Gardner, Assadourian, and Sarin all seem to be of the opinion that consumption, while essential to human life and prosperity is leading us into an end that is self inflicted. While I can agree on this point to an extent, that we are using resources way too fast and need to be aware of our actions and their consequences, we also have already taken measures to do so. However, I also feel that consumption can be a stepping stone to finding a way to best sustain ourselves. The majority of the world knows that humans are really cutting down on the ecosystems through urbanization and industrialization. The authors also seem to say that consumption has been able to increase through the raise of communication such with telephones and television throughout the world’s population. Through these technologies, advertising products and other “essentials” can increase a person’s desire to go out and obtain more material items that then cause the increase in production and consumption of resources. This makes this method one of the more predominate themes that is taking up a central place in our lives today. As I read this article, I found myself asking what would be a good way to stop this and find a solution to this problem, but I also often found that a strait solution was sometimes hidden in the facts of what the past dictated about this issue, but not as much for predicting any concepts of the future. Having an optimistic viewpoint at the end, the authors said that,” consumption can act not as the engine that drives the economy but has a tool that delivers an improved quality of life.” Would this imply that the authors still have hope for human kind to find a way through this problem of consumption?

thoughts

(I am not sure I understand 100%, but this is what I got) Jacqueline Kasun argues that population planners have irrational arguments when it comes to attempting to control our families. She argues that their arguments stand between our freedoms to propagate. She begins her article by arguing that the only reason why people believe there is an environmental crisis in the first place is because we are educated on the fact that we are overcrowded. She relates this argument to Garrett Hardin’s “lifeboat” analogy. That we assume there are limitations when “no such knowledge exists.” She states that the reason human beings crowd together, as we did so many years in the past, is because we need to work together as a unit. We need to give and receive together. A critical issue is the government and whether they truly have the right to preside over reproduction. I agree with Kasun that it is tough to make arguments against population growth when the numbers are unknown; however, her article was written in 1988. It has now been 30 years. In such time we have faced wars, different policies, and an environmental movement. The Earth now contains a stunning 6 billion people which is predicted to still increase. We now have the technology, like it or not, that enables us to see the reserves the world still has available, and to measure the death and birth rates of humanity. Even if we cannot predict them all, in another given 30 years we will have breached ever corner of this world. I hate technology just as much as Heilbroner and Kasun seem to argue, but at this point, it may be the only way we can propose a “better” method for population planning. I do not want to turn to governmental rule, especially as drastic as that in Chine, but I do agree that at the rate we are going the growth of population will inevitably outrun the growth of the food supply. However, Kasun does not throw out policy all together. Kasun does believe that we need governmental policy in order to reduce pollution, poverty, unemployment and hunger, but we should not make irrational policies when it comes to families. We just need to be aware of the people who want to use the environment and peoples’ degradation as an excuse to establish their own rule.

Population and Resources

Kasun argues that there are no imminent absolute limits to Earth’s resources, and that increases in the population pose no threat to these resources—I do not believe so does so successfully. She claims that the market will manage resource scarcities by raising prices, forcing individuals to cut back and spend less, while also encouraging producers to make alternatives available. This claim, however, does not take into account that those who use the most resources are also those with the most money, and that higher prices might not dissuade these individuals from continuing to be consistent consumers of the given product. In addition, raising the price of a resource will only affect its availability for so long; it might slow the depletion of the resource, but it could not possibly stop it. As for alternatives, while they must be developed, there are only so many possibilities, and it is not possible to predict that alternatives will be developed before the damage has been done. Kasun also believes that individual families can be trusted to regulate the number of their children; however, human beings are selfish creatures, and there are many incentives, social, emotional, and financial, to having more children. The tragedy of the commons teaches us that humans, in general, cannot be trusted to place the welfare of their society above their own individual interests, and I believe that encouragement by the society or the government, at the very least, is required if families are to have fewer children. Kasun also states that it is an assumption that the Earth’s limits are fixed and known; she denies that any knowledge of such limits exists, and that all that is known is that the types and quantities of resources are changing. Her claim appears counterintuitive, and it does not seem to make sense to say that resources are unlimited—the only thing that could expand our potential resources would be technology or science, and there is no guarantee that advances in these fields would come soon enough to be of any use to us. Furthermore, if it is unknown whether or not there are limits to the Earth’s resources, it seems more intelligent to me to err on the side of caution, particularly given the fact that the population is exploding. Kasun also states that knowledge has enabled us to live in comfort in areas where in the past, others barely survived. It could be, however, that the methods being used to pull so much out of the Earth so quickly will ruin it in the long run, and that future stores are being sacrificed for bounty at the present time. Kasun also fails to mention other changes that humans are bringing about by the population increase. The polar ice caps are a limited natural resource, as is the ozone layer, and I do not foresee human ingenuity solving the problem of their injuries—the economic notion of scarcity hardly resolves these issues. I do not believe that economic concepts have a place, or at least the sort of place that Kasun promotes, in population ethics. Simply because absolute capacity is alien to economics does not mean that it is alien to the issue of the population and the Earth’s resources. Economists determine how scarce a material is by how its price changes over time—I do not believe that this is a reliable method in these circumstances, as any number of factors could affect its price. I would also like to know which authorities use human life expectancy as the best overall index of the Earth’s environmental quality; it seems to me that individual humans could live longer for a time by destroying and taking advantage of the environment.

