Kasun's alternative could be just as hazardous as she considers population control to be

Kasun feels very strongly that doomsdayers are extremely hazardous to humans and their rights. She poses the "where's the proof to back up their claims" question that seems to always arise against advocates of caution. She seems to think that their lack of proof in combination with the danger they pose to freedom are enough reason to completely prevent population control and caution.
She asks how they can be sure that the market mechanism cannot handle population growth. She seems unconcerned, or at least not concerned enough about the fact that it's a 50/50 chance. It seems wrong of her to suggest that this incertainty justifies a reliance on everything working out like it has in the past, and does not justify a cautious lifestyle to prevent the possible. Also her reliance on this past principle seems ungrounded becuase we are not the same society we once were. We are far more technologically advanced that ever before and that means that we cannot depend on a different society's past for answers to a questionable and dangerous situation.
She asks why families cannot be trusted to adjust the number of their children to the availability of resources. People have shown patterns of caring more about continuing there blood line than the betterment of earth. People are concerned for themselves before others and this is an inevitable fact. The cautious believe in "if it COULD happen, then it should be prevented". There is no denying that things are not in balance right now. The population level is struggling to find balance. It seems as though she ignores the fact that people are already showing that they can't be trusted.
She really comes after the lifeboat capacity policy for its precautionary measures. It seems as though she thinks that they are fools and are trying to control people more than help them. The policy is a selfless precautionary measure for the good of all people and earth.
Lastly, her alternative to the lifeboat policy of increasing food production and distribution and increasing population even further requires a drastic change that will inevitably lead to further exhaustion of earth.

Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Oct. 27 by Kasun and Gardner/Assadourian/Sarin.

“Tragedy of the Commons” is an important article by Garrett Hardin. This theory describes a problem in which many individuals acting independently in their own self-interest ultimately destroy a shared limited resource (despite the fact that it may not be anyone’s interest for this to happen in the long run). Thus, the Tragedy of the Commons challenged Adam Smith in his belief that individual decisions reached will be the best decisions for an entire society. Instead, Hardin advocated “social arrangements” that produce responsibility which might include some form of “mutually agreed upon coercion” or “incentives.”
Hardin's argument is of great significance and is impressively convincing. However, I believe that he has made a tactless hypothesis. One of the concepts that Hardin makes an assumption about is the nature of reason within humans. He states that "as a rational being, each herdsman seeks to maximize his gain." This then can be reinterpreted on the other hand to be that any person who does not seek to maximize his gain is thought to be irrational.
However, I fully disagree with this inference. This conception of the nature of reason I find to be misleading. Some people who are able to functionally think and reason correctly may reason from a different value set. They may choose to live simply so as to meet the needs of life with the least energy and with the least damaging impact on nature and the environment. Therefore, for people who reason this way, minimalism and prudence permits and allows these individuals to have a better life as they may spend their “gains” on spiritual, cultural and intellectual development instead of consumption. These people may have no interest or desire in maximizing their material gain in regards to consumption.
So therefore, as Hardin seems to stress, reason makes rational individuals seek specific goals and lifestyles that would lead them to environmental destruction. Hardin seems to make his claim very understandably; however, to test this theory, we must try to interpret it in another way. How does Hardin rationalize those who do not lead such lifestyles? Accordingly it can be restated in a logical and equivalent manner such that does this then make them irrational? I do not believe so which is where my reservations lie with Hardin’s assumption.
Despite my criticism above about the nature of reason in humans, I do not necessarily think that this assumption prevents Hardin’s arguments from being effective. From the most consumptive individualists to the most simplistic, everyone works together to consume land, water and resources. Ultimately, action needs to be taken to produce corrective feedback that will help persuade individuals to act responsibly so that we relinquish our “freedom to breed” sort of speak.

Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Oct. 22 by McKibben and Hardin.

I agree with Derek Parfit’s belief that there doesn’t always have to be a “definite victim” in order to call something bad or a crime. It is undeniable that our choices that we are making now will affect future generations, and I agree that we are responsible for making wise environmental decisions now to ensure that future generations will be better off. Humans are somewhat to blame for any detrimental effect we might have on future generations, and should do what can be done to benefit future generations while also looking out for ourselves.

While others may disagree and challenge that we should look out for the interests of ourselves in the here and now, I believe that we can still further ourselves as well as the potential future generations to come at the same time. Making more environmentally friendly decisions now such as acting to end the overexploitation of resources will help us to live longer with the continual ability to draw from those resources over time, while at the same time helping to preserve the chance that those same resources will help and sustain others in the future. Similarly, burning fossil fuels and pumping other harmful substances into the air is a detriment to us now, and even more so in the future. Depleting the ozone layer, which enables through harmful radiation from the sun, increases the risk of skin cancer as well as a host of other issues that immediately effect generations now, and only grows worse for those in the future. We must not be consumed by short sightedness and instead look to the effects we will have on those individuals yet to come. Becoming environmentally aware and taking actions now really will benefit us, and will most definitely make the lives of people yet to come much better. We must act with not only ourselves in mind, but those of the future in order to secure them with the best possible lives we can.

