Assumptions Clouding Parfit's Theory

By the end of Derek Parfit’s argument for intergenerational rights and duties, I had not been convinced of my responsibility towards future generations. At face value, it seems he succeeded in showing that a traditional view of these duties are not necessarily accurately posed. However, behind his confusing examples and hypothetical scenarios are left essential assumptions, which we are required to blindly accept.

To clarify his views towards the beginning of the essay, Parfit cites the invention of the train as an example of significant policies, decisions and time affecting our identity. In the respect to my mother and father being in proximity to each other to meet, marry, etc., I agree. But to say that a couple’s sperm and eggs vary enough in the span of one month to completely change their offspring’s identity seems a stretch (though I admit, I am far from adept at the science, so hopefully Cody can shed some insight in class on this). If a couple keeps the same exact lifestyle from August to September, what significant difference would there be between a baby conceived in August versus one conceived in September? Were I the baby conceived in September, I would feel comfortable saying that, had I been instead conceived by the same parents a month earlier, I would still be the same person (not just “sufficiently like” (365) me).

A larger problem I had with the reading was Parfit’s throwing around suggestions of decisions being “worse for” or “better for” individuals, or life being “worth not living.” I wish these concepts had been better qualified with specific mentioning of what it means for someone to be better off, or how one would go about deciding her life was not worth living.

I find it mainly difficult to consider Parfit’s theory because I am not convinced that major population changes occur due to biological differences Parfit suggests, and further because I have no sense of how to judge a good life versus a bad life, versus a life not worth living.