Thursday, December 3, 2009
Stuart Mill's Attempt
John Stuart Mill’s challenges the idea that in order to have more prosperity and welfare, resources need to be overly used to ensure economic growth. Conversely, he believes that constraints on our over consumptive attitudes is needed in order to improve the quality of life. Ultimately, Mill is arguing for a more qualitative way of live as opposed to a quantitative. He states that the increase of wealth is not boundless, and that the progressive state will one day come to a halt. The only logical conclusion is that this unlimited growth attitude will destroy the environment and inevitably reduced quality of life. However, he seems to write as though he knows we will always move forward, and will not heed the warning signs the environment throws our way. This article was written in 1884. We have, to this day, not slowed down. In fact, humanity is moving ever forward. Every year the Earth is pumped with more gases due to the anthropogenic caused by mankind.
Another thing I picked up on was his common idea of integrating humanity and the universe. He groups everyone and everything together as a species in which needs to work together to improve the overall universe. He pushes for education to be a main concern. It’s as if being less educated is a scape-goat, exemption from the overall economic crisis. Therefore we should include them. The “better” minds are those who are going to bring this universe to a standstill, but it will affect everyone inside it. Overall, people should take responsibility for their actions, and in the meantime cease the notion that economic growth comes from killing the Earth.
Unfortunately, it is past this point at which I became stuck. In describing the limitations of CBA, Schmidtz emphasizes the importance in respecting people’s rights, certainly an important and admirable action. However, to illustrate his argument, he introduces Peeveyhouse v. Garland Coal (1962). He notes that Garland Coal refused to perform its contractual obligations in their entirety by not restoring the Peeveyhouse property back to its original condition after completing a strip-mining operation on it. Restoring the land would cost Garland Coal $29,000, while the restored land’s value would have be worth only $300. Referring to the Supreme Court of Oklahoma’s decision to award Peeveyhouse $300 in damages as “generally…regarded as utterly mistaken,” Schmidtz explains that the court reached its decision because the restoration would not be cost-effective. Though quite biased, nothing Schmidtz stated was false. Still, I feel need to offer defense to the court’s decision. To do so, I used the case law - http://academic.udayton.edu/CasesLawEcon/Contracts/Peevyhouse%201962.pdf.
One aspect ignored by Schmidtz was the actual contract itself. In exchange for royalties on the extracted coal, Peeveyhouse allowed Garland to strip-mine a section of their land for five years. A provision of this contract was that Garland was expected to return the land to its original condition. Although the major terms of the contract were upheld by both parties, Garland did breach the contract by not performing the provision. However, there was substantial performance of the contract. Although it can be argued that $300 in expectancy damages (the value of the land had Garland restored it) was not sufficient, it is also not unreasonable to argue that $300 is an equitable remedy. For instance, the economic waste doctrine holds that “if granting repair costs to the owner would result in ‘unreasonable economic waste,’ then the proper measure of the owner's damages should be the difference between the value of the project as promised in the contract and its value as delivered” (https://litigation-essentials.lexisnexis.com/webcd/app?action=DocumentDisplay&crawlid=1&doctype=cite&docid=43+DePaul+L.+Rev.+185&srctype=smi&srcid=3B15&key=5c38a755056f84a867ca8216380126c8). As a main rule of contract law, a party should not be awarded more damages than she would have anticipated had the contract she was a party to had it not been breached. In an ideal world, Garland would owe Peeveyhouse specific performance, or at least enough compensation for Peeveyhouse to find an outside party to hire to fix his land. In such an ideal world, the court would consider the subjective value of the land to Peeveyhouse, and not just its monetary value. But, such a thing as expectancy damages is necessary in the realm of contracts.
As discussed in my business law class, consider my making a contract with a builder to build my dream home. I stipulate a specific placement of the windows in my house. Upon completion of my home, I see that my windows are placed in wrong positions by a matter of inches. The builder did in fact breach our contract, and I want him to correct his mistake, which would indeed involve a great sum of money and seems on the whole, an unreasonable remedy for the builder’s innocent mistake. Protecting the builder from such a commercial impracticality, the court would consider any loss of value to my home due to the different placement of the windows. Although the placement has important subjective value to me, it would not change the monetary amount my home is worth. As such, no action would be taken against the builder.
This tangent was probably not worthwhile, in that I still find myself agreeing with Schmidtz’s core points. Maybe it could illustrate the complexity behind decisions and policies in that cost-effectiveness must at least be a consideration in addition to morality. But overall, I just found myself irked at Schmidtz’s quick dismissal and simplification of the Oklahoma court’s conclusion.
Citizens or Consumers?:
I agree with Sagoff’s argument for a Kantian approach to policy recommendation in regard to the environment – humans ultimately have to be treated as “ends in themselves” and not as simply a set of market preferences. It is obvious, however, that what people politically support and what people consume can be completely different and, in fact, contradictory. Our market preferences will never completely align with our political preferences, but this doesn’t mean that we should view human beings as merely “haver[s] of wants” (635) but rather it suggests that our market preferences ultimately cannot be the judge of our policy, especially in regard to the environment. The economist approach to policy formation suggests that what we ought to do as a community is less important than what we actually do as individuals making choices in the market place. Morality, however, isn’t concerned necessarily with the way things are but rather with the way things should be, and indeed, the economist’s position then isn’t concerned with morality but with efficiency and expediency in the market.