Future Generations and Energy Policy

It’s hard to say exactly what Parfit might purpose in terms of environmental policy, other than his main claim that we are responsible for the kind of environmental policies that will influence the welfare of people in the future, regardless of whether their personal identity changes as a result of our influence. I agree with Parfit’s claim that “it is bad if those that live are worse off than those who might have lived” (370).This claim seems reasonable to me in that it doesn’t side-step the responsibility that is delegated to the current generation to insure that future generation – again, without reference to whether they are different people because of our influence – have a high quality of life. If can create conditions by which future generations live better lives, we are morally obligated to increase the overall welfare of those people.

At the risk of sounding pedestrian, it’s occurred to me at this point that I really don’t have much to say for or against Parfit’s view only because his thesis, which of course does say interesting things about intergenerational rights and duties, ultimately proposes a common-sense view of morality that I think most people already hold, that is, that we are responsible for the welfare of future people and that we should consider the immediate, long-term, and predictable effects of our actions. This is a simplification of Parfit’s argument, of course, but ultimately I think his riffs on personal identity (which already seem a stretch, like Kristin was suggesting) ultimately lead to a dead end for me. I agree with Melanie’s blog post as well that Parfit, while being philosophically interesting, is at the same time boring and inconsequential for policy formation. I do like this piece however for Parfit’s ability to anticipate the implications of believing or not believing his intuitions as well as the puzzling view of obligations to children that haven’t or won’t be born. So maybe I'm being too harsh.... But I guess I’m just willing to express my (frustrating) inclination to be philosophically provincial here only because my reading of this article has, in regard to understanding environmental issues, brought me around the cul-de-sac back to where I started.

Thoughts on Parfit

The thoughts that jump to the front of my mind regarding Parfit's piece are ones of confusion and a lack of satisfaction. Throughout his writings he suggests multiple hypotheticals, many complicated responses to hypotheticals, which he does not offer complete answers too in every situation, and he relies on a plethora of assumptions without much reasoning. All of this makes it in some cases difficult to follow, particularly when it comes to following his opinion.By the end you do come away with a clear point and conclusion; however, this conclusion is simply "many moral theories need to be revised". If Parfit had taken the time to try and reason as to why a certain theory was better, the writing may have been much more substantial. Regardless, the principle he seems to supporting, principle (B), I do agree with. It would be bad if people are worse off than what they might have been. In the case of depletion or conservation, or any of the situations regarding a large group of people, it seems rather obvious to me depletion is not a good idea. To be honest the amount of hypotheticals he presents creates a great mess of ideas to sift through to find the one conclusion he meagerly offers up.

Still, Parfit's goal is one that seems both pluasible and in general good. Future people should be able to blame those in the past for poor mistakes that lead them to lives that are not as good as they could be. Placing blame on the past does not assist in helping the present. Hopefully it instead makes people now realize that we are responsible for the future and the generations ahead of us. As parents can be blamed for the way children turn out, so can we be blamed for the generations after us; we must not hurt ourselves, but we cannot ignore the consequences of our actions.

Assumptions Clouding Parfit's Theory

By the end of Derek Parfit’s argument for intergenerational rights and duties, I had not been convinced of my responsibility towards future generations. At face value, it seems he succeeded in showing that a traditional view of these duties are not necessarily accurately posed. However, behind his confusing examples and hypothetical scenarios are left essential assumptions, which we are required to blindly accept.

To clarify his views towards the beginning of the essay, Parfit cites the invention of the train as an example of significant policies, decisions and time affecting our identity. In the respect to my mother and father being in proximity to each other to meet, marry, etc., I agree. But to say that a couple’s sperm and eggs vary enough in the span of one month to completely change their offspring’s identity seems a stretch (though I admit, I am far from adept at the science, so hopefully Cody can shed some insight in class on this). If a couple keeps the same exact lifestyle from August to September, what significant difference would there be between a baby conceived in August versus one conceived in September? Were I the baby conceived in September, I would feel comfortable saying that, had I been instead conceived by the same parents a month earlier, I would still be the same person (not just “sufficiently like” (365) me).

A larger problem I had with the reading was Parfit’s throwing around suggestions of decisions being “worse for” or “better for” individuals, or life being “worth not living.” I wish these concepts had been better qualified with specific mentioning of what it means for someone to be better off, or how one would go about deciding her life was not worth living.

