exclusive; while it is uncertain to what degree we should pursue each of these, we should probably do both. So, if we genuinely try to decrease our carbon emissions and at the same time begin geoengineering research, knowing it might necessary because of others’ failure to reduce their own emissions, this can hardly be thought of as a moral failure. Indeed, it might be said that we should try harder to get others to reduce emissions, but we will only achieve so much success at this, and at a certain point it becomes a better use of time to in some capacity pursue geoengineering.
Let’s reconsider who is morally at fault. So, while Gardiner considers the pursuit of geoengineering research to be the acknowledgement of a moral failure, we might respond by saying that if one does not advocate the taking of precautionary measures, keeping in mind the inevitable proportion of the population that does not adopt a more responsible lifestyle (such precautionary measures might be advocating geoengineering research), that is also a moral failure. Again, while beginning geoengineering research is acknowledging a moral failure, it is not necessarily our failure. Furthermore, we might actually be obligated to do such research.
Consider how the advocates of geoengineering projects are not necessarily the same individuals responsible for excessive carbon emissions and for climate change. In this way, while the decision to begin geoengineering research in preparation for a future scenario where it might be necessary is a “calculated moral failure”, it is not necessarily the moral failure of the person doing the calculating. Instead, it might be calculated by geoengineers on behalf of the irresponsible citizens of the world. If the motivation to pursue geoengineering lies in the expectation of the continued moral failings of others, I think this is justified.
Of course, as Gardiner acknowledges, the options of reducing our carbon emissions and beginning geoengineering research are not mutually exclusive; while it is uncertain to what degree we should pursue each of these, we should probably do both. So, if we genuinely try to decrease our carbon emissions and at the same time begin geoengineering research, knowing it might necessary because of others’ failure to reduce their own emissions, this can hardly be thought of as a moral failure. Indeed, it might be said that we should try harder to get others to reduce emissions, but we will only achieve so much success at this, and at a certain point it becomes a better use of time to in some capacity pursue geoengineering.
Let’s reconsider who is morally at fault. So, while Gardiner considers the pursuit of geoengineering research to be the acknowledgement of a moral failure, we might respond by saying that if one does not advocate the taking of precautionary measures, keeping in mind the inevitable proportion of the population that does not adopt a more responsible lifestyle (such precautionary measures might be advocating geoengineering research), that is also a moral failure. Again, while beginning geoengineering research is acknowledging a moral failure, it is not necessarily our failure. Furthermore, we might actually be obligated to do such research.
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