The challenge which Sargoff faces, however, is the practical application of the Kantian position. If, as the economist suggest, our market preferences accurately reflect our interests – though we would support just political causes at the same time – then ultimately our policy must coincide with the majority opinion. We can’t pretend that we are against factory farming if we are consistently supporting the industry; our market preferences show to the economists our true selves behind the politically correct/ideal mask which we hide behind. Sargoff, however, responds to this objection by claiming that, though our market preferences as consumers may ultimately express our true interests, we are nevertheless still outside of morality, that is, still talking about the way things are rather than how they ought to be. The practical application of Kantian principles, while extremely demanding, may be exactly what morality requires and our obligations as citizens may, in fact, sometimes trump our preferences as individual consumers.
Wednesday, December 2, 2009
Schmidtz
Schmidtz’s piece is one of the few readings we have had that seems to takes other arguments more seriously, and understands that things are not simply black and white. His support of Cost Benefit Analysis is well placed, as is his skepticism in it. Though I agree that there are benefits from CBA Full Cost Accounting, such as the public’s ability to scrutinize and provide input in, Schmidtz does not address the issue of value enough. To be clear though, CBA, if done properly, does offer a chance for greater equity, environmental protection, and other goods. To denounce CBA in every aspect implies turning a blind eye to another tool that may help people makes good decisions (not a definite), something that makes no sense.
The other issue I have with CBA concerns values. Schmidtz makes reference to this, but he does not seem to give the idea enough weight. He falls back on the fact that we are simply human on several occasions. We are not evil, just human. Does that imply we naturally do not act fully accountable? If that’s the case then there is a great deal of work ahead of humanity.
I got a bit side tracked, but another point I wanted to mention regards the case of the neighbor with the barking dog. It says he’s not evil for keeping his neighbors up at night, since he was not fully accountable. In this case, and many others though, I believe he (or a she) is fully accountable though. The point here is that the others do not react when they have the ability to do so. One last thing to mention is the use of the Ontario Hydro case. Schmidtz final mentioning of this is that the prospects of public accounting made Ontario Hydro rethink what they owe the environment. There could be a multitude of other reasons this happened that Schmidtz does not mention, ranging from tax breaks, a new CEO, new legislation, a bad series of PR, and more. Schmidtz should not presume so much.
this post has no title
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Decision Making
If the potential costs or disadvantages of injecting sulphate aerosols into the atmosphere (e.g., causing further anthropogenic harm to the atmosphere/ozone, causing harm/injury to people, causing species extinctions) outweigh the potential benefits of doing so (e.g., improving the condition of the atmosphere), the logical conclusion that we would then come to would be that we should not use this method of geoengineering because of the risk(s) associated with it. However, any decision, whether or not it concerns the environment, should be made based on the consideration of multiple factors- cost-benefit analysis could be one of these factors but should not be the only one. Likewise, any other factor should not on its own be the basis of any decisions, especially those decisions that directly concern the health of the environment.
In Defense of Steady-State Economics
In realizing our current condition with overcrowding, struggle for employment, depletion of natural resources, and extremities between classes, Mill states that a steady-state would be an improvement. Being in a more stagnant system does not mean there will not be continued increase in spiritual, educational, technological, and scientific fields. And it could increase these parts of culture and social progress as a whole.
Mill offers a few options for steps to reaching a steady-state. He mentions stricter population control (and distribution) and legislation that leads to restraints on sum/acquisition of fortune one may have-leading to better paid and overall wealthier population of workers.
I feel, however, more information is necessary in this excerpt concerning the process of reaching a steady-state economy from our current status. How exactly is population going to be controlled so that it reaches a state closer to the birth rate mirroring the death rate? There should also be more mentioned about the policies or steps for controlling our consumption (of energy and materials). There should be a focus on planning out and setting aside enough land and water so that ecological processes may continue with little/less disturbance to maintain a balance between human presence and natural ecosystems and species. Increased regulations on rates and amount of resource use is also necessary in addition to higher/stricter standards for emission (limits) and toxicity (severance taxes, quotas for extraction...).
Finally, a statement Mill makes on page 601 should be treated more as a matter of opinion rather than fact, and may not be the best support for the notion that steady-state will work. Mill claims, "the best state for human nature is that in which, while no one is poor, no one desires to be richer, nor has any reason to fear being thrust back, by the efforts of others to push themselves forward", yet where is the evidence that this is fact? For throughout history, I personally only am familiar with constant states of competition, of bettering oneself or one's clan/group. Biologically, I feel that his statement lacks support, for every species strives to continually evolve to a more "fit" state. Such a Utopian world he describes doesn't appear to have ever existed (or consequently prove it works/is feasible) and seems will be an extremely difficult status to attain based off of (evolutionary) history.
100+ years later, we're still not there. Why?
We cannot continue to obey the commands of comparative advantage and accumulation. To do so is to delay the inevitable achievement of stasis, jeopardizing the environment and human well-being.