I find it mainly difficult to consider Parfit’s theory because I am not convinced that major population changes occur due to biological differences Parfit suggests, and further because I have no sense of how to judge a good life versus a bad life, versus a life not worth living.

arguments against parfit's views questioned

Even though they are view that Parfit is opposing, I don’t think that what is considered good quality of life holds the validity that its argument does, and the idea that we can’t see out of our personal identity. When using the examples of power plants and resource uses, it is said that if the people choose the risky option, or depletion, then people living in the future suffering the consequences won’t be suffering anymore because their identity is in that time frame and they won’t have any other experiences to compare their environment to. The people who are living with these consequences can know that hundreds of years earlier, there was a different option that would have lead to a different outcome, so they know that their reality could have been better.
The very idea of the type of well being in consideration can’t fully constitute all of well being. Again, in the power plant and conservation/depletion examples, it seems quality of life is determined by health, and material possessions. These things factor into well being, but aren’t the most important aspect. The mental state. Wealth doesn’t determine how truly happy a person is. There have been studies that show material possession and wealth don’t equate to more happiness. Even more importantly, as we consume more and gain more, overall happiness hasn’t risen in people. In the case of depletion, we can’t say that their well being is better, because in some other poor places in the world with less consumption, they can have less but be just as happy.

Parfit leaves readers wanting

Parfit fell short of making any kind of impact on me with his piece. To be perfectly honest, I didn't even want to finish the piece. I would hope that each paragraph or thought would end with some strong thesis or strong opinion from Parfit but it never did. He seemed almost to switch his views throughout the piece, so I had to keep going back to consult earlier paragraphs, searching for clues to understand.

If he didnt seem to switch sides then he made that little sense to me as a reader, which is also a problem. He also seemed to do a lot of "They are equally important", but this is a problem because the whole reason there is a problem is because a choice can't be made on which one is more important, which one is priority and which should be acted on.

He is just reminding us of the issue at hand without ever providing any kind of assitance, or nothing good enough to be called assistance. By not stating his belief strongly enough for me, as a reader, to carry it through to the end of the reading, he is not providing a defense. And without a defense there is no solution.
He spends so much time providing all these scenarios. He breaks them down and discusses them at length. Then he compares them to each other, making it seem like it will come to this grand conclusion of a logical solution, but it does not.

I'm not trying to insult his intelligence, because he poses good points and forces the reader to examine their beliefs in light of the scenarios and questions. He is sturring thought in readers. It just seems dissapointing that he has so much to say but no real conclusion to speak of.

Anyway, I personally think the whole "the people that would die with the Risky policy would not be alive in the future without that policy" thing is a intellectual waste of time. I feel that it is going no where fast and has no possible solution whatsoever. I mean yes, you have to wonder about it, but posing questions like that will not solve our problem at all.

I think it is our duty to save lives and makes lives better now because we are HERE on earth NOW and that is the duty to which we are entrusted. The NOW. But I do not support the Risky policy (killing people later) just to enhance things for the better now. I do not think it is ok to do something that we know will kill people, ever. Fix now without condemning the future. I personally think that efforts now to make things better (conservation) will inevitably save the future. I think sacrifice is necessary, as long as it doesnt compromise a life, and it is sacrifice that will carry conservation forward.

Parfit what?

I'm sorry I'm completely lost on the whole idea of the "future people". The idea of getting into the specifics of whether when we make a decision the people whom would have existed in the first option are no longer the exact same people who would have existed in the second is just mind-boggling. On 367 he states "If we choose...this will lower the quality of life more than two centuries from now. But the particular people who will then be living would never have existed if instead we had chosen conservation." I don't know about anyone else but that doesn't seem to make a whole lot of sense to me, in the sense of logic. Whether or not these people are really the same people should not matter. The fact is that from a decision we are making, life could be worse for one group of people, or better for another group of people. In the "depletion or conservation case", I think that conservation would be the morally acceptable decision. It accounts for the fact that while "quality" of life would be somewhat more moderate, it would be better off for the whole in general, not just the people who are living in the next two centuries. While if delving into the technicalities of the argument, the people living worse off may not be the exact same people, there are still people involved, with the same moral rights and therefore are entitled to the better quality of life!
In the last full paragraph on 268 Parfit asks the question "Or does it matter whether these lives would be lived by the very same people?" and to answer him, I would say it does not! There will be people either way, people whose lives will be different due to our decisions and because of this it makes a moral difference.
Overall I like the idea of what Parfit is trying to do, and making an argument on the specifics of a situation to further clarify exactly what is going on is respectable. However, I do not think that it makes a whole lot of difference in the grand scheme of things. I belive most of the examples he gives need to be given a "black-and-white" perspective in that in one case, a decision can be made that is better for the future people, or one can be made that is worse for them. That it is. Whether or not they are the the actual same people does not matter, there will still be people in the same situation because of your direct action. Therefore, it is morally reprehensible to make that decision.