In Population and Consumption by Gardener, Assadouirian, and Sarin they offer a revealing analysis of the problem of over consumption and the factors which contribute to it. The emphasis that is placed on the human psyche and socioeconomic factors offers a specific explanation for the over consumption that developing and industrialized nations are experiencing. Although both of these factors that lead to over consumption are poignant in the environmental ethics discussion they are selective and incomplete in their considerations. Looking at the psychological factors of over consumption, we can see where the authors of this article fell short of a complete consideration of the true characteristics of this factor.
The psychological aspect of over consumption illuminates social problems but simply considers say the American society as a unified whole. The authors have this to say specifically about the role of the individual and government in the consumption issue: “Individuals as well as policy makers might consider the seeming paradox that quality of life is often improved by operating within clear limits on consumption.” They suggest that the policy makers in government and the individuals of the country are on a unified wavelength, that is to say more specifically that a large majority of Americans would or even could agree on being regulated on such a personal level. Take for example the current hot button political issue of chewing tobacco. There is legislation proposed by democrats to ban the manufacturing and sale of certain flavors of chewing tobacco in the fear that kids may get hooked up this unhealthy substance. It is widely agreed that tobacco is not good for you, yet conservatives say it is up to the individual to make this choice not the government. It is this condition of the American psyche that challenges the arguments of the authors. The fear of losing control over one’s own pursuit of happiness is divided along economic and social lines. Consequently, to suggest that policy making could be a solution to undercut or get around the psychological characteristic of many Americans is inadequate. Since controls on the choices people are allowed to make would come from the government, they would not be received well by many Americans who have entrenched themselves against authoritative government.
Further down the line of the argument made by the authors is their examination of the social health that the consumption culture currently possesses. They argue that even though the amount of people who are considered wealthy has risen significantly, the amount of those who have described themselves as happy has hit a plateau. This leads the authors to conclude that it is not unfettered material accumulation that makes one truly happy, rather it is instead the time spent with family and friends. Further, as a part of their overall prescription to over consumption, they suggest people must think of their decisions and desires in relation to the wellbeing of the rest of the country. It does not seem overly plausible to say that people can start to curb their desires in consideration of the whole. If people in an overconsumption society cannot make decisions that make themselves happy, how can they possibly be expected to desire less resource intensive products for the sake of people they don’t even know. While I don’t have a much better prescription to the problems of overconsumption, it seems most evident that attacking the principle of capitalism or right wing political views will not get your anywhere no matter how right your argument may be. Rather, using the free market as a tool to achieve this goal is possible. Even more possible to the ability to change the way people think, not through argument but through persuasion. Ben Franklin once said in reference to changing the way the masses of the country think is to teach them as if you taught them not. Ultimately consumption is a decision made by individuals, and since more and more people will be deciding whether or not to consume a change must be made in the human psyche. It seems dangerous, but subversion is seemingly the only real possibility for a smooth transition away from cultures of overconsumption.

Kasun

Kasun’s “The Unjust War against Population” is an interesting piece that examines the reality of much of the negative effects we associate with large-scale population increases. I thought that the most credible element of the piece was the variety of statistical data Kasun uses to add credibility to her arguments and it made it difficult to find fault with. However I did have critiques of some of her ideas.

The first was the confidence that she put into widespread individual responsibility when it comes to overall species survival. She stated that “The historical record clearly shows that human beings can act and cooperate on their own in the best interests of survival…”(p.403) The problem is that people are bound by their personal needs and thus bound in their abilities to act in this society. If there is only one food source, despite the fact that its use may be detrimental to the overall population, individuals will exploit it to survive. Even if they desire to act in the best interests of the overall wellbeing of the population, those interests may not coincide with their own survival and thus fall by the wayside. This idea brings to mind the example of the Russian peasants and their desire to eat the edible seeds we read about in an earlier piece discussing responsibility to future generations. While the best interests of all would’ve been to keep the seeds until spring, their personal interests were those of immediate survival. I’m not advocating the elimination of a few for the good of the population, but pointing out those individuals can only be responsible for rational group logic to a degree.

Jacqueline refers to the almost inexhaustible sources of energy of planet provides us with. Therefore she concludes that there is no threat from resource depletion. The problem we are facing now is the clean energy crisis, where the forms of energy that are readily available may inadvertently be harming the environment. Kasun merely flows over this fact, despite that it could be a contradictory effect of large-scale energy usage to sustain a large population. The larger the population, the more energy consumed, and unless new clean technologies are implemented the more environmental impact. I thought that this was a critical point that should’ve been addressed in the whole debate of population impact.

The last point that I thought Kasun drew unfounded conclusions was on pg 410, she stated a number of the positive advantages to having a large population. I thought that a few drew credit, but some I thought were without statistical support. Kasun states that population growth “encourages governments … to devote more resources to education. If wisely directed these efforts can result in higher levels of competence in the labor force.” Just because a society is devoting more to education, such as America has done, this does not equate directly to higher competence levels. Additionally, she states that “one advantage of large cities…is that they are mentally stimulating”. Again, without statistical data backing this up I’m not sure how much credit they lend to the argument.

Overall I agree that there is a great deal of unfounded negative occurrences linked with large populations such as larger politically volatile age groups, something that Kasun mentions. I do not think that a large-scale population is necessarily negative, but just as with anything else it must be managed properly for the best interests of the group. Pollution, resource management, and human rights must all be monitored with any size population.