I think Sagoff can use Mill's concept to further explain why somethings are - and should remain- outside the control of the market, owing to their super-economic value (i.e. have moral or aesthetic value beyond that for which we are willing to pay.) The economic valuation of things, exemplified by the application of cost-benefit analysis and the commodification of the environment or worker safety, is a driving force in our refusal to accept a stationary state.
Sagoff
I felt that Sagoff’s critique of the cost-benefit analysis adequately displayed the problems in using such a system. How could a person’s life, or even their safety for that matter, ever be treated as a commodity and therefore given an exact monetary value? Coinciding with Sagoff, I believe that one’s life cannot be accounted for in this manner and that human life, as well as environmental quality has a greater, inherent value. Given this, I did find the first few sections of the article to be a bit overwhelming; however they did continue to illustrate his Kantian viewpoint.
With that aside, I had a question of whether or not this Kantian value system was one that Sagoff thought could be implemented practically. He describes the system as needing individuals to “put aside their personal interests, it would follow that they put aside their power as well.” (p.627) However, isn’t he advocating that this value or practice of neutral positioning be instilled in the individual, since there would be no way to enforce it? How could we force individuals in power to accept this Kantian view in order to find a neutral position from which to judge? Also, if this system were accepted, what would happen in situations where there are opposed sides, each with their own legitimate claims? I understand that this may be delving too much into the practicality of the issue but it just arose as I finished reading the piece.
Overall Sagoff clearly displays the problem with the cost-benefit value system in today’s society and does a good job of calling for a replacement using the Kantian value system. I felt a personal agreement with the aim of a society where the individual is valued for himself and the population disregards making decisions in a cost-benefit manner because it ensures that there is never an acceptable amount of personal suffering. Also, he does an excellent job of calling to the individual to realize the power they possess in their actions and use it to benefit others not just look in self-interest.
Quality not quantity: High densities promote the spread of infectious diseases
Thoughts on Sagoff's Message
Redistribution is the best bet in my eyes.
Cost-Benefit Doesn't Cut it
I am in agreement with Sagoff that economic factors should not be the only concern especially when dealing with things in which the value cannot be determined by how much one is willing to pay for it. For example some believe that steps should be taken to protect worker only insofar as the benefits outweigh the costs. This is speaking in market terms. When protection becomes too expensive, the cost is no longer worth it to some people. However, the cost of these safety measures is too limited of an analysis of if they are worth employing. While society may get more "bang for its buck" this way, it is at the expense of the safety of the workers. To not take the proper measures to protect these people is immoral. This ethical dilemma according to Sagoff outweighs any monetary costs that will result.
Similarly, in the case of the environment, one cannot put a price on the trees, the land, and the creatures that inhabit them. While one cannot give a monetary value to the environment, many still argue never the less, that it has substantial value. Sagoff argues that there are two sides to every person: the consumer, who only looks for what he or she wants or needs, and the citizen, who makes decisions based on what is best for not only themselves but the population as a whole. The cost-benefit analysis only takes into account how much someone will pay for something. People are only viewed as consumers. We tend to only our wants and desires.
Sagoff points out that we also act as citizens and that this causes us to act to maintain the balance of a "good" society. Cost-benefit analysis is a good place to start when dealing with things such as public safety and environmental quality, but we must not stop at how much people want something and how much it will cost us. We need to look further into the moral implications that the decisions incur. Just because something is economically more cost effective, doesn't make it right.
Sagoff
I agree with him that a big problem is the fact that individuals don't realize the influence they have. They are not lost in the multitude. I remember I confronted a friend of mine recently for not recycling some bottles and such and she said something along the lines of "It's not like it makes a difference. I'm just one person". She didnt understand that it is individuals who lead to a multitude. It has to start with someone before it can become many. People need to face the fact that they can't be lazy and say they don't matter because they are only one person. It will take this recognition on people's part before the proper changes can be met.
He reminds us that we prevent significant deterioration of air quality as a matter of self interest and as a matter of collective self respect for everyone and our planet. This is the compromise, the balance that is needed between the two types of interests. The answer involves, in part, a recognition of responsiblities both from us and from the government. As humans, we must address our contempt for the contradictional lifestyle we embrace, we must step out of our habitual tendencies and up to the plate that has a time limit, which people are just starting to understand.
Tuesday, December 1, 2009
Monday, November 30, 2009
Geoengineering
sophie's choice comparison
I wholeheartedly believe most of Gardiner’s piece in terms of our blindness to the underlying problem and our arrogance to think we can control the Earth; however, there is one point in his paper that deducts from his overall argument. He details additional liabilities and marring evils to geoengineering. He makes the point that he agrees that we have a moral responsibility to future generations with geoengineering but that we also have a moral responsibility to pursue better climate policies. This is an example of Sophie’s Choice. He discusses Sophie’s Choice as an illustration that can be applied to the geoengineering debate. Sophie had a choice; one or the other. She had to choose between saving one of her children or submitting both to be killed by the Nazis. There was no in between. She made a clear choice in a black and white decision. However, in the geoengineering debate there is plenty of gray area, which makes this a poor reference and argument that deducts from Gardiner’s argument.