The Search for Solution to Energy Policy and Further Future

Parfit's arguments in his piece come mostly in the forms of multitudes of questions rather than succinct and sturdy beliefs. Filled with varying point of views and "for-instances", Parfit has attempted to redevelop the thought process involved in deciding and justifying choices about "intergenerational rights and duties". Yet, how can he claim they are insufficient if he comes to no better conclusion of his own?
He finds the current or most popular views to be wrong or underdeveloped. While not exactly coming to a specific argument for justifying policy decision-making, he generally feels that we are responsible, no matter who or how many come into existance in the future, for policies affecting the standard of living for those humans further along, especially if we can cause their lives to be better or worse because of it.
While hoping for general summations at the ends of paragraphs or any hint of strong support for a single claim for his own belief, I was met with more and more questions and more and more scenarios than I would have liked to come across.
Parfit offered explanations to examples of situations and their implications in relevance to what other people may find to be true and morally relevant; and for his own "intuitions", gave weak suggestions to what may be an acceptable claim. In fact, he changes claims throughout the text, trying to find a suitable and supportable position. He instead concludes his text with the thought that, "...this part of morality...concerned with human welfare, cannot be explained in person-affecting terms. It's fundamental principle will not be concerned with whether acts will be good or bad for those people whom they affect" (Parfit, 372). This leads me to believe that he spent his whole time explaining and questioning what is good or bad to just dismiss it altogether and leave us with the notion that "...moral theories may need to be revised" (372)...but how so? Give something solid!
I understand that he argues against standard views and traditional ways of justifying "intergenerational rights and duties", and he did this by breaking down and disecting situations; but he offers nothing in return or replace of them. He calls for a "claim X"...better and wider than claim B ("If the same number of lives would be lived either way, it would be bad if people are worse off than people might have been") and can sometimes be used in congruence with PAP statement ("It is bad if people are affected for the worse"). Both of these, apparently, are better than his original claim A ("It is bad if those who live are worse off than those who might have lived"), which can only be supported and weighed if he examined more deeply into moral theory...a task he finds too massive to attack.
If he is ending his piece with the idea that human welfare morality cannot be supported in identifying good or bad acts or outcomes, why do all of his statements try to incorporate those conditions? If he realized that such an examination is too much for him to accomplish, why bother at all? I feel he has not persuaded anyone to follow a better method of justifying policies and plans for the future because he offered nothing in return. I'm not sure if Parfit would believe in this, and I'm not even sure I would totally agree with such a notion, but...in an anthropocentric, increase common good point of view...perhaps the following could be fit into an argument or statement: All human life has value and so we must consider all persons and increasing the common good (a long-term goal). Whether a person is of a present or future existence, this does not change the fact they are human beings. Therefore, moral consideration and common good must still be acknowledged.

Parfit is too Hypothetical

When reading Derek Parfit's paper, I was somewhat confused as to what his position was on whether or not we should care about future generations and thus, take measures to ensure their survival. From what I gathered, it appears that Parfit believes that we have an obligation to future generations even if those generations consist of different people based on what decisions we make. He believes that wrongs do not require a victim. I believe in order for something to be wrong, it must either affect someone in a harmful way or have the potential to detrimentally affect someone's life. I agree with Parfit that we are somewhat to blame if people in the future are harmed by something we do now, knowing it may have a detrimental affect in the future.

However, Parfit does not convince me that we are more obligated to ensuring the survival of future generations than we are in preserving our current generation. Parit claims that when we make a decision, we must take into consideration not only those individuals who will be alive in future generations, but also those individuals who may have lived if we had made a different choice. Using this method, it is extremely difficult to determine which choice is the better or more "moral" one as we cannot predict the future and exactly what people will be in it. I cannot see a practical application to Parit's argument.

If I have to make a choice as to whether to make life better for someone in the present generation or make a choice that may or may not help someone who may or may not exist in the future, I will be likely to help the person who is alive now. This is not to say that I don't care about the well-being of future generations as I do think it is important to do what we can to preserve resources for them, but I do not think that we should care more about future generations than the generation that is struggling to survive right now. The bottom line is that Parfit has an interesting idea, but it appears to be based too much on hypothetical situations than on concrete evidence.

Separator post

The posts above concern the reading for Oct. 15 by Parfit.

Martin Golding

Martin Golding has no problem in arguing that our obligations towards future generations are negligible. Before he delves into his argument about obligations he sets up three preliminary questions that need to be addresses. Who and what are the individuals to whom we owe these obligations, and to what class of obligation do they belong. In the first part of his piece he argues that obligations to future generations are essential for the sake of the future community. However, I have several concerns with that; one of which is what is the future? He seems to generalize the future, but does he mean generations from now, or a few years from now. I feel as though no time is better than the present, we have things going on in society that we need to address now- everything from disease to destruction of the Earth. Which takes precedence over the other? That brings up the subject of weight, which is more important. Humanity or the environment… However, trying to stay on track… in the later part of his essay he then turns around to say that present peoples’ should not have any obligation to future fellows. “It is doubtful that we should regard ourselves as being under an obligation to future generations (pg 363).” We don’t know what values they will uphold, what inventions will be introduced, and what futuristic problems may occur. How can we uphold obligations to people who have yet to exist? Golding discusses pollution and curbing population growth and asks how we can have such obligations without the collective effort of the people. It is tough to determine outcomes without the membership of the future generation. Our actions now will determine our future. As Golding states, “whether we have obligations to future generations in part depends on what we do for the present (pg. 364).”