The Global Hamburger Joint: Vegetarian Options Available

I support Gardner et al. that the “Consumer Culture” has a moral obligation to balance consumption in concern to impoverished peoples. The issue of overconsumption is similar to one person eating two hamburgers, when they only physically need one, in front of another person who has the same dietary need. The frivolity of the over-consumer is immoral because the spurned hamburger-lover could starve, and also because of the ethic of “sharing is caring”.

On a larger scale, the consumption power behind the purchases of grand automobiles, luxurious vacations, and video games can be seen as that “second hamburger”, eaten right in front of the people who need it most. The main factor that ties the two examples together is how we are interconnected in our consumption sources. Our lifestyle choices become more pronounced and influential as our industries spread out over the globe. In the context of a large industrial complex taking resources from many different origins, the rich and the poor can be accessing the same store of products, but with unequal distribution. The resources are assumed to be taken from each others’ environments, or lands, so that everyone deserves a piece. The moral bone-to-pick is that we are taking too much.

Addiction to consumption is the hurdle to jump. I would imagine it to be like untangling a bunch of wires in someone’s head, to try to show them how exactly to live without consuming for consumption’s sake. However, I am still skeptical because of my cold fear of change, utilitarianism and the concept of a “basic good”. I am interested to know how the facts and the education would come together for such a movement, and also how such a seemingly “pleasant” world would work.

The Population Problem

In the article titled “The Unjust War against Population”, Jacqueline Kasun argues that that human population increase is not a problem and that there are still massive quantities of the resources we need on earth to sustain both our current population as well as future generations. Kasun criticizes the metaphor used by some advocates of population control that the earth is like a lifeboat and can only hold a certain number of humans before we run out of resources; she claims that the types and quantities of economic resources are always changing and that even if we were to run out of a particular resource, our technological capabilities would allow us to find and use a substitute. I believe that this argument is too narrowly-focused and ignores critical implications of destructive human behaviors.
It is likely that if we were to run out of a certain economic resource, such as oil, we could still survive and maintain our current quality of life by using some sort of substitute (e.g., nuclear power). However, this is a completely anthropocentric viewpoint; it fails to acknowledge the fact that human beings are not the only things of value on this planet and that there are other organisms which are affected by our actions. For instance, drilling for oil in the arctic may benefit us (at least in the short run), but the more we do it, the more damage we cause to ecosystems and the many non-human species that occupy them. Likewise, the hazardous waste that collects as a result of utilizing nuclear power is also harmful to the environment. It is egotistical to assume that the earth’s resources exist solely for our benefit and that the environment possesses no value other than the utilitarian sort.
Even if exhausting certain resources would pose no substantial immediate threats to humankind, there is plenty of evidence suggesting that our depletion of world resources and the actions we take to go about extracting/using them can have negative effects on the environment. Moreover, given that we are part of the environment, degrading it will eventually have a considerable negative impact on us as well; no matter how technologically advanced we become, we cannot remove ourselves from the larger environment.
If overconsumption was not as prevalent in industrialized countries as it currently is, and if natural resources were more evenly distributed among people around the world, population in itself may not be perceived as such a serious problem. Maybe even more important than controlling our population is changing our economic system and our way of life.

Ignorance is Bliss

Kasun has forgotten one major point in her argument. She states that countries will be better off economically with a larger population but neglects to state the cost. With increasing population and a better economy, there comes a higher standard of living. People then wish to own property, property that they must take from nature. This leads to deforestation. Increasing populations also need more food, and with increased standards of living, there is an increase in choosiness over foods being consumed. The forests and other rich lands will thus fall to industrial farming. One may argue that China’s population has become very expansive, yet their standard of living is low and their food is rationed to a certain number pounds of rice per week. China’s people are oppressed by the government that sets quotas on the number of children a family is allowed to have (passively or actively). Jacqueline Kusan states that she doesn’t think government should interfere with the number of offspring a family can produce, so Kasun would have to give in to one of her convictions to use this argument.
Sooner or later humans will realize that carrying capacity (k) affects them, as well. Population models of every species, excluding humans, show that once a species overshoots its carrying capacity, a large number of the population will die off or have too few nutrients to reproduce. Thus, the population not only reaches the defined carrying capacity but undershoots it. The k for humans was established to be 4 billion people, without the help of intensive farming. The population is over 6 billion people as of 2000 and continues to increase annually. This success is attributed to industrial farms. If humans keep growing exponentially, room will run out for farms, and then it is likely that we will experience the effects of overshooting our k. This will lead to starvation and billions of deaths. Kasun chooses to remain blissful of the situation and apparently wants nothing done to save the human race from their apocalypse.

The Problem of Overpopulation in Kasun

In her article “The Unjust War against Population”, Jacqueline Kasun argues that in spite of a commonly argued position, overpopulation is not a threat to humanity. In her argument she provides shocking statistics relating to the earth’s potential agricultural output, such as that fact that “it would be possible to feed…more than twenty-two times as many [people] as now exist, at a Japanese standard of food intake” (406). While I believe that her argument may face additional difficulties, here I pose an objection relating to the focus of Kasun’s argument, which I believe to be wrongly directed.

If we concede Kasun’s argument that the earth is for all intensive purposes capable of providing humankind with food for thousands of years, or even the position that humankind will never run out of resources (a stronger claim than that argued by Kasun), we would still be left with the fact that these resources are not equally distributed. We can see this in the world today; places where starvation is rampant are in a meaningful sense ‘overpopulated’.