Geoengineering is not something that we have to do cold turkey. Why are we suggesting that it is one or the other? To do it or not? Sophie’s Choice is not a good comparison as it was only a decision with two choices. Crutzen favored exploring the possibility of geoengineering with sulfate aerosols. Therefore, with more research of geoengineering, there could be many ways in which we pursue this option so its not a do it or not solution.
Because climate change is a complex and intricate problem, there is no black and white. Thus, it might be our best option to benefit ourselves from technical fixes, like geoengineering, in the transition for a change to even occur. Why can’t we at least investigate whether geoengineering could be one of those fixes? Geoengineering might have the potential to be a good way to bring rising temperatures under short-term control and it could also allow us to wait for the longer-term fix of cutting carbon emissions. Here is a gray area that is unlike Sophie’s Choice in terms of being one or the other. Therefore, it seems as though we have a moral obligation, one that is very different from Sophie, to consider geoengineering through more research so to better understand the gray area.
When Gardiner criticizes the suggestions of Ralph Cicerone concerning geoengenering, he paraphrases Cicerone’s argument to a level where it is easy to find vague and often insufficient arguments. The first aspect of Cicerones’ position that Gardiner contends is the desire to promote free inquiry in the research of geoengering. Gardiner suggests that Cicerone is considering freedom of inquiry in fantastic terms. Gardiner uses the example of counting every blade of grass on the lawn of someone in Washington just to know, for the value that simple knowledge of how many blades of grass exist in this lawn. While I am not sure the exact position of Cicerone, it is reasonable to assume that his argument for open inquiry is meant to entail at least some degree of triage. Yet Gardiner suggests that knowledge associated with geoengenering research may be irrelevant. Citing Thomas Schelling, Gardiner says that inquiry and research may prove to be irrelevant due to the expectation that technological advancements in the future will be so profound it will negate the relevance of the geoengenering research done in the present. I take this claim by Gardiner presumptuous and ill-conceived. To assume that there will be these technological advancements in the future is naïve, not to mention the assumption that present research will not at least hasten these significant technological advancements is pessimistic and reliant on the future for answers. Therefore, while I agree that some knowledge is trivial in researching geoengenering, you can’t assume that all research is so futile.
Secondly, I find the argument concerning the degree of resource expenditure on geoengenering to be insufficient. While Gardiner admits that geoengenering research is not an “all or nothing game”, he is suggesting that there is no way to adequately or prudently allocate funding or research without it becoming just that. Implicit within his argument is the contention that we are unable to rationally begin research on geoengenering without detrimentally underfunding other more important projects. I agree this is a cause for concern and that there will be difficult choices made, but this does not justify not taking the chance to do this research. Gardiner seems to take a pessimistic view of geoengering research, and ultimately finds that it’s deployment is a question concerning the lesser of two evils, but it seems he places much of his faith on the science of the future. I find this to be ill conceived because if it comes down to future generations inheriting the precedent we set with regards to geoenegering research, they will leave it to the next generation as well. Personally, why not take the chance now? There may be unforeseen goods rather than evils that come from research.
Geoengineering = Open-Heart Surgery?
This analogy does not fit climate change and geoengineering completely (Ex. It does not fully consider the intergenerational dilemma by having only one human body), but I am interested in its implications. Political inertia is similar to the resistance one has to changing their diet because both are a result of conflicting values. While the body desires fats, salts, and sugars in large quantities, the mind can also realize the negative effects of such high consumption. Similarly, “we” can see the theoretical implications of our consumption of fossil fuels and the resultant emissions, but that comes into conflict with our “high-consumption” way-of-life. We can rely on medicine or geoengineering to bail us out of the “bad diet” but is that sustainable? However we could take the rout e of geoengineering being a bridge between our bad life-style and our “good” life-style afterwards. After a quick search on Google, I found this quote from someone who has worked with people on changing their diets, “In 20 years of working with patients, I've found that people will commit to change only when their motivation outweighs the challenges,” (oprah.com). It seems that there is a consensus that mitigation is the best solution but a lack of sufficient reasons to make it a reality.
“Calculated moral failure”: Accounting for the moral failings of others
Consider how the advocates of geoengineering projects are not necessarily the same individuals responsible for excessive carbon emissions and for climate change. In this way, while the decision to begin geoengineering research in preparation for a future scenario where it might be necessary is a “calculated moral failure”, it is not necessarily the moral failure of the person doing the calculating. Instead, it might be calculated by geoengineers on behalf of the irresponsible citizens of the world. If the motivation to pursue geoengineering lies in the expectation of the continued moral failings of others, I think this is justified.
Of course, as Gardiner acknowledges, the options of reducing our carbon emissions and beginning geoengineering research are not mutually exclusive; while it is uncertain to what degree we should pursue each of these, we should probably do both. So, if we genuinely try to decrease our carbon emissions and at the same time begin geoengineering research, knowing it might necessary because of others’ failure to reduce their own emissions, this can hardly be thought of as a moral failure. Indeed, it might be said that we should try harder to get others to reduce emissions, but we will only achieve so much success at this, and at a certain point it becomes a better use of time to in some capacity pursue geoengineering.
