Friday, September 11, 2009
Thursday, September 10, 2009
(unrelated)
Babycakes by Neil Gaiman
A few years back all the animals went away.
We woke up one morning, and they just weren't there
anymore. They didn't even leave us a note, or say good
bye. We never figured out quite where they'd gone.
We missed them.
Some of us thought that the world had ended, but it
hadn't. There just weren't any more animals. No cats or
rabbits, no dogs or whales, no fish in the seas, no birds
in the skies.
We were all alone.
We didn't know what to do.
We wandered around lost, for a time, and then some
one pointed out that just because we didn't have animals anymore, that was no reason to change our lives. No reason to change our diets or to cease testing products that might cause us harm.
After all, there were still babies.
Babies can't talk. They can hardly move. A baby is
not a rational, thinking creature.
We made babies.
And we used them.
Some of them we ate. Baby flesh is tender and succulent.
We flayed their skin and decorated ourselves in it.
Baby leather is soft and comfortable.
Some of them we tested.
We taped open their eyes, dripped detergents and
shampoos in, a drop at a time.
We scarred them and scalded them. We burnt them.
We clamped them and planted electrodes into their
brains. We grafted, and we froze, and we irradiated.
The babies breathed our smoke, and the babies' veins
flowed with our medicines and drugs, until they stopped
breathing or until their blood ceased to flow.
It was hard, of course, but it was necessary.
No one could deny that.
With the animals gone, what else could we do?
Some people complained, of course. But then, they
always do.
And everything went back to normal.
Only.. .
Yesterday, all the babies were gone.
We don't know where they went. We didn't even see
them go.
We don't know what we're going to do without them.
But we'll think of something. Humans are smart. It's
what makes us superior to the animals and the babies.
We'll figure something out.
If Our Justifications for Human Equality are True, then so Must Be Arguments for Animal Liberation
Singer says that as a society, we have become speciesists - in the tradition of racists who favored their own skin color over any others, we favor our own species over any other. We are unknowingly participating in the oppression of animals who have the capacity to feel both pleasure and pain. He cites our meat production and consumption as the most aggregious example of speciesism. We destroy the most fundamental interest of other species, i.e. their lives, for our own pleasure, since we do not require meat to survive.
Because we have decided collectively as a society that equality should be shared amongst all members of our own species, regardless of age, gender, race, or mental capacity, we must use the least common denominator as a basis for the right to equality. (Singer does not mean equality in the most clear sense, but only equality of consideration: that we should consider the potential pain or pleasure that could result from our interactions with others. The well-being of any organism must not be given any more consideration than the well-being of any other organism.) Singer clarifies the concept of the least common denominator through examples. Some individuals are more intelligent than others, but still deserve equality. Even if some races showed an average proficiency in a certain trait, that race should be treated the same as another. Because one more intelligent person is not given more equality than another,one less intelligent species should not receive less equality than a more intelligent species. Where philosophers have fallen short is in that they have failed to realize this least common denominator may not be exclusive to humans.
Somewhere in the middle
Kant needs to check his facts because he will find that he has none
Singer supports my view in asking what the relevance of thinking/rationalizing is in determining worth. Kant's defense to why we can't apply this notion to human beings who are unable to rationalize (mentally handicapped, children, and the comatose) is that they have the capacity/potential for rationality even if it is never exhibited. Well, it's a good thing that there is the rest of humanity to speak for those humans who cannot speak for themselves. There is no one to speak for the animals, so people like Kent take it upon themselves to call animals unworthy of such defenses. Why is it unfair to take advantage of an isolated defect (Singer,81) but taking advantage of a general limitation (Singer,81) like animals is permissible? Kant asserts that it boils down to them being in the human category. This seems to be his only resolution for everything. That is not proof! That is an easy excuse for not having an answer.
I appreciate Kant's theory that animals should be treated well unless they have to be killed for food or for a "useful purpose" and that otherwise, for the most part, cruelty of any kind to animals is wrong and should not be permitted. I accept the reality that people will never stop eating meat (at least I believe this) and that's something I have to deal with. In light of this I say "kill them fast and keep it as painless as possible for the animals". So I agree with him in this aspect. Avoid suffering where it can be avoided. I do not, however, thing it is right to kill them. I would prefer that meat was not eaten.
Kant continues to insult the animals by saying that our duties to animals are indirect duties to humans. So hurting and animal impinges on the moral character of the "hurter" and thus makes them a danger or a weak link to the rest of mankind. I believe that this is true. I believe that anyone capable of hurting or killing an animal is capable of being a threat to humanity. I do not, however, support his view that this if the ONLY reason to be good to animals. He is consequently lowering the status of other species by raising our own above them all. And, he does this with no authority and no real facts to back up his theory other than "because I said so", and that is not enough. I think Kant needs to check his facts and realize that he doesn't have any.