Indeed, as Kasun argues, these cases may well be attributed to other factors. Dr. David Hopper, whom Kasun quotes, writes, “The world’s food problem does not arise from any physical limitation on potential output or any danger of unduly stressing the environment. The limitations on abundance are to be found in the social and political structures of nations and in the economic relations among them” (406). But even conceding this point, it cannot be denied that there are ‘overpopulated’ areas, if we simply take this to mean that there is not enough food for the people living there. So, while overpopulation ‘shouldn’t be’ or ‘doesn’t have to be’ a problem, it still is a problem, regardless.

While it may not ultimately solve this problem of unevenly distributed resources in the way that destroying oppressive political and social structures might, counteracting overpopulation would still meaningfully contribute to this end. So, we could say that while correct, Kasun’s argument is at the same time misdirected. Even if she does set straight misunderstandings regarding the earth’s potential carrying capacity and what this means for the future of earth, we maintain that overpopulation is a problem.

Kasun's alternative could be just as hazardous as she considers population control to be

Kasun feels very strongly that doomsdayers are extremely hazardous to humans and their rights. She poses the "where's the proof to back up their claims" question that seems to always arise against advocates of caution. She seems to think that their lack of proof in combination with the danger they pose to freedom are enough reason to completely prevent population control and caution.
She asks how they can be sure that the market mechanism cannot handle population growth. She seems unconcerned, or at least not concerned enough about the fact that it's a 50/50 chance. It seems wrong of her to suggest that this incertainty justifies a reliance on everything working out like it has in the past, and does not justify a cautious lifestyle to prevent the possible. Also her reliance on this past principle seems ungrounded becuase we are not the same society we once were. We are far more technologically advanced that ever before and that means that we cannot depend on a different society's past for answers to a questionable and dangerous situation.
She asks why families cannot be trusted to adjust the number of their children to the availability of resources. People have shown patterns of caring more about continuing there blood line than the betterment of earth. People are concerned for themselves before others and this is an inevitable fact. The cautious believe in "if it COULD happen, then it should be prevented". There is no denying that things are not in balance right now. The population level is struggling to find balance. It seems as though she ignores the fact that people are already showing that they can't be trusted.
She really comes after the lifeboat capacity policy for its precautionary measures. It seems as though she thinks that they are fools and are trying to control people more than help them. The policy is a selfless precautionary measure for the good of all people and earth.
Lastly, her alternative to the lifeboat policy of increasing food production and distribution and increasing population even further requires a drastic change that will inevitably lead to further exhaustion of earth.

Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Oct. 27 by Kasun and Gardner/Assadourian/Sarin.

“Tragedy of the Commons” is an important article by Garrett Hardin. This theory describes a problem in which many individuals acting independently in their own self-interest ultimately destroy a shared limited resource (despite the fact that it may not be anyone’s interest for this to happen in the long run). Thus, the Tragedy of the Commons challenged Adam Smith in his belief that individual decisions reached will be the best decisions for an entire society. Instead, Hardin advocated “social arrangements” that produce responsibility which might include some form of “mutually agreed upon coercion” or “incentives.”
Hardin's argument is of great significance and is impressively convincing. However, I believe that he has made a tactless hypothesis. One of the concepts that Hardin makes an assumption about is the nature of reason within humans. He states that "as a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain." This then can be reinterpreted on the other hand to be that any person who does not seek to maximize his gain is thought to be irrational.
However, I fully disagree with this inference. This conception of the nature of reason I find to be misleading. Some people who are able to functionally think and reason correctly may reason from a different value set. They may choose to live simply so as to meet the needs of life with the least energy and with the least damaging impact on nature and the environment. Therefore, for people who reason this way, minimalism and prudence permits and allows these individuals to have a better life as they may spend their “gains” on spiritual, cultural and intellectual development instead of consumption. These people may have no interest or desire in maximizing their material gain in regards to consumption.
So therefore, as Hardin seems to stress, reason makes rational individuals seek specific goals and lifestyles that would lead them to environmental destruction. Hardin seems to make his claim very understandably; however, to test this theory, we must try to interpret it in another way. How does Hardin rationalize those who do not lead such lifestyles? Accordingly it can be restated in a logical and equivalent manner such that does this then make them irrational? I do not believe so which is where my reservations lie with Hardin’s assumption.
Despite my criticism above about the nature of reason in humans, I do not necessarily think that this assumption prevents Hardin’s arguments from being effective. From the most consumptive individualists to the most simplistic, everyone works together to consume land, water and resources. Ultimately, action needs to be taken to produce corrective feedback that will help persuade individuals to act responsibly so that we relinquish our “freedom to breed” sort of speak.

Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Oct. 22 by McKibben and Hardin.

I agree with Derek Parfit’s belief that there doesn’t always have to be a “definite victim” in order to call something bad or a crime. It is undeniable that our choices that we are making now will affect future generations, and I agree that we are responsible for making wise environmental decisions now to ensure that future generations will be better off. Humans are somewhat to blame for any detrimental effect we might have on future generations, and should do what can be done to benefit future generations while also looking out for ourselves.

While others may disagree and challenge that we should look out for the interests of ourselves in the here and now, I believe that we can still further ourselves as well as the potential future generations to come at the same time. Making more environmentally friendly decisions now such as acting to end the overexploitation of resources will help us to live longer with the continual ability to draw from those resources over time, while at the same time helping to preserve the chance that those same resources will help and sustain others in the future. Similarly, burning fossil fuels and pumping other harmful substances into the air is a detriment to us now, and even more so in the future. Depleting the ozone layer, which enables through harmful radiation from the sun, increases the risk of skin cancer as well as a host of other issues that immediately effect generations now, and only grows worse for those in the future. We must not be consumed by short sightedness and instead look to the effects we will have on those individuals yet to come. Becoming environmentally aware and taking actions now really will benefit us, and will most definitely make the lives of people yet to come much better. We must act with not only ourselves in mind, but those of the future in order to secure them with the best possible lives we can.

