Using Singer to Critique a Kantian Treatment of Animals

My reading of Wilson’s defense of Kantian perspective of animals was a cycle of frustration, understanding, then hesitant acceptance, and an ending of general uneasiness. I found myself unable to fathom why human dignity depended on humans distancing themselves from animals, why animals are means instead of ends, how humans can justifiably dispose of animals as if they are merely “things” (67). Moreover, I felt adverse to the notion that “our dignity as humans is in part determined by our ability to distance ourselves from animals, by using them as means to our ends” (68). But somehow, Wilson’s explanations of these notions placated me into a uncertain submission to the Kantian perspective. For instance, having been a vegetarian for several years, I no longer consider why it seems wrong to eat meat, but simply consider it immoral. My basic, almost superficial, defense of animal rights was easily justified by Wilson without it leading to my desired conclusion. If I understood correctly, due to my love of animals, pragmatic and moral predispositions describe my vegetarianism as necessary for my own happiness. Although mollified by the testament that animals should not be treated cruelly, I objected to the ultimate reasoning behind this. Wilson’s comment that “animals should not be treated as things, but they should also not be treated as humans,” is logical and frustratingly obvious, but less obvious is why animals are still means instead of an ends in themselves.
Contrary to Wilson’s article however, reading Singer’s article was akin to experiencing an epiphany. After navigating through a befuddling maze of ends and means, I felt refreshed with Singer’s straightforward philosophy. Equality of consideration, specifically while considering suffering, seems to me to be all the reasoning necessary for one to call for animal liberation. Keeping in mind Singer’s notion of speciesism, I reread Wilson with a different perspective. In every sentence detailing human dignity, I substituted “power” for “dignity” and came to see errors of the Kantian perspective. Though initially Wilson’s article seemed to prove that it was natural for humans to always use animals as a means, it seemed more that it was a desire for dominance which kept humans using animals as means.