Wednesday, September 9, 2009
rational or irrational, that is the question
According to Kant, everything rational has intrinsic moral worth. Kant describes this idea that every rational being exists as an end-in-oneself and not merely as a means to an end. Therefore, animals are not intrinsically worthwhile because they cannot be rational. Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or that of another, like an animal, always have an end and never a means. Kant stresses that human beings are free creatures, free to choose, have intelligent thoughts and rationalize. However, he claims that animals are not humans by any means and our duties towards then are indirect duties towards the human race. In essence, to spite an animal, you spite a human. He means that we may not “use” animals as means to our selfish ends. They are not objects or instruments to be used. And to truly judge a man we can do that through “his treatment of animals.”
I agree with Kant’s argument that we learn value towards one another through kindness to all creatures, and that “our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties to human nature.” However, my question is whether or not it is wrong to use another human being as a means. He does state that to use a human being is to disrespect humanity, but does not mention anything about using them as a means. An example of my argument would be to own a human being, or be a slave owner. Humans are rational and to use another human being is irrational according to Kant. By using the slave they become an instrument. If I were to ask Kant this, he would most likely respond that as long as each side consents to the transaction then both sides are respecting the humanity of the other person. However the slave would not consent. Therefore, this agreement would go against Kant’s idea because it denies the basis to be free and have moral intrinsic worth. It denies the moral status of the person as an end in themselves. Hopefully this idea makes a little sense.
Peter Singer & Dignity
I’d like to limit my discussion of Peter Singer’s article A Utilitarian Defense of Animal Liberation to his considerations of dignity, in particular to his claim that “Philosophers frequently introduce ideas of dignity, respect and worth at the point at which other reasons appear to be lacking” (80). Here, Singer doesn’t actually persuade me very much that arguments on dignity are so misguided or expendable.To me, it seems that Singer is claiming that appeals to dignity fail in explaining why humans (even bad or deficient humans) are more significant morally than animals because questions of dignity only take “the problem back one step” in that it would complicate the question of justifying human/animal inequality by seeking “relevant capacities or characteristics that all and only humans possess” (80). Later Singer claims that Benn’s discussion of research on an imbecile versus a dog is deficient since he “find[s] it hard to see anything in this argument except a defense of preferring the interests of members of our own species because they are members of our own species” (81). I don’t want to be misunderstood as disagreeing with Singer’s overall claim about speciesism, but I can’t help but think that his criticism of Benn’s argument suggests a possible counterclaim to the problem of dignity. If we were to choose between “feeding a hungry baby or a hungry dog” as Benn discusses, we would naturally chose the baby first. True, it seems that we choose the baby because we view it from our own perspective as human beings. And though I won’t argue it here (because of both space, and my hesitation to make such a large claim), it feels to me like morality is a human enterprise or endeavor or capacity, etc. (I can’t think at the moment of any other species that practices morality in the way humans do.) So while it is a claim for speciesism (which I’m not sure I want to condone), I think that there is a link between dignity and the capacity for moral thought, and if one were to grant that human beings are naturally endowed with a moral capacity (similar to Kant’s view on rationality) then dignity is still a factor in the discussion of inequality and not simply a rhetorical diversion.
Using Singer to Critique a Kantian Treatment of Animals
Contrary to Wilson’s article however, reading Singer’s article was akin to experiencing an epiphany. After navigating through a befuddling maze of ends and means, I felt refreshed with Singer’s straightforward philosophy. Equality of consideration, specifically while considering suffering, seems to me to be all the reasoning necessary for one to call for animal liberation. Keeping in mind Singer’s notion of speciesism, I reread Wilson with a different perspective. In every sentence detailing human dignity, I substituted “power” for “dignity” and came to see errors of the Kantian perspective. Though initially Wilson’s article seemed to prove that it was natural for humans to always use animals as a means, it seemed more that it was a desire for dominance which kept humans using animals as means.
Do animals deserve equal rights?
