A Lack of Reasoning

Leopold has qualms with notions of “self-interest” yet, as Callicott admitted, it seems much of land ethics depends upon what philosopher Scott Lehmann refers to as “enlightened self-interest” (184). Callicott comes to Leopold’s defense, arguing that this self-interest, though necessary to land ethics, is such that it “is not discernible to the participating individuals” (185). It seems this is because Callicott is not even referring to individual self-interest, but collective. He compares the future self-interest of humanity to the interest of the land, and all encompassing it.
Though hesitant to be labeled cynical, I am inclined to believe this is the only smidgeon of incentive provided by Leopold or Callicott for one’s participation in land ethics. For individuals, it is not convenient to abide by this ethic. One of the leading necessities for followers of the ethic is to reject the notion of land as property to be utilized without feeling obligated towards its well-being. I will concede that I think this environmental responsibility is important, but reasoning for environmental responsibility should not stem from abstract concepts of love, sympathy and respect, and lead towards ends of beauty and integrity.
For what reasons do individuals truly have for abiding by the land ethic? Humanity is threatened with Leopold’s prophetic warning, that “the conqueror role is eventually self-defeating.” But does Leopold ever establish the intrinsic value of biotic communities, such that we humans should feel morally responsible for ensuring their equal consideration in our every-day decisions? I am hesitant to affirm this.
Though slightly unrelated, this brings me to the question of human rights as separate from the guidelines of land ethics. In defending Leopold against the counter-argument proposed against land ethics, Callicott compares the human and biotic communities to country and state citizenships. He notes that as a citizen of a community or family, some moral responsibilities are required outside the realm of responsibilities required as a citizen of the country. He likens this to certain moral responsibilities we are responsible for as humans which do not apply as members of the biotic community. In this way he justifies principles of individual human worth and dignity defending against claims that land ethics supports “massive human diebacks” (182). I find these two situations incomparable. The membership Callicott refers to in addition to membership to land ethics gives “human rights” and “individual human worth and dignity,” which seem like extremely significant responsibilities. To use his comparison is to say that there generally could be such a disparity in responsibilities between a country and a community within that country. And, as noted earlier, there is another generalization of human rights, human worth and human dignity. Where did these concepts come from? He offers no supporting reasoning or rationale to suddenly incorporate these concepts into his argument. It was these generalizations, in addition to the lack of reasoning and explanations that kept me from fully appreciating the concept of land ethics as a realistic possibility.