Future Generations and Energy Policy

It’s hard to say exactly what Parfit might purpose in terms of environmental policy, other than his main claim that we are responsible for the kind of environmental policies that will influence the welfare of people in the future, regardless of whether their personal identity changes as a result of our influence. I agree with Parfit’s claim that “it is bad if those that live are worse off than those who might have lived” (370).This claim seems reasonable to me in that it doesn’t side-step the responsibility that is delegated to the current generation to insure that future generation – again, without reference to whether they are different people because of our influence – have a high quality of life. If can create conditions by which future generations live better lives, we are morally obligated to increase the overall welfare of those people.

At the risk of sounding pedestrian, it’s occurred to me at this point that I really don’t have much to say for or against Parfit’s view only because his thesis, which of course does say interesting things about intergenerational rights and duties, ultimately proposes a common-sense view of morality that I think most people already hold, that is, that we are responsible for the welfare of future people and that we should consider the immediate, long-term, and predictable effects of our actions. This is a simplification of Parfit’s argument, of course, but ultimately I think his riffs on personal identity (which already seem a stretch, like Kristin was suggesting) ultimately lead to a dead end for me. I agree with Melanie’s blog post as well that Parfit, while being philosophically interesting, is at the same time boring and inconsequential for policy formation. I do like this piece however for Parfit’s ability to anticipate the implications of believing or not believing his intuitions as well as the puzzling view of obligations to children that haven’t or won’t be born. So maybe I'm being too harsh.... But I guess I’m just willing to express my (frustrating) inclination to be philosophically provincial here only because my reading of this article has, in regard to understanding environmental issues, brought me around the cul-de-sac back to where I started.

Thoughts on Parfit

The thoughts that jump to the front of my mind regarding Parfit's piece are ones of confusion and a lack of satisfaction. Throughout his writings he suggests multiple hypotheticals, many complicated responses to hypotheticals, which he does not offer complete answers too in every situation, and he relies on a plethora of assumptions without much reasoning. All of this makes it in some cases difficult to follow, particularly when it comes to following his opinion.By the end you do come away with a clear point and conclusion; however, this conclusion is simply "many moral theories need to be revised". If Parfit had taken the time to try and reason as to why a certain theory was better, the writing may have been much more substantial. Regardless, the principle he seems to supporting, principle (B), I do agree with. It would be bad if people are worse off than what they might have been. In the case of depletion or conservation, or any of the situations regarding a large group of people, it seems rather obvious to me depletion is not a good idea. To be honest the amount of hypotheticals he presents creates a great mess of ideas to sift through to find the one conclusion he meagerly offers up.

Still, Parfit's goal is one that seems both pluasible and in general good. Future people should be able to blame those in the past for poor mistakes that lead them to lives that are not as good as they could be. Placing blame on the past does not assist in helping the present. Hopefully it instead makes people now realize that we are responsible for the future and the generations ahead of us. As parents can be blamed for the way children turn out, so can we be blamed for the generations after us; we must not hurt ourselves, but we cannot ignore the consequences of our actions.

Assumptions Clouding Parfit's Theory

By the end of Derek Parfit’s argument for intergenerational rights and duties, I had not been convinced of my responsibility towards future generations. At face value, it seems he succeeded in showing that a traditional view of these duties are not necessarily accurately posed. However, behind his confusing examples and hypothetical scenarios are left essential assumptions, which we are required to blindly accept.

To clarify his views towards the beginning of the essay, Parfit cites the invention of the train as an example of significant policies, decisions and time affecting our identity. In the respect to my mother and father being in proximity to each other to meet, marry, etc., I agree. But to say that a couple’s sperm and eggs vary enough in the span of one month to completely change their offspring’s identity seems a stretch (though I admit, I am far from adept at the science, so hopefully Cody can shed some insight in class on this). If a couple keeps the same exact lifestyle from August to September, what significant difference would there be between a baby conceived in August versus one conceived in September? Were I the baby conceived in September, I would feel comfortable saying that, had I been instead conceived by the same parents a month earlier, I would still be the same person (not just “sufficiently like” (365) me).

A larger problem I had with the reading was Parfit’s throwing around suggestions of decisions being “worse for” or “better for” individuals, or life being “worth not living.” I wish these concepts had been better qualified with specific mentioning of what it means for someone to be better off, or how one would go about deciding her life was not worth living.

I find it mainly difficult to consider Parfit’s theory because I am not convinced that major population changes occur due to biological differences Parfit suggests, and further because I have no sense of how to judge a good life versus a bad life, versus a life not worth living.

arguments against parfit's views questioned

Even though they are view that Parfit is opposing, I don’t think that what is considered good quality of life holds the validity that its argument does, and the idea that we can’t see out of our personal identity. When using the examples of power plants and resource uses, it is said that if the people choose the risky option, or depletion, then people living in the future suffering the consequences won’t be suffering anymore because their identity is in that time frame and they won’t have any other experiences to compare their environment to. The people who are living with these consequences can know that hundreds of years earlier, there was a different option that would have lead to a different outcome, so they know that their reality could have been better.
The very idea of the type of well being in consideration can’t fully constitute all of well being. Again, in the power plant and conservation/depletion examples, it seems quality of life is determined by health, and material possessions. These things factor into well being, but aren’t the most important aspect. The mental state. Wealth doesn’t determine how truly happy a person is. There have been studies that show material possession and wealth don’t equate to more happiness. Even more importantly, as we consume more and gain more, overall happiness hasn’t risen in people. In the case of depletion, we can’t say that their well being is better, because in some other poor places in the world with less consumption, they can have less but be just as happy.