Blog 2 ~ Animals are concious beings
Kant speaks of our “duties towards animals” as being “indirect duties to mankind.” While I agree with this statement, my opinion strongly differs from his when he speaks of animals being merely a “means to an end,” and mindless beings containing no self-conscious. It is as if Kant only views animals as things to practice good behavior on so as to further our human interactions, and ultimately mankind as a whole. I agree that good and respectful behavior towards animals helps to establish better relationships with people, but animals are not mindless things where their sole purpose is to serve the human race. Having spending months with elephants in the bush, or with chimpanzees in Uganda for instance, gives much insight into just how complex animals are. Chimpanzees share 98.7% of our DNA, and have complex social systems and ways of living. Prior to Jane Goodall’s research in Gombe, we thought that man was the only one to ever make and use tools, and that was surely what separated us from animals. However, old knowledge was proved wrong when it was discovered that chimpanzees make tools and utilize them for feeding purposes etc. How can anyone possibly say that animals don’t have a conscious mind? Elephants frequently visit the bones (or graveyards) of old relatives who have died. I’ve seen them numerous times come upon such bones, and gently handle them, put them up to their mouths, carry them around. They remember their old kin; they, like chimps, also have complex social systems. They have consciousness similar to humans. Only one who has never really spent time observing them would be able to say that they are mindless beings.
kant's contradicting points
One could also say that purpose isn’t something tangible, so it is an illusion of the mind and in reality, we have no more purpose than a dog or a monkey. Animals reactions to take care of their young and collect food seasonally are instinctual. A sense of purpose in humans can be made up by the mind as where instinct is very deeply rooted into animals biologically. Humans have shed much more of their instincts that animals have. So perhaps animals have more direct duties or purpose that humans do.
This sense of purpose in instinctual making it more unconscious and they don’t have to be self aware to follow instinct. which according with Kant, animals don’t possess. However this runs into the conflict that Kant puts emphasis on both self consciousness and sense of purpose and duty where sense of purpose doesn’t correlate with self consciousness.
singer's potential
First of all, I think that Singers arguments are very noteworthy, provocative and thought-provoking. However, unfortunately, he is too radical in some of his claims and too narrowly individualistic to capture and inspire an influential environmental ethic that is needed today. With Singer’s arguments, it seems as though he argues for the individual and not the whole with the idea of equal consideration of each being. However, in our environmental realm now, we must see things in terms of ecosystems and processes. His view of an animal centered philosophy ignores the concept of species as a whole, as we need to pay equal consideration to each being. How do we deal with endangered species? If we are only to consider beings equally, does this mean that we should be considering a fly just as much as a whole species of endangered giant pandas?
Another claim that is a bit extreme that loses an ability to inspire a wide spread environmental ethic is his indifference, or what some might consider lack of respect, to some humans, especially the mentally handicapped. This is a very slippery slope in defining who is a “person.” Additionally, another argument that puts Singer at a disadvantage and loses a strong following is his belief that because animals have the ability to feel pain and pleasure, this then puts them on a plane of moral equivalence with us and of equal consideration.
However, despite these criticisms, Singer provides a very interesting lens to look at animals rights in the environmental ethics realm. But, his strength lies in his ability to draw more on reason than those philosophers, such as Kant, who rely more on abstract principles of duty and obedience than pain and pleasure. Despite these strengths, Singer cannot inspire a true environmental ethic that will be adopted by many until his beliefs become more moderate and kept within the bounds of societal human values as a majority.
Human and Animal Equality
I find this to be false in that I believe all animal life has equal value to human life. To say that since we are thinking, reasoning beings qualifies us to have some greater importance than animals is not logical reasoning in my opinion. Kant gives the example of an owner who shoots his dog does not fail in his responsibilities to the dog, for it cannot judge, but rather fails in his duty to humanity (by acting cruelly). I do not see the difference in value between the dog and a human in this example. If we as reasoning beings judge that cruelty to animals by humans directly relates to one’s losing or failing humanity then shouldn’t that action of cruelty be stopped? In that sense, there really is no distinction between whether negative actions are directed against humans or animal, only that it results in the same degradation of humanity. I must say that I believe that killing of animals, in a non-sadistic ways is permissible for humans. Not for any reason other than that they provide sources of food, and a means to survival for humans. I do not see this as degrading to humanity in any way as long as it is done in a respectful manner, such as the Native Americans did, which realizes that animal life serves as a cornerstone of human survival.
The Green Kant: Kant's Treatment of Animals
I agree with Wilson in that it wouldn't make sense for us to treat other animals the way that we treat each other, not because it would cause our status to decline, but because of the many differences that exist between humans and other animals. For instance, there are in fact differences in intelligence and ways of communicating between humans and other animals that would prevent us from treating them in the exact same way that we treat one another. Even so, I do not think that this should prevent us from giving non-human animals (and other forms of life, such as plants) certain rights for their protection.
