A Critique of Regan's Rights View

Explaining the benefits of the rights view over contractarianism and utilitarianism, Regan twice emphasized “in principle.” I found this to be a telling aspect of his rights view. Though contractarianism may not be the best support for human and animal rights, I had not considered it allowing discrimination any more than the rights view may. Regan claims that the rights view denies discrimination “in principle,” unlike crude contractarianism (88). Although he had previously discussed Rawls’s view of contractarianism as an improved version of the philosophy, it seems he deliberately ignores it here in order to make his point. I can fathom contractarianism leading to discrimination, but Rawls’s “veil of ignorance” means to address this problem. In principle, should people set moral guidelines with equal consideration of all species, genders, races and physical and mental attributes, discrimination would ideally be averted [Rawls admittedly did not include animals in his view, but I am for the sake of my argument]. Hypothetically, the signatories are ignorant to the circumstances of their existence. So, beings unable to participate in deciding moral laws (ie. babies, mentally incapacitated, animals) would still have their needs considered.

I recognize the impossibility of this being flawlessly accomplished, but at any rate Rawls’s concept discourages speciesism and encourages tolerance and equal consideration by means of perceiving just and unjust actions through manifold perspectives. Whereas in principle the rights view would lead people to treat non-human animals and humans with respect, should someone question or violate this view, what reasoning behind the rights view would compel her to uphold justice and equality? Regan only offers the notion of “inherent value” (87).

In respect to utilitarianism, a being’s ability to feel suffering or pleasure calls for her equal consideration in matters of rights. Though inflicting suffering may sometimes be necessary, utilitarians strive to minimize inflictions. The rights view does not consider this, again relying on inherent value of the individual. Should the notion of inherent value be dismissed, what further logic would compel us to not violate individuals’ rights, were we granted the opportunity? How would people cope with having to choose a lesser of two evils when abiding by the rights view?

As Warren emphasizes, Regan does not define inherent value, but only tells us what it is not (92). Hence, for us to treat humans and animals equally and justly under the rights view, we must acquiesce to a presupposition which is neither defined nor proved logical.