Parfit leaves readers wanting

Parfit fell short of making any kind of impact on me with his piece. To be perfectly honest, I didn't even want to finish the piece. I would hope that each paragraph or thought would end with some strong thesis or strong opinion from Parfit but it never did. He seemed almost to switch his views throughout the piece, so I had to keep going back to consult earlier paragraphs, searching for clues to understand.

If he didnt seem to switch sides then he made that little sense to me as a reader, which is also a problem. He also seemed to do a lot of "They are equally important", but this is a problem because the whole reason there is a problem is because a choice can't be made on which one is more important, which one is priority and which should be acted on.

He is just reminding us of the issue at hand without ever providing any kind of assitance, or nothing good enough to be called assistance. By not stating his belief strongly enough for me, as a reader, to carry it through to the end of the reading, he is not providing a defense. And without a defense there is no solution.
He spends so much time providing all these scenarios. He breaks them down and discusses them at length. Then he compares them to each other, making it seem like it will come to this grand conclusion of a logical solution, but it does not.

I'm not trying to insult his intelligence, because he poses good points and forces the reader to examine their beliefs in light of the scenarios and questions. He is sturring thought in readers. It just seems dissapointing that he has so much to say but no real conclusion to speak of.

Anyway, I personally think the whole "the people that would die with the Risky policy would not be alive in the future without that policy" thing is a intellectual waste of time. I feel that it is going no where fast and has no possible solution whatsoever. I mean yes, you have to wonder about it, but posing questions like that will not solve our problem at all.

I think it is our duty to save lives and makes lives better now because we are HERE on earth NOW and that is the duty to which we are entrusted. The NOW. But I do not support the Risky policy (killing people later) just to enhance things for the better now. I do not think it is ok to do something that we know will kill people, ever. Fix now without condemning the future. I personally think that efforts now to make things better (conservation) will inevitably save the future. I think sacrifice is necessary, as long as it doesnt compromise a life, and it is sacrifice that will carry conservation forward.

Parfit what?

I'm sorry I'm completely lost on the whole idea of the "future people". The idea of getting into the specifics of whether when we make a decision the people whom would have existed in the first option are no longer the exact same people who would have existed in the second is just mind-boggling. On 367 he states "If we choose...this will lower the quality of life more than two centuries from now. But the particular people who will then be living would never have existed if instead we had chosen conservation." I don't know about anyone else but that doesn't seem to make a whole lot of sense to me, in the sense of logic. Whether or not these people are really the same people should not matter. The fact is that from a decision we are making, life could be worse for one group of people, or better for another group of people. In the "depletion or conservation case", I think that conservation would be the morally acceptable decision. It accounts for the fact that while "quality" of life would be somewhat more moderate, it would be better off for the whole in general, not just the people who are living in the next two centuries. While if delving into the technicalities of the argument, the people living worse off may not be the exact same people, there are still people involved, with the same moral rights and therefore are entitled to the better quality of life!
In the last full paragraph on 268 Parfit asks the question "Or does it matter whether these lives would be lived by the very same people?" and to answer him, I would say it does not! There will be people either way, people whose lives will be different due to our decisions and because of this it makes a moral difference.
Overall I like the idea of what Parfit is trying to do, and making an argument on the specifics of a situation to further clarify exactly what is going on is respectable. However, I do not think that it makes a whole lot of difference in the grand scheme of things. I belive most of the examples he gives need to be given a "black-and-white" perspective in that in one case, a decision can be made that is better for the future people, or one can be made that is worse for them. That it is. Whether or not they are the the actual same people does not matter, there will still be people in the same situation because of your direct action. Therefore, it is morally reprehensible to make that decision.