Let’s reconsider who is morally at fault. So, while Gardiner considers the pursuit of geoengineering research to be the acknowledgement of a moral failure, we might respond by saying that if one does not advocate the taking of precautionary measures, keeping in mind the inevitable proportion of the population that does not adopt a more responsible lifestyle (such precautionary measures might be advocating geoengineering research), that is also a moral failure. Again, while beginning geoengineering research is acknowledging a moral failure, it is not necessarily our failure. Furthermore, we might actually be obligated to do such research.
Thursday, November 19, 2009
Separator post
The posts above concern the reading for Dec. 1 (Stephen Gardiner's "Geoengineering" piece).
William Baxer: People or Penguins
This piece is dated and so the environmental crisis that we are assuming in this class might not have been so easily assumed when he was writing. However, the pollution we have created has reached a point where is threatens us with major, life threatening issues. Our problems are way bigger than DDT and penguins. If we are to use his theory of working on the environmental crisis only enough to live comfortably I am not convinced that we will survive. He might argue that we will, each generation will survive by doing enough to keep the environment stable enough for human existence. But is this enough? The question has arisen of the extent of our responsibility to future generations. Do we owe prosperity anything?
I am not sure what Baxter’s answer here would be. Here we can see his theory of “trade-offs” becoming more complicated. “As a society we would be well advised to give up one washing machine if the resources that would have gone into that washing machine can yield greater human satisfaction when diverted into pollution control.” Would the “human satisfaction” of future generations be applicable? We can consider this through thinking first of people already in existence. I would love my children and want to do all I could to make the world livable for them; this could be minimalistic on my part. However, I also love my grandchildren, which would require a little more work to insure their safety and happiness. Yet, if I am concerned with their happiness, their “human satisfaction”, then I would want them to see their grandchildren living in a safe and healthy environment. Reaching this optimal level of pollution is not the answer because as self-centered a species we are we care about fellow human beings. It is for their sake that we should work for high standards of environmental improvement. However, I again agree with Baxter that we need to find figure out what we mean by this.
Wednesday, November 18, 2009
I however refuse to believe that animals and nature have no moral status and are simply at our disposal. Baxter blatantly refuses to believe that we should preserve the environment or its balance unless in doing so we benefit ourselves, and I disagree whole heartedly. I believe that it is our duty to try and help preserve the natural environments and animals around us, for they are just as much a part of this world as we are. While I do not think that we should put them at equal status or above ourselves, I think that they should be given some moral consideration. I do not think that cutting down trees for lodging is wrong per say, but that there is a balance between conservation and fulfilling basic human needs, and that we must strive to maintain this balance. Baxter claims that “there is no normative definition of clean air or pure water,” but I disagree again. Clean air and water is what the earth naturally does through its interconnected processes of life without the interference of man. I am not inferring that we should discontinue our use of the earth’s resources; I think that with all our innovations in technology we must aim to further push its limits and find new and more efficient ways of living, essentially decreasing the size of our human footprint.
Baxter: Heartless Monster or Pragmatist? (Probably a little of Both)
First let me say what I agree with in regard to Baxter’s article. He claims that environmental scientists and activists don’t have a clear objective when it comes to ecological problems – we want “clean air” and “clean water” and “lower pollution,” but it’s not clear what precisely the aim should be. Concreteness, I agree, has to be added to make a goal real. To solve any societal problem people need to know exactly what the goal should be and work logically and sequentially to reach that goal. Indeed, Baxter takes this point further and adds that, in reality, we need to reframe the pollution problem. We’re always going to have some level of pollution, and instead of demanding “no pollution” we should try to reach some “optimal state” of pollution – a stable and manageable level of pollution that can reasonably be achieved and maintained without devastating effects on the environment. Baxter is plainly a realist when it comes to ecological concerns. And while I realize he is talking theoretically, I do think, however, that he is guilty of his own criticism toward environmentalist: he should articulate more concretely (and empirically) what exactly this “optimal state” would look like, and how we could reasonably achieve it.
On the other hand, I completely disagree with Baxter’s attitude on species welfare. While I do believe – though I won’t argue it here – that value does come from humans (the anthropogenic view) I do not think that humans are the only creature which should have a moral status or should somehow be the ultimate measure of value in the universe (the anthropocentric view). He claims that real people, at some level, are really concerned with the safety of other species only insofar as they derive pleasure or some benefit from their existence and that “questions of ought” – that is, ethical questions – “are meaningless [when] applied to a non-human situation” (521). He defends this view by stating that before humans, there was no question whether plants might have been wrong for spreading across the earth and changing the composition of the atmosphere or whether rightness or wrongness even mattered when “the first amphibian…crawl[ed] up out of the primordial ooze” (521). This, to me, is a defense for the anthropogenic view, however, not the anthropocentric view. While I recognize I risk name-calling, I think when Baxter states “I have no interest in preserving penguins for their own sake” he is really confusing his own self-centeredness with the view that all humans are interested in other species only instrumentally. The burden of proof should be on Baxter to show that even if we only cared about species by way of their instrumental value that that is a morally justified way to be in the world. Maybe we naturally view the planet that way, but that doesn’t mean it’s right or that we don’t need to change that perception. I would need to see more information In the end, these arguments (that non-human situations are morally meaningless and that humans are ultimately selfish and that we see other species only in terms of their possible instrumental value) require better defense.