Moreover, I do not think that it is necessarily the case that animals are incapable of reasoning. An animal that is targeted as prey by another animal, a predator, can certainly think in such a logical manner that it realizes it is in danger of being killed and must get away from the predator that is pursuing it. Wilson or Kant may respond to this argument by saying that this example simply illustrates a survival instinct that animals possess and that does not constitute reasoning. However, whether one considers this animal's response to being in danger an instinct or not, it fits the definition of the word reason. Anyway, humans as well as other animals are driven by many instincts, such as the instinct to eat and drink in order to survive. Humans and other animals are more alike than Wilson and Kant would like to believe.
There are differences between human beings and other animals that might lead one to believe that we are actually the inferior species, such as the fact that four-legged animals are able to run at much faster speeds than we can. Interestingly, Wilson does not acknowledge such differences in her article. Despite the existence of these differences, which Wilson is most likely aware of, she does not seem to believe that any other animal species is superior to human beings.
Only Rational Beings Have Moral Worth
To further the point that we have certain duties to animals because we correspond those duties to humans, I turn to Michael Vick. Why was he put in jail? Why did he lose millions of dollars in endorsement deals and have to pay fines? Was it because people were mad that he violated the rights of the dogs? Some were, but I don’t think it’s that the dog’s actual rights were violated, since they don’t have any rights within our society. But more, I think that it is the fact that it scared people. For our society to hear about the numbers of dogs he had in his possession that were either hurt or dead, scared people. I think that’s because people unconsciously applied Kant’s ideas that the way we treat animals reflects the way we would treat humans. Sure Michael Vick would probably not have committed murder later in life, but it does say something about him as a person and about his morals. I think that is the big issue here. It’s not that animals have rights and should be treated as equal to human. It’s that humans should have enough dignity and love for other creatures to not want to harm them for their own selfish purpose. Wilson made the following statement at the end of her piece that I think makes my point perfectly. She says that we should be motivated to keep from treating animals cruelly out of respect and because we know our dignity as a human being is as stake in our treatment of animals.
Animal Cruelty: A Choice or An Obligation?
Without animals as a separate entity from humans, the judgment of morality and human actions, both to humans, and outwards to animals lack a contrast (Wilson 71). Currently, human beings can observe and make judgment on the treatment of animals and whether it is cruel or not. They can then adjust their actions accordingly such as becoming a vegetarian or protesting against factory farms which could translate in a similar compassion shown to fellow humans (Wilson 67).
If this judgment were to be replaced by a law, then human beings would lack the choice of abstaining from animal-cruelty (Wilson 71). Singer’s method of enforcing laws for animal rights only reforms our actions towards animals, while Wilson’s interpretation of Kant’s idea of animal-treatment would alter our actions towards animals and ourselves (Wilson 71). I consider Kant’s method more expansive and malleable than Singer’s method because it does not rely on complete societal compliance or the erasure of the popular concept of human dignity. If humans were to value the treatment of animals by their own volition instead of being forced to by law, then that compassion might translate inwardly, thereby creating a heartier effect than just more law-abiding citizens.
Fair Treatment
I'm Confused...
Kant’s piece was a hard read for me. Although it was only a few pages short, Kant’s writing was confusing and strangely worded. When I finally understood what he was talking about, I enjoyed playing around with the ideas of “means”, “springs” and “motives” in my head, but when I looked at Kant’s definitions again, they all seemed to be describing the same thing (or being.)
I understood “means” to be the ground of possibility of action, so that could be a person named James. I understood the “springs” to be: The subject ground of the desire, so if Julia were after James as a boyfriend, James would be the “means” and the “spring?” I understood “motives” to be: the objective ground of the violation, so what would be the motive in James and Julia’s case? Company? If someone could explain this to me, I would greatly appreciate it.
I also had a hard time understanding what Kant meant when he kept talking about “ends.” I have a hard time thinking of beings as “ends” because I think of “an end” as a destination, not a being. The only time I understood what he meant by “ends” was when he said “So act as to treat humanity whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end-withal, never as a means only.” I understood this to mean: don’t use people to get to things.
The one thing I really agree with from Kant’s piece was “We can judge the heart of a man by his treatment of animals.” If I’m understanding this correctly, in judging a man by his treatment of animals, are we using animals as “means” and not “ends?” I find myself judging people very harshly when I suspect they don't treat animals with the respect I believe they deserve.