The Search for Solution to Energy Policy and Further Future

Parfit's arguments in his piece come mostly in the forms of multitudes of questions rather than succinct and sturdy beliefs. Filled with varying point of views and "for-instances", Parfit has attempted to redevelop the thought process involved in deciding and justifying choices about "intergenerational rights and duties". Yet, how can he claim they are insufficient if he comes to no better conclusion of his own?
He finds the current or most popular views to be wrong or underdeveloped. While not exactly coming to a specific argument for justifying policy decision-making, he generally feels that we are responsible, no matter who or how many come into existance in the future, for policies affecting the standard of living for those humans further along, especially if we can cause their lives to be better or worse because of it.
While hoping for general summations at the ends of paragraphs or any hint of strong support for a single claim for his own belief, I was met with more and more questions and more and more scenarios than I would have liked to come across.
Parfit offered explanations to examples of situations and their implications in relevance to what other people may find to be true and morally relevant; and for his own "intuitions", gave weak suggestions to what may be an acceptable claim. In fact, he changes claims throughout the text, trying to find a suitable and supportable position. He instead concludes his text with the thought that, "...this part of morality...concerned with human welfare, cannot be explained in person-affecting terms. It's fundamental principle will not be concerned with whether acts will be good or bad for those people whom they affect" (Parfit, 372). This leads me to believe that he spent his whole time explaining and questioning what is good or bad to just dismiss it altogether and leave us with the notion that "...moral theories may need to be revised" (372)...but how so? Give something solid!
I understand that he argues against standard views and traditional ways of justifying "intergenerational rights and duties", and he did this by breaking down and disecting situations; but he offers nothing in return or replace of them. He calls for a "claim X"...better and wider than claim B ("If the same number of lives would be lived either way, it would be bad if people are worse off than people might have been") and can sometimes be used in congruence with PAP statement ("It is bad if people are affected for the worse"). Both of these, apparently, are better than his original claim A ("It is bad if those who live are worse off than those who might have lived"), which can only be supported and weighed if he examined more deeply into moral theory...a task he finds too massive to attack.
If he is ending his piece with the idea that human welfare morality cannot be supported in identifying good or bad acts or outcomes, why do all of his statements try to incorporate those conditions? If he realized that such an examination is too much for him to accomplish, why bother at all? I feel he has not persuaded anyone to follow a better method of justifying policies and plans for the future because he offered nothing in return. I'm not sure if Parfit would believe in this, and I'm not even sure I would totally agree with such a notion, but...in an anthropocentric, increase common good point of view...perhaps the following could be fit into an argument or statement: All human life has value and so we must consider all persons and increasing the common good (a long-term goal). Whether a person is of a present or future existence, this does not change the fact they are human beings. Therefore, moral consideration and common good must still be acknowledged.

Parfit is too Hypothetical

When reading Derek Parfit's paper, I was somewhat confused as to what his position was on whether or not we should care about future generations and thus, take measures to ensure their survival. From what I gathered, it appears that Parfit believes that we have an obligation to future generations even if those generations consist of different people based on what decisions we make. He believes that wrongs do not require a victim. I believe in order for something to be wrong, it must either affect someone in a harmful way or have the potential to detrimentally affect someone's life. I agree with Parfit that we are somewhat to blame if people in the future are harmed by something we do now, knowing it may have a detrimental affect in the future.

However, Parfit does not convince me that we are more obligated to ensuring the survival of future generations than we are in preserving our current generation. Parit claims that when we make a decision, we must take into consideration not only those individuals who will be alive in future generations, but also those individuals who may have lived if we had made a different choice. Using this method, it is extremely difficult to determine which choice is the better or more "moral" one as we cannot predict the future and exactly what people will be in it. I cannot see a practical application to Parit's argument.

If I have to make a choice as to whether to make life better for someone in the present generation or make a choice that may or may not help someone who may or may not exist in the future, I will be likely to help the person who is alive now. This is not to say that I don't care about the well-being of future generations as I do think it is important to do what we can to preserve resources for them, but I do not think that we should care more about future generations than the generation that is struggling to survive right now. The bottom line is that Parfit has an interesting idea, but it appears to be based too much on hypothetical situations than on concrete evidence.

Separator post

The posts above concern the reading for Oct. 15 by Parfit.

Martin Golding

Martin Golding has no problem in arguing that our obligations towards future generations are negligible. Before he delves into his argument about obligations he sets up three preliminary questions that need to be addresses. Who and what are the individuals to whom we owe these obligations, and to what class of obligation do they belong. In the first part of his piece he argues that obligations to future generations are essential for the sake of the future community. However, I have several concerns with that; one of which is what is the future? He seems to generalize the future, but does he mean generations from now, or a few years from now. I feel as though no time is better than the present, we have things going on in society that we need to address now- everything from disease to destruction of the Earth. Which takes precedence over the other? That brings up the subject of weight, which is more important. Humanity or the environment… However, trying to stay on track… in the later part of his essay he then turns around to say that present peoples’ should not have any obligation to future fellows. “It is doubtful that we should regard ourselves as being under an obligation to future generations (pg 363).” We don’t know what values they will uphold, what inventions will be introduced, and what futuristic problems may occur. How can we uphold obligations to people who have yet to exist? Golding discusses pollution and curbing population growth and asks how we can have such obligations without the collective effort of the people. It is tough to determine outcomes without the membership of the future generation. Our actions now will determine our future. As Golding states, “whether we have obligations to future generations in part depends on what we do for the present (pg. 364).”

Martin Golding seems to say first that we should make sure that we always look ahead to our future generations to make sure that we keep everything in good shape for them and make the future the best possible for them. I agree with Golding to a point; we should think through the consequences of our actions. I also can take into account his other point that we should not trouble ourselves with the future generations because they may not have the same morals and values that we have today. Who’s to say that the future generations will care about the extinction of a certain species that we care so much about today such as the Polar Bear? There are acts now to help prevent the endangerment of these animals and other precious species that we today see as important and valuable to the world today, but will there be people who even care about Polar Bears and other species in the future? If we always keep looking ahead and not looking at the present, how will we handle the issues today? When Golding says that the future is something to preserve, does he mean that the present is not as valuable? While reading this article, I found myself confused with what he would say as an opinion and would consequently question myself as well. I believe that we should look to the future with regards t our present actions, but it should not be something that we obsess over. I take from this reading a message that says to be concerned but not to have that concern take over our present day lives and keep us distracted from the problems we face today.