Links between Bradford and Baxter
Baxter also seems to address the issue in some ways by showing that there is a trade-off between pollution and what we gain from it. This seems to allow the idea that while there may be too much pollution; we do not have to return all the way to surviving by subsistence farming. I do wonder whether Baxter is right about using resources always creating pollution. I would largely agree it is common for this to be true in a capitalist society but I am not sure that it is always true. For example I would find it hard to believe that walking through a natural environ and picking wild berries or another natural product and then using it yourself would be pollution. I mean it would be possible to do so in an ecologically unfriendly way but I believe it could also be done in a nonpolluting and eco-friendly way. However this is outside of any capitalist system, though to be it does seem to be an example of when resource use does not lead to pollution. Personally I would agree that we should try to pollute less though perhaps not make a radical shift back to subsistence farming. To me it seems like we need to decide how much value a human has and how protected they should be from such an industrial-capitalist society. To me it seems we often pick wealth over preserving or bettering human life.
Baxter sets the bar too low
Moving on from the criteria, Baxter says that they are the only sound starting point for six reasons. The first of the six claims that it is the only view that coincides with the way most people think and act. I think that moral goals should not be relaxed just because most people are not meeting them. That’s like saying it’s ok to set a lower moral standard for rapists because it corresponds to reality. We should in no way relax moral expectations to cater to their twisted behavior. The second supporting point says that these criteria do not advocate for destruction of nature because man needs nature in the long run. However, current events prove otherwise. Corporations, in their unending endeavor to maximize profit, use and abuse nature with total disregard for how their actions harm nature and other, typically poor, people. His third point says that what is good for humans is often good for nature. But I disagree with this. What humans view as a good thing is often detrimental for nature. Humans view eating a lot of food as a good thing, but the food industry is creating huge problems. In factory farming animals are treated horribly and forests and ecosystems are destroyed to make way for even more factory farms and for more plant-food to feed the animals. Overall, Baxter’s fourth criterion is contradictory and about half of the support he presents for the criteria is wrong.
Subsistence living the only way?
The first point that I thought was intriguing was the idea of third world countries and their inability to afford both safety measures to deal with hazardous contaminates used in their fledgling industrialization. It immediatly made me question not whether or not these chemicals should be used by them, but rather, if we are in the situation as a supplier don't we have a higher obligation to see that they are used effectively and safely? I felt that Bradford went straight to the solution of removing all chemical production. While this is a possible solution, I do not think it has the practicality necessary to become a legitimate solution.
Moving on, Bradford comes to the same conclusion when speaking about non-subsistence living. He believes that industrial civilization, or as he refers to it, an "exterminist" system, is the result of corporate "greed, plunder, salvery..." and that the only way out of it is back to subsistence living. While I understand the correlation between industrialization and widespread chemical use, I cannot submit to the claim that is a contentious decision of the factory owners or government to allow for such things. Or to the short-sighted claim that the only way to counter these problems is to go back to a subsistence living. Technology is a mighty tool, one that is in need of responsible use. Just because chemical production has negative aspects does not mean it is bad; rather it requires greater focus on safety and proper usage. Outright reversion to "village life" is not something that is practical, while it may be effective. Responsible handling of chemicals, of all technologies that produce pollution, can result in perfectly safe technologies. In developing countries, aid should be given by nations that have cut their pollution quantities in the mindset that it will be beneficial to all. As dicussed in the earlier piece by French, one nation's pollution does not only affect that localized area, but has far-reaching consequences.
pollution's a problem...and baxter's a jerk
Firstly, his criteria for his "human organization" problem-solving tactics are selfish (see #2), species biased (see #3), and nearing the line of tragedy of commons situations (see #4), although he claims to avoid this with redistribution. Also, it's great he is able to throw his view out there ("my observations about environmental problems will be people-oriented, as are my criteria" [pg. 520]), but his support for this "attitude" is not so great. To say that no massive destruction of plants and animals would occur since there is human dependence upon them (leading to preservation) is basically a lie. Look at all of the species that have disappeared, are endangered, or threatened because of us. And to what degree of our reliance is enough for proper preservation? Is fauna and flora not directly relied upon not worthy of existence?
In addition, his claim that what is good for humans is basically good for other living creatures too is weak. And what is his definition of "good", the basic elements required to live? Even when looking at just humans...what's good for an infant and what's good for an adult are not always the same. He is making unfounded generalizations.
Another one I have a problem with is his notion that "agricultural use of DDT must stop at once because it is harmful to penguins" (pg. 521) is an extreme assertion. Doesn't he realize how narrow-sighted he sounds? Firstly, penguins are not the only species experiencing the ill effects of DDT; and secondly, their situation can serve as an example of what various effects could occur with multiple life-forms...if it can harm them, why not humans too? It'd be in our interest to turn to a safer product.
For his fifth argument (for his "attitude") he inquires the amount each type of species would count if included in our social organization and if/how people will be their proxies, for "self-appointment does not seem workable to [him]" (pg. 521). Well, Baxter seemed to have no trouble at all in appointing the human race to speak for and make choices affecting all of these species.