Tuesday, September 8, 2009
Practicle Application of a Moral value for Animals
Wilson does not satisfy my question of how this appeal to humanity within each individual can become both percolated through society, and how even such an appeal would result in a sufficient outcome. Taking our nation into consideration we have many different religious and consequently moral beliefs which dictate the decisions of one in their everyday life. How does she intend to generate this appeal to humanity within each person if there is no social repercussion for disregarding this respect for humanity? Further still, how can social repercussions be handed down if animals do not have some sort of rights. I think it would be hard to distinguish between moral rights and legal rights given the close relation our laws have with our moral standard. In recent news, Micheal Vick was sent to prison for two years for his role in a dog fighting ring. Why I believe that sentence was excessive, would Kant think the same thing? By saying that animals do not have the same moral clout as humans do, how can Vick have received such a sentence while another NFL star killed a human in a DUI crash receiving a smaller sentence. In the case of Vicks NFL peer, he settled out of court for a large sum of money. I think that this situation exemplifies the way in which raising the moral status of animals would serve to diminish the moral status of humans. How can we understand the moral value of animals if our moral dealings between humans are not entirely black and white?
Monday, September 7, 2009
Satyagraha for Conservation
Dwivedi proposition of a satyagraha for conservation, a movement towards a more Hindu lifestyle, though having the ability to potentially help with the current ecological problems does not take into account several factors. The first point that should be noted is that even in India's past, when the entire country was Hindu and there had been no foreign culture introduced yet, there were people who had lavish palaces, armies of merchants, brothels, and went about business in a cut throat manner. Regardless of the religion in a given area nearly every culture around the world has had people who exploited something, or who were always looking for ways to get one up on everyone else. Though the caste might have had positive effects for the environment, within each caste there was still competition. War was not a foreign concept to India, nor were merchants who horded massive amounts of wealth. It seems almost naive to assume one religion has the power where others do not.
Aside from the competition within each caste, the caste system itself left hundreds of thousands of people in ill health, poverty, and without personal freedoms. Something like the caste system would have a hard time being imposed again, and if it somehow was accomplished you have no promise of the environment improving, only the degradation of peoples' homes, and most likely physical health.
I agree with Dwivedi in that religion can play a key factor (religions guide the lives of millions of people), but there are just so many other factors at play that one cannot simply look at this with only one type of lens. With Dwivedi it's not only a religious lens though, it's a Hindu lens, something that in many peoples' eyes will just cause more problems.
Gaining Back Respect for Nature
Satyagraha for Conservation: A Hindu View
Changing Lifestyles not Religions
However, while I agree that these teachings and ideas coincide with our efforts to save the earth not everything she mentioned had to be taken to the degree that she did. The Buddhist way of life is one people should strive to live up to, however it seemed that she was trying to convert the world to adopt not only the moral mindset of this religion in regards to nature but the entire religion itself. Her repeated belief that mans immorality is directly responsible for the deterioration of this earth can easily be refuted by anyone outside this religious belief.
I think it would have been a stronger argument to put forth the ideals of the religion as a way to base one’s life off of but not necessarily taking on the entire religious way of life and beliefs. Statements like, “Man has to understand that pollution in the environment has been caused because there has been psychological pollution within himself” makes me think that she is merely trying a new angle to be evangelical. I understand her theory, that if we change the attitudes within ourselves about greed and the like than we will change our attitude toward greed in the ecologic sense. Yet, this change within us does not have to include a change of religious practice to do so.
Our Obligation to Environmental Protection
In order to solve the environmental crisis we need not incorporate religious views, whether they concern nature’s status as “a sign of the Creator” (Samarrai 324) or the intrinsic value of nature. That is to say, while religions, either individually or in conjunction with one another, might be able to motivate individuals to pursue the goal of environmental sustainability, it does not seem that the motivation needs to be religious in kind. Operating from outside of the religious realm, according to Segun Ogungbemi, it seems that we are already obligated. This obligation comes from what he calls quite simply, “conventional morality”, and it can be stated as “not taking more than you need from nature” (Ogungbemi 331).
Ogungbemi later provides us with yet another reason to promote environmental awareness and responsibility by “reformulat[ing]” our already discussed obligation. He aruges, because we are “Invariably endangering our existence” when we exploit the environment (Ogungbemi 337), (“our” refers to us as well as future generations) we are already obligated to act in an environmentally sustainable fashion based simply upon these considerations.
Also consider the words of Sociologist Ramachandra Guha in his discussion of the issue of nature’s intrinsic or extrinsic worth. For no matter which side of this discussion we find ourselves arguing for, it seems that we will not be motivated to act differently for either answer. It seems reasonable to conclude from this that if we believe ourselves to have an absolute duty to protect the environment, no matter what the basis for this belief, we will have just as much motivation to act, and it is for this reason that in the case of environmental protection, religion should not be able to provide us with any greater motivation toward action than our already existent moral knowledge.