Martin Golding seems to say first that we should make sure that we always look ahead to our future generations to make sure that we keep everything in good shape for them and make the future the best possible for them. I agree with Golding to a point; we should think through the consequences of our actions. I also can take into account his other point that we should not trouble ourselves with the future generations because they may not have the same morals and values that we have today. Who’s to say that the future generations will care about the extinction of a certain species that we care so much about today such as the Polar Bear? There are acts now to help prevent the endangerment of these animals and other precious species that we today see as important and valuable to the world today, but will there be people who even care about Polar Bears and other species in the future? If we always keep looking ahead and not looking at the present, how will we handle the issues today? When Golding says that the future is something to preserve, does he mean that the present is not as valuable? While reading this article, I found myself confused with what he would say as an opinion and would consequently question myself as well. I believe that we should look to the future with regards t our present actions, but it should not be something that we obsess over. I take from this reading a message that says to be concerned but not to have that concern take over our present day lives and keep us distracted from the problems we face today.

The Trouble with Hardin's Math

Garrett Hardin argues that the decisions we make in the present that affect either our immediate benefit or delay benefit for some future generation are like math problems that calculate the changing value of things based on interest. He thinks that when someone needs something in the immediate, his perception of the potential interest that could accrue to that 'something' in the future diminishes until the return is not worth the investment. To relate his example, the hungriest people will decide to eat grains allocated as seeds for future plantings now because they do not appreciate the value of saving them. The trouble with this assessment is that the interest isn't the part of the equation that changes. The grains will have the same value for future generations whether they are reluctantly forgone by the hungry or whether they are preserved by a united society. What really changes in the equation is the value of the 'something' in the first place. The hungriest desire the grain the most, so the initial value of the 'something,' the grain, is higher for them. The well-fed policemen in charge of protecting the grain see less value in the grain, so the investment is less of a sacrifice.

Of course, my correction of Hardin's math does absolutely nothing to help answer the seemingly impossible question of whether we "owe it" to posterity.

I also wanted make a critique of the conservation movement in light of Hardin's essay and his story of the poor Chinese in conflict with the priest. The conservation movement seeks to preserve nature for future generations, while ignoring the needs of the less privileged in the present. The Sierra Club, then, is like the well-fed policeman or priest, who guards the grain or tree, because they do not need it in the immediate present. I imagine the indigenous peoples of so many nations faced with mandates forbidding them from their subsistence practices can make the same point to conservationists: "Why do I have to serve posterity while you stuff your belly? Where is your sense of justice?"

In Who Cares for Posterity? by Garret Hardin he posits an interesting examination of human reason in the context of the existence of future generations. His consideration of human nature, namely our faculty of reason, offered a strong base to ground his argument. I specifically want to address his assertion that resources of the future can only be protected by institutional means. He offers two examples of institutional protection of resources in the siege of Leningrad and food shortage scenario in the USSR. In the first example it was a desire to preserve the horticultural identity of Russia that rationalized many deaths at the hands of starvation. In the second example it was a more explicit reverence for the future itself. In both examples reason was replaced by a belief in some greater good that future existence as a whole is more important than the existence of lives in the immediate. Hardin seems to suggest that we must check reason in order to preserve an environment and ability to exist for the future generations. If he doesn’t flat out call for a rejection of reason, he thinks that it is necessary to reject it at times.
I don’t think he made a sufficient connection between the sacrifices of an individual and that of an institution. His example of institutional sacrifice in the case of Leningrad does not seem to translate over to the individual. Yes, in both cases I mention there are circumstances of starvation and consequent restrictions. In the second example in Russia, it seemed that it was a social agreement that led people to respect the future. What about a situation where a nation was not starving but rather had an abundance of food. Would he say in such cases it is not within human nature to learn or adopt a sufficient reverence for the future? I would hope that in such a case, no matter if he thinks humans are capable of adopting a new reverence, that some degree of reason could be employed. I am not all together convinced that reason should be rejected as a viable medium to adopt a sustainable future. What is so unbelievable about our rational faculty acting in a way that preserves the future? What about the free market for example, what if government put such constraints on the free market where it was not so free anymore. What if it was impossible to be profitable unless your business helped the earth more than it hurt it. While I am not sure that should even happen, I just wanted to point out that application of reason could make the future brighter, even if we don’t care about it.

We are too selfish to ever care enough about future generations to make any significant difference!