Baxter's rejection of the proposition" 'to preserve the environment' unless the reason for doing so...is the benefit of man" (pg. 521) seems odd on account of our environment is where we live, what we rely on for survival. Is he secretly aware of another planet currently full of endless resources for us? How does keeping this planet healthy not benefit mankind?
To his issue with the lowering levels of pollution (bottom of pg. 521)...it will not necessarily lead to lower levels of food, shelter, education, and music...but perhaps different variations of these means (and others) of human satisfaction. He loves painting as drastic a picture as the extreme conservationists.
Lastly, is the cost of putting in labor, and skill, and money, and time into one project (pollution control) and not being able to use those resources in another type ("building hospitals, fishing rods, schools, electric can openers"). He should also consider the costs that accumulate when not controlling pollution such as various medical expenses, deaths, filtering/cleaning smaller and smaller (and increasingly more expensive) amounts of water, and increased land-use, fertilizers, and farm equipment required for degraded farm lands to keep producing goods.
Pollution Reduction and Human Happiness are not Mutually Exclusive
The toxic chemicals that enter the environment through runoff as a result of agricultural activities and that contribute to health problems among humans (as well as other species) do not need to be used (at least in the proportions they are used on conventional farms), as evidenced by the success of organic farm industries. In addition, pollution emitted from factory farms could be reduced simply by implementing regulations mandating farm operators to regularly clean up animal wastes and provide healthier environments for the animals to be raised in. Reducing pollution in ways such as this would allow more humans—such as those who live in close proximity to factory farm facilities—to live healthier lives, something that Baxter would agree would be a good thing.
Moreover, we wouldn’t have to give up any of our happiness or current quality of life if these changes were to take place; rather, our quality of life would increase. If all produce was produced organically and if all factory farms were operated in a clean and safe manner, smaller yields of produce and meat may be produced than those that currently are, but I think that the long-term health benefits received by humankind (from being provided with healthier, chemical-free foods and air with less pollution) would far outweigh these minor sacrifices and may reduce some individuals’ need for extensive medical care. Furthermore, if all industries followed the same regulations, the issues of cutting costs and competition among industries would not be exacerbated, because all industries would have the same restrictions imposed upon them.
I'm not sure we could be friends, Baxter.
I thought of the concept of biophilia, which seems to argue that humans have an evolutionarily programmed interest in the well-being of non-human members of our Earth community. We derive pleasure from seeing megafauna in the wild; we make scientific breakthroughs with the fluids of rare plants. He uses the example of DDT, which he sees as having benefits for humans but negative consequences for other species. I would have to argue that DDT also has negative affects for humans: if we did not outlaw it based on its affect on animals, it could have accumulated in the biosphere to the point where it infiltrated our own fat cells. The penguins were an indicator of the bad affects of a generally toxic substance. (Even though this is my argument against his example, it strikes me as a flaw in his piece that he goes on to argue "what is good for humans is, in many respects, good for penguins and pine trees..." - without acknowledging his own example of DDT, good for humans, as an exception, since even he acknowledged it as being bad for animals.)
In his conclusion, Baxter claims that controlling pollution is costly, but I would argue (and I believe Hilary French would agree) that the best means of controlling pollution are avoidance techniques. (It might actually save money to prevent pollution.) The expected "cost" that many corporate think tanks assign to pollution control is really only in terms of lost profit, which is only a marker of money. (Baxter and I agree, at least, on the irrelevance of money.) There wouldn't be any additional use of resources to prevent pollution. Even if the lost profit happened, it might actually serve Baxter's goal of minimal sharing of wealth, as a means of redistribution, since large corporations that have an unbalanced amount of money anyway would be the ones losing out.
changing perceptions
"Getting rid" of the chemical factories is not the answer.
Tuesday, November 17, 2009
Monday, November 16, 2009
Thoughts
I have two arguments for the third part of our reading assignment
1. The authors have a general argument for buying locally versus buying globally… if you’re not eating locally you’re wrong. The authors believe that purchasing locally is better, overall, for the environment. It cuts down on extra costs such as shipping and extra fuels being burnt, etc. However, my argument right back at the authors would be: how can be so sure that organic farmers uphold the standards that are posted on the USDA network, not to mention these regulations are very loose? Additionally, although local may seem to be friendly to the environment, it can be quite the opposite when it comes to organic fertilizers. There are over 500 different types of fertilizers; anything from crab meal made from Blue Crabs to Bat guano. However, when people purchase these organic things their actions have a consequence on crab populations and biodiversity. For instance; crab meal is made from crushed up shells that are left over from the crab industries. The way these industries go about harvesting these crabs can be detrimental to their populations. Using the Chesapeake Bay for an example has one third of the nation’s crab population. However, since the 1990s, blue crab catches have significantly dropped by 70%. To break it down even further, between 1968 and 2005, commercial crab harvest from the Chesapeake averaged about 73 million pounds annually. That is a lot of crab. Overharvesting these crab populations can have reprocautions in the food chain. Furthermore, harvesting bat guano is detrimental to the caves in which the guano is collected. Let’s take a cave in Jamaica for example. The destruction of Jamaican caves is due to human visitation through mining the guano. Additionally, rich deposits of bat guano act as food for several invertebrates that dwell at the bottom of these caves.