The Trouble with Hardin's Math

Garrett Hardin argues that the decisions we make in the present that affect either our immediate benefit or delay benefit for some future generation are like math problems that calculate the changing value of things based on interest. He thinks that when someone needs something in the immediate, his perception of the potential interest that could accrue to that 'something' in the future diminishes until the return is not worth the investment. To relate his example, the hungriest people will decide to eat grains allocated as seeds for future plantings now because they do not appreciate the value of saving them. The trouble with this assessment is that the interest isn't the part of the equation that changes. The grains will have the same value for future generations whether they are reluctantly forgone by the hungry or whether they are preserved by a united society. What really changes in the equation is the value of the 'something' in the first place. The hungriest desire the grain the most, so the initial value of the 'something,' the grain, is higher for them. The well-fed policemen in charge of protecting the grain see less value in the grain, so the investment is less of a sacrifice.

Of course, my correction of Hardin's math does absolutely nothing to help answer the seemingly impossible question of whether we "owe it" to posterity.

I also wanted make a critique of the conservation movement in light of Hardin's essay and his story of the poor Chinese in conflict with the priest. The conservation movement seeks to preserve nature for future generations, while ignoring the needs of the less privileged in the present. The Sierra Club, then, is like the well-fed policeman or priest, who guards the grain or tree, because they do not need it in the immediate present. I imagine the indigenous peoples of so many nations faced with mandates forbidding them from their subsistence practices can make the same point to conservationists: "Why do I have to serve posterity while you stuff your belly? Where is your sense of justice?"

In Who Cares for Posterity? by Garret Hardin he posits an interesting examination of human reason in the context of the existence of future generations. His consideration of human nature, namely our faculty of reason, offered a strong base to ground his argument. I specifically want to address his assertion that resources of the future can only be protected by institutional means. He offers two examples of institutional protection of resources in the siege of Leningrad and food shortage scenario in the USSR. In the first example it was a desire to preserve the horticultural identity of Russia that rationalized many deaths at the hands of starvation. In the second example it was a more explicit reverence for the future itself. In both examples reason was replaced by a belief in some greater good that future existence as a whole is more important than the existence of lives in the immediate. Hardin seems to suggest that we must check reason in order to preserve an environment and ability to exist for the future generations. If he doesn’t flat out call for a rejection of reason, he thinks that it is necessary to reject it at times.
I don’t think he made a sufficient connection between the sacrifices of an individual and that of an institution. His example of institutional sacrifice in the case of Leningrad does not seem to translate over to the individual. Yes, in both cases I mention there are circumstances of starvation and consequent restrictions. In the second example in Russia, it seemed that it was a social agreement that led people to respect the future. What about a situation where a nation was not starving but rather had an abundance of food. Would he say in such cases it is not within human nature to learn or adopt a sufficient reverence for the future? I would hope that in such a case, no matter if he thinks humans are capable of adopting a new reverence, that some degree of reason could be employed. I am not all together convinced that reason should be rejected as a viable medium to adopt a sustainable future. What is so unbelievable about our rational faculty acting in a way that preserves the future? What about the free market for example, what if government put such constraints on the free market where it was not so free anymore. What if it was impossible to be profitable unless your business helped the earth more than it hurt it. While I am not sure that should even happen, I just wanted to point out that application of reason could make the future brighter, even if we don’t care about it.

We are too selfish to ever care enough about future generations to make any significant difference!

Heilbroner, in his piece asks the loaded question of “why should we care about future people or whether humanity survives in the distant future?” He admits that reason alone won’t drive us care enough about these future generations to actually do something about preserving their future. So he poses an idea, with the help of Smith, that we should use our inner consciousness and, “our love of what is honorable and noble, of the grandeur and dignity, and superiority of our own characteristics” to give us the drive to preserve the future of mankind. I personally think that although this is a great idea, it is just that, an idea. Not a practical answer to his question asked. I think humans are simply too selfish to ever fully adopt the plan to “save” or “preserve” future generations. If reason itself doesn’t compel us help preserve them (and reason is usually the only thing that can make people do things), I think it is ridiculous to think that people will accept the enormous actions that need to be taken for this plan to work because it is honorable, for our dignity, or because it is noble and the right thing to do. I think it’s ridiculous. A few, and definitely not enough to even matter, may be compelled to preserve future generations because of this reason, but most, the large majority of people, will never accept reasons such as dignity or honor as reasons to change any behavior of theirs.
Not only do I disagree with these abstract moral reasons for preserving future peoples, because I don’t think it’s even possible, but I also disagree with Heilbroner’s concept that if we aren’t changing our ways we are “the executioners of mankind” or “that we are passing the ax of the executioner off to the next generation”. I think the prosperity of future generations is up to them. Sounds mean, but who is to say that by preserving our resources and controlling our population numbers we will be making life any better for future generations? For all we know, in the year 3075, a group of people will decide to make a bomb that blows up the entire world. That has nothing to do with us, in this day and age. That particular generation decided to be “the executioners of mankind.” If that were to occur, all of our sacrifice and hard work would be ruined by some future generation, not by us. Even though it sounds selfish, I think we should enjoy ourselves now, while we can. No one knows what the future holds. So who is to say we are making any kind or “horrible difference” with our current actions? And who is to say we would me making some kind of “great improvement” by changing our ways? No one can tell us that, and that is why I think too many people today will not buy into the sacrifices that go along with trying to “preserve future generations”. No one really cares, whether it’s because reason can’t make them care, or because they don’t buy into the honor and dignity idea, they simply don’t care enough to change. And even if either of these reasons can make some people care, it won’t be enough to matter, or to make any significant difference. So let’s have fun while we’re here and let the future generations worry about themselves when that time comes, because they will most likely be trying to “have fun while they are here” as well. So why should we be the saviors if they will most likely screw it up later anyway?