Heilbroner, in his piece asks the loaded question of “why should we care about future people or whether humanity survives in the distant future?” He admits that reason alone won’t drive us care enough about these future generations to actually do something about preserving their future. So he poses an idea, with the help of Smith, that we should use our inner consciousness and, “our love of what is honorable and noble, of the grandeur and dignity, and superiority of our own characteristics” to give us the drive to preserve the future of mankind. I personally think that although this is a great idea, it is just that, an idea. Not a practical answer to his question asked. I think humans are simply too selfish to ever fully adopt the plan to “save” or “preserve” future generations. If reason itself doesn’t compel us help preserve them (and reason is usually the only thing that can make people do things), I think it is ridiculous to think that people will accept the enormous actions that need to be taken for this plan to work because it is honorable, for our dignity, or because it is noble and the right thing to do. I think it’s ridiculous. A few, and definitely not enough to even matter, may be compelled to preserve future generations because of this reason, but most, the large majority of people, will never accept reasons such as dignity or honor as reasons to change any behavior of theirs.
Not only do I disagree with these abstract moral reasons for preserving future peoples, because I don’t think it’s even possible, but I also disagree with Heilbroner’s concept that if we aren’t changing our ways we are “the executioners of mankind” or “that we are passing the ax of the executioner off to the next generation”. I think the prosperity of future generations is up to them. Sounds mean, but who is to say that by preserving our resources and controlling our population numbers we will be making life any better for future generations? For all we know, in the year 3075, a group of people will decide to make a bomb that blows up the entire world. That has nothing to do with us, in this day and age. That particular generation decided to be “the executioners of mankind.” If that were to occur, all of our sacrifice and hard work would be ruined by some future generation, not by us. Even though it sounds selfish, I think we should enjoy ourselves now, while we can. No one knows what the future holds. So who is to say we are making any kind or “horrible difference” with our current actions? And who is to say we would me making some kind of “great improvement” by changing our ways? No one can tell us that, and that is why I think too many people today will not buy into the sacrifices that go along with trying to “preserve future generations”. No one really cares, whether it’s because reason can’t make them care, or because they don’t buy into the honor and dignity idea, they simply don’t care enough to change. And even if either of these reasons can make some people care, it won’t be enough to matter, or to make any significant difference. So let’s have fun while we’re here and let the future generations worry about themselves when that time comes, because they will most likely be trying to “have fun while they are here” as well. So why should we be the saviors if they will most likely screw it up later anyway?

Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Oct. 13 by Heilbroner, Hardin, and Golding.

I liked Meadows’s article because it called to attention the fact that we need to do more to protect biodiversity than just protect a couple animals in a zoo, or fence off an area for a national park. I like that she suggests “just leaving it alone.” It seems so simple, yet, like she pointed out before: there is barely any place on earth that humans haven’t raped for its resources. In the end of her article, Meadows calls for everyone to have moral respect for nature no matter what your reasoning is; whether it’s selfish or whatever.

Moving onto Russow’s article, I was bothered again by the selfishness displayed in the arguments of human beings to save certain species. With all of the recent readings, I am having a hard time coming up with a really good, convincing argument as to why species have value other than the value humans put on them. I hate the selfish arguments for things like game animals (“there will be fewer for humans to hunt if their numbers drop”) or the story about the condor eggshells that were weakened by DDT (“well then it’s probably affecting human health as well”) or protecting rare plants (“because of their medicinal value to humans.”) Why can’t we just protect and conserve things because living thing should have the right to live and thrive?

As for the case of the Orioles… it is more natural for animals or a species to weed themselves out than it is for them to be made extinct by humans. I feel like the Orioles should be encouraged to keep up with their seemingly natural interbreeding, because they are probably coming up with a stronger, better species by doing so. They’re probably doing this and getting the good traits from both species.

Meadows and Russow

Meadows has a very practical argument which is fairly simple in the way she states it which is that we need to control humanity in order to protect the environment regardless of we do it for moral reasons or for reasons of self-preservation. Russow’s claim that we need to protect the Earth to defend ourselves I can completely agree with though I believe it is more complex than she makes it out to be. For example what are ethical ways of controlling human numbers with such a huge base population and in what ways should we govern ourselves? I think these are much, much more difficult questions to answer than she makes them out to be. I don’t know why Russow believes it is more arrogant to consider ecosystems as a source of economic value in creating medicines etc rather than viewing them in terms of their ecosystem services or in their accumulated knowledge. All seem very anthropocentric reasons for valuing diversity so I would think they would be fairly equally arrogant. I largely agree that biodiversity as a source of economic value, environmental services, and as a source of wisdom are very accurate reasons to value nature.
Russow seems to conclude that species can have a greater/less degree of aesthetic value and that we have moral obligations to preserve that aesthetic value. I can agree that aesthetic value is definitely a valid source of value to give to creatures however while it may seem a practical one to her I am not sure that it is. For one thing it is a very subjective source of value and what one person finds aesthetically pleasing may vary from person to person. I also feel that it could be considered a rather arrogant point of view to equate life to a piece of art such as a painting. I am also not sure what the basis is for a moral obligation to preserve things with aesthetic value. Is aesthetic value an example of intrinsic value and how do we measure it? Personally it seems to me that while she does prove that other arguments will fail to protect certain species, aestheticism will also fail to accomplish giving protection to species.