2. My other argument lies with the misquoted press woman, Lindsay Allen, on page 225. She ran an experiment with Kenyan children given additional-animal based foods. Although she is trying to improve and help their diets, I find that studying these effects on children and using the kids as experimental projects is wrongfully using them and it is a moral issue. I could similarly tie this back to the ‘golden rice’ experiment (pg. 214). Produced decided to lace corn, which is a staple food for nourishment, with beta-corotene. Although this could very well have been a wonderful product for third world countries suffering from a majority of the population being malnourished, I tend to wonder how many patents it had to go through. I still do not think they have reached the final product because I have yet to hear about it on a global scale. Therefore, just as experimenting kids was a moral issue, I believe spending millions of dollars on a useless product is a moral issue as well. The product process is draining to public resourced and distracts us from a sustainable agriculture that can produce real solutions to world hunger and malnutrition.
Another issue I have is in regards to the conclusion on killing creatures without the potential to become as intelligent/rational/etc. as humans. If someone believes this is okay, that a retarded human incapable of developing like other humans do is allowed to be killed, Singer and Mason seem to have no real response. They talk about how this is not an impregnable defense, but it is still a defense they do not completely bring down. When Scruton talks about human beings being fulfilled by their aspirations and achievements he lacks another point that would help refute Singer and Mason's response that Scruton must support killed retarded people. Human beings are also fulfilled based on relations, even with retarded people, where as animals are not. Their offspring will even be eaten/abandoned if found to be retarded. Humans on the other hand will have emotional damage due to attachments we can forms with them, which as we all know can lead to physical damage (emotional to physical that is).
In the end I'm a little fuzzy on all this myself, and I've mostly raised more questions than answered any.
Eating Animals
Softer Food Ethic Also Promotes Critical Thinking
As a result of this curiosity, I attempted to research the “ethical nature” of two companies after a visit to a grocery store. The benefit of labels is that it distinguishes if big companies are potentially unethical even though it doesn’t legitimately denote ethicality to the labeled. The “Darling Clementines” that are manufactured by Sun Pacific are not organic or free trade . . . but they are not animal flesh either. The Sun Pacific website promoted the taste of its products and their efficiency of production, but I could not find what chemicals they use when farming. I do not think that they are the most ethical choice, but at the time I did not see any organic Clementines. I also tried researching “Sun Chips” and found some articles about the branding of certain foods as green foods. All in all, I can understand where curiosity and work meet in the process of becoming an ethical consumer. Singer and Mason’s book would be very useful for wading through the information acquired from such searches.
history shows capitalism wins over ethics...
However, Singer and Mason argue the point that the industrial and capitalistic driven food system can be transformed by our individual consumptive choices. Therefore, with this belief, factory farming will then become obsolete if more and more people refrain from purchasing those factory farmed foods.
But, as they both point out, while organic food has become more visible so has "corporate organic companies,” such as Horizon. These companies are providing healthier and more environmentally sustainable food and are therefore more ethical. Thus factory farming in the traditional sense could become obsolete.
However, these companies are then subject (especially as more and more people jump on the organic bandwagon) to the same drive of necessity as every other capitalistic company. By this I mean that these “corporate organics” will have to constantly drive down production costs in order to remain competitive, which is exactly what the “free market” demands. With that said it seems almost inevitable that our capitalistic economy will takeover most organic production; thus, most likely leading to the destruction of the principles of community building, social justice and respect. The “free market” and capitalism are strong forces that compel many companies to become competitive and then succumb to the pressures of cutting costs. What does this cost cutting affect? Who does this cost cutting affect? Workers? The environment? Animals?
What’s to say that organic food production won’t become what our factory farming became in 25 years? Why wouldn’t they try to remain competitive and cut costs? There is always going to be that constant tension between making a profit in a capitalistic economy and ethics in production and history has shown us that the economy has won.
The authors take their argument further in relation to the farming techniques and ethical implications that eating meat drag along with it. In their “Drawing Conclusions” section, the authors make some conclusions that don’t really seem to follow their arguments. They go from an environmentally conscious argument for not eating meat to the unethical treatment even the well treated animal’s experience and than finally arrive at the psychological problems even the conscientious meat eaters must experience. I will concede that the environmental argument is sound, and should cause people to reduce the amount of meat they consume. Their argument for the unethical treatment of the Polyface Farm animals seems to be stretching the limits on what they demand of animal treatment. Polyface seems to be doing a fair job of treating the animals well, despite what the authors have said. The farm is doing almost all it can to make life for these animals “good.” They are doing such a good job that they receive accolades from well known news papers. Yet the authors attempt to put down the efforts as insufficient. I think the authors needed to give a bit more praise for this farm having an ethical standard that is self imposed. Lastly, their argument regarding the psychological temptations that even conscientious meat eaters face seems to be pretentious. They say that since meat eaters face temptation to take the easy way out by eating animals that were treated poorly, it is likely they will do it. As a result the line is “fuzzy” in what is humane enough to eat. While they are correct about the line being fuzzy, they will only alienate meat eaters by saying they have little or no control over what they eat. To be frank, the authors come off as stuck up, not to mention morally and ethically superior due to their ability to walk such a hard line.