Separator post

The posts above concern the readings for Oct. 8 by Meadows, Russow, and Stone.

Morality and Natural Behavior in Watson

In his piece, “A Critique of Anti-Anthropocentric Ethics”, Richard Watson discusses the unattractive implications of the anti-anthropocentric, egalitarian view, which he believes amounts to self-contradiction. However, I will offer objections to his treatments of morality and ‘natural human behavior’. I begin by offering two quotations. The first highlights Naess’ distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘life’ communities, which Watson quickly dismisses. He writes, “Animals cannot be citizens [i.e., members of a human moral community]. But animals may, as far as I can understand, be members of life communities” (237). Watson goes on to argue, “If we are to treat man as a part of nature on egalitarian terms with other species, then man’s behavior must be treated as morally neutral too” (238). However, why is it that humans cannot be equal to other species by being a member of Naess’ “life community”, and at the same time be the lone member of the moral community?

An alarming implication of anti-anthropocentric and egalitarian view, if Watson is correct that people must be “morally neutral” in the above sense, is a kind of “inactivism” (236); when the biocentrist’s “hands-off” view towards other species is combined with egalitarianism, Watson believes he is similarly required to ‘take his hands off’ his own species. Notice how this absolute and unapologetic inactivism strikes us a kind of moral failing. I believe that it is an overextension on Watson’s part to say that we would need to restrain ourselves in this way and to actually refrain from following our moral impulses. To act in such a way would be like attempting to imitate a species incapable of moralizing, as opposed to really acting in a way that is “natural” for humans.

Watson expresses his understanding of ‘natural behavior’ when he argues, “Human ways—human culture—and human actions are as natural as are the ways in which any other species of animals behaves. But if we view the state of nature or Nature as being natural, undisturbed, and unperturbed only when human beings are not present, or only when human beings are curbing their natural behavior [emphasis added], then we are assuming that human beings are apart from, separate from, different from, removed from, or above nature” (238). The italicized passage highlights a conflict between natural behavior and morality, but this is not how we think about these issues. Consider, if we were to use “natural” in this way, we would be hard pressed to identify when a human is living in his or her “natural state”—is it (1) when acting morally (which will require the rejection of some desires, such as the desire to pursue “evolutionary potential” (239)), or is it (2) when living out our evolutionary potential (which might involve denying the morally relevant features of a situation and the accompanying intuitions we experience)?

Watson’s treatment of the issues of morality and natural human behavior are problematic and ultimately stand in the way of his argument against the anti-anthropocentric view.

social ecology: almost there

Social Ecology provides an organic view of social theory such that it claims that the present ecological problems are rooted in deep-seated social problems. This particular theory emphasizes the inter-dependence with humans and nature. Moreover, it stresses the importance of examining the degree of connectedness you currently have with yourself, individuals, your community and nature.

Bookchin makes a strong case for the concept of social ecology by examining the relationships between human populations and their environments. This idea accentuates the notion that you can enhance yourself, society, the environment, and ultimately the world. Moreover, Bookchin describes the complexity of relationships between people and with nature, along with the importance of examining the social structures that coincide with these dynamics. Our ecological problems cannot be realized, much less managed or solved, without facing the social issues from that activate or perpetuate them. Social ecology positions the roots of the ecological crisis in a theory of domination between people. Thus, the domination of nature is seen as a product of domination within society. Therefore, if we change the relationships between humans, then our relationship with the rest of nature can change.

However, my reservations with Bookchin’s arguments lie in following two concepts. One is the concept of domination; couldn’t a socially egalitarian society, free of social domination, exploit the Earth and nature too? What would Bookchin reply to this? He doesn’t seem to address this point which makes his claim less substantial.

Another criticism of mine lies in his evaluation of Deep Ecology. His main critiques stems from his dismissal of Deep Ecology’s ecobabble. I fully believe that Deep Ecology relies too much on the idea of ‘Self’ and “Earth wisdom” and ignores the social nature of humanity and the social origins of our present ecological crisis. However, wouldn’t it be fairly easy for critics to easily assume social ecology is guilty of the same type of jargon? How can he provide an argument against this?

But, more importantly, I believe that Bookchin has cautiously detailed a rational and inter-disciplinary philosophy which he strongly upholds and defends. Thus, social ecology presents a more reliable and sound argument than deep ecology. Social Ecology’s best argument lies in the forward-looking nature and notion of responsibility inherent; thus emphasizing re-individualization that can transform humans into active agents in remaking society.

Is Hierarchy Necessary for Human Societies?

I am critical of Bookchin’s assertion that hierarchy is the root of our environmental problems because of his lack of comparative evidence with his utopia. His goal is to destroy hierarchy and have humanity be equal with the environment (Bookchin 242). I am skeptical of the removal of hierarchy because of Bookchin’s lack of societal examples, and his evidence of hierarchy throughout human culture (Bookchin 246). While Bookchin’s argument of re- individualization strengthens the offense against hierarchy, it does not do so adequately because of the vague nature of the concept. It would be more convincing if Bookchin gave a process to this transformation.

Bookchin focuses on a primarily negative view of hierarchy, and does not examine its possible benefits, such as societal order. Considering the history of hierarchy, I would argue that nature selects for such a system, and that Bookchin’s utopia could be unsustainable. If every human were to be conceptually “re-individualized” and had a powerful empathy with the oppressed of the world, would they follow “social ecology”? How will a human group remove hierarchical values and how would their symbiotic society function? These are questions that Bookchin considers but only gives optimal answers for without considering negative alternatives.

I believe that a social ecology could occur, but that it will break down, as hierarchy manifests itself again in human nature. I do not believe that hierarchy can be destroyed but at the same time I do not want to believe that humanity’s true nature is to dominate. While Bookchin’s argument progresses the understanding of human domination in environmental problems, I believe he demonizes it too early, without weighing the pros and the cons in comparison to his utopia.

The arguments of Richard Watson raise two main points which lead to a valid challenge to the ecological philosophy of many anti-anthropocentric biocentrism views. The first point Watson makes of George Sessions view, particularly his contention of the intrinsic value found in ecological equilibrium raises an important question of the extent to which value can be placed on nature itself. More importantly, he raises an even greater question challenging the ecosophy view of what the ultimate goal of human life is.
As Watson points out, the concept of human’s role in nature as superior does not have to result in a destructive end. It may very well result in that but it seems to be presumptuous to say that human beings as actors in nature should not be considered apart of it. I especially like his argument contending the ecosophy view that humans should not change the ecology of the planet. Since humans are as much a part of nature as a rat or fish, they should be able to do what they are naturally capable of doing. That includes thinking and utilizing their rationality to better themselves and their lives. The goal of humanity will never be to simply end its existence, but like Watson said it could very well end up happening. In that light, I am all for humans being allowed to live within their natural disposition and act within their nature. If it is within human nature to ultimately destroy itself than let it happen. We cannot change human nature to suite a desired outcome in our dealings with the environment. It seems if we tried to we would end up in the same position if we hadn’t tried.
What is to say that we cannot work in light of human nature and go with the very relationships that define humanity? Humans should utalyze their rational faculties to improve their relationship with the environment. It only seems natural to go this route.
The second argument made by Watson challenging Spinoza’s contention that the ultimate good of humanity to arrive at a greater understanding of nature. It does not seem to be the ultimate goal of humanity being as most people don’t do it. Moreover, just because it would bring you joy to realize a greater understanding of nature, does not mean that it is the ultimate end of humanity. It is dangerous to associate such sweeping assumptions to an argument for an ecological ethic. It made sense for Watson to contest this point and it is perfectly logical to assume human nature is contrary to that which Spinoza posits.

Anti-Anthropocentric Ethics

I believe that Watson’s position against ecosophy fails to recognize certain counterarguments. He says that according to ecosophy, nature is natural only when human beings are not present or restraining their natural behavior, and that this assumes that humans are separate from nature. I would argue that nature is as it should be when no one species is causing astronomical and devastating effects on the environment—it just happens to be that humans are that species, and it would be just as bad an action if it were done by any other species. He also says that other species are morally neutral and their behavior can be neither good nor bad, but that the moral evaluation of human behavior sets humans apart. I might argue that each species has its own unique characteristics that distinguish it from others, for example, human morality. On one level, certainly, all species are different, but on a much deeper lever perhaps all things are one. One might also say, to make things a bit more equal, that an action of any species can be bad or wrong, and that no behavior is morally neutral; however, any animals, not just humans, that are able to understand the moral significance of their actions ought to be held responsible for any wrong actions, and in this way the division is not made between nonhumans and humans, it just happens to lie there as far as we know. Watson also says that it is the nature of humans to flourish at the expense of other species and the planet’s ecology. From this position, I am led to assume that he believes that this nature is inherent in humans; however, I believe that there can be, and have been, individuals and even societies who do not live by causing massive destruction. If this nature can be separated from the human, then it is not inherent, and so should not serve as a reason why such destruction is a natural part of being a human being. Watson also comments that humans alter things, and that this is their destiny and nature’s way. It might be any being’s nature to alter things a bit, but I do not see evidence that humans inherently must cause a large scale of devastation to the planet. In addition, just because it is does not mean that it ought to be. Slavery, at a time, was widely accepted, but just because it existed does not mean that it ought to have existed. Even if humans do tend to ruin their environment, it does not mean that they ought to, let alone that their very tendency to damage their surroundings gives them the